Prince of Wales in front

[Mostlyharmless]

I don't know if this has been discussed before but Tovey ordered Holland to Denmark Straits. What if he had explicitly ordered Holland to place Prince of Wales in front of Hood when going into action whilst saying that there was no need for Holland to shift his flag? Holland obviously wouldn't have done this without an order but it seems like a good idea in retrospect and an explicit order copied to Prince of Wales would seem to avoid any suggestion of the Duke of Plaza Toro https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHnmWgv55ZU.

[paul.mercer]

If PoW had been placed in front of Hood and Bismarck had opened up on her as the leading ship Hood may have been able to make her turn in order to bring all her guns to bear then perhaps the battle may have gone a different way, quite possibly with PE receiving a few 14" or 15" shells which could have put her out of action or at least severely damage her, leaving Bismarck having to fight two capital ships on her own. If this was the case then Lutyens would have probably tried to use his speed to break off the action, although whether he would have abandoned PE and run is debatable.
Whatever he decides it doesn't look good for the German ships.

[hans zurbriggen]

Hello Mr. Mostlyharmless, hello Mr.Mercer,
I remember I have read here that German 'fighting instructions', in case of confrontation against multiple units, foresaw to open fire on vessel carrying the largest guns, therefore Hood would have been targeted anyway.
IMHO, having Hood no immunity against German WWII 38 cm guns at any distance, risk for her was extremely high in any case.

hans

[paul.mercer]

Hi Hans,
Thanks for your reply, as you say Hood had the largest guns (in calibre) but PoW being a 'full blown' battleship with 10x14" guns in my opinion would probably be considered the more dangerous ship particularly as the Germans had no idea of her gunnery problems. Pre war, Hood had achieved a reputation of being the largest and possibly the most powerful ship in the world and that reputation might have persuaded Bismarck to open fire on her first no matter whether she was in the battle line, but I think that the usual procedure would be to open up on the leading ship, no matter which one it was.

[hans zurbriggen]

Hello Mr.Mercer,
I respectfully disagree: it was not a matter of danger perception but of engaging rules.
Bismarck opened fire against Rodney on May 27 (because of largest guns) despite KGV was HF flagship and was slightly closer to her.

IMHO, only chance for Hood not to be targeted, is in case of explicit orders from Tovey to Holland to engage with PoW only, keeping Hood far from her and joining once PoW and Bismarck are already fully engaged at short distance: a very unlikely scenario.

hans

[paul.mercer]

Thanks for that Hans,
You are probably correct in your reasoning, for all her faults, Rodney was still a very powerful ship, although I do wonder if Lutyens, having 'seen off' one KG class battleship, decided that Rodney was a far more dangerous proposition and opened up on her first?

[Byron Angel]

AIUI, Adm Holland was greatly concerned about the vulnerability of Hood's mediocre deck protection to long-range plunging fire; hence his high approach speed and extremely sharp early approach angle which resulted in Hood's aft main battery turrets initially being unable to bear upon the approaching Lutjens. In such a case, leading the approach made sense as it would have remove Hood from the danger of plunging fire at the earliest possible moment. Hood also still probably had a knot or two in hand over PoW's best speed.

FWIW.

B

[Steve Crandell]

Didn't the formation leader traditionally lead the formation in the RN? Under the circumstances, especially knowing that PoW had a green crew, Holland might very well have felt that he would look like a coward if he switched places with the newer ship.

[Byron Angel]

Didn't the formation leader traditionally lead the formation in the RN? Under the circumstances, especially knowing that PoW had a green crew, Holland might very well have felt that he would look like a coward if he switched places with the newer ship.

Hi Steve,
Agreed. I'm pretty confident that all those considerations had to have been carefully weighed by Holland.

Byron

[marcelo_malara]

Didn't the formation leader traditionally lead the formation in the RN? Under the circumstances, especially knowing that PoW had a green crew, Holland might very well have felt that he would look like a coward if he switched places with the newer ship.

Hi Steve,
Agreed. I'm pretty confident that all those considerations had to have been carefully weighed by Holland.

Byron

In the age of sail there would have been no objection on the flag not being on front. In fact the admiral of a big fleet would be in the center of the main, not even the viceadmiral leading the van would be at the front of it.

[wadinga]

Hello All,

For smaller formations the practicality of follow-my-leader means the elimination of much unnecessary signalling. Hipper and Beatty, for instance, led with their flagships, although as when HMS Lion circled involuntarily, this could create some confusion. At Jutland, in the main action, where many more ships were involved in the line of battle,(as in the days of sail), it would be more practical for the C-in-C to be placed somewhere in the middle so visual signals could be relayed simultaneously to the extremities, especially when visibility was poor. This meant telling the leading ship where to go as "Guide of the Fleet".

Even at Trafalgar, many British officers considered it unwise for C-in-C Nelson in HMS Victory to lead since if she were disabled early in the fight, he would lose control of the fleet, and the matter of cowardice or excessive bravado did not come into it.

In previous threads, we have uncovered the actual letter where Tovey, employing a massive dollop of hindsight, belatedly suggested he should have "instructed" Holland to lead with PoW. Such "Wise after the event" recriminations are fairly pointless, IMHO, and presuppose knowledge of German targetting choices and their strict adherence to "rules" about calibre. Since, at Denmark Straits, until the first British salvoes landed, most senior German officers thought they were engaging cruisers, strictures about engaging a ship whose calibre was 1" larger than the other would be difficult to apply.

Tovey, employing his "Wise after the Event" logic, did later order Somerville not to assault Bismarck with his tinclad HMS Renown unless his own Home Fleet battleships were already engaged.

Byron's observation about Holland's decision to close as rapidly as possible is, of course, spot-on, but I consider this was mainly to give PoW's gunners (and his own) the best chances of hitting and slowing the enemy, since escape from the superior numbers of RN ships would be his preferred choice. Weaker deck armour was a concern for Holland, but detailed knowledge and consideration of immunity zones would surely be ignored in the heat of battle, since it was a dice roll as to whether one was hit at all, or where precisely projectiles might land and whether they would perform as designed.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

In the age of sail there would have been no objection on the flag not being on front. In fact the admiral of a big fleet would be in the center of the main, not even the vice admiral leading the van would be at the front of it.

I agree, Marcelo.
I'm sure you are quite familiar with the cumbersome nature of trying to command a fleet of 30 or 40 warships formed in a battle line that might be up to 8 or 9 miles long. Even with the admiral's flagship positioned in the center squadron, the best means of distributing signals through a deployed fleet required use of a parallel line of "repeating ships" (typically frigates) to copy the signals made by the admiral's flagship and pass them to one another up and down the line so that all the line-of-battleships could clearly see them. This could indeed be a time-consuming process with a large fleet. If the admiral was leading the line, the repeating process could only go in one direction and would consequently take much longer to accomplish.

Nelson's success at Trafalgar (IMO) derived from the following -
( a ) the captains under his command had (generally speaking) been so well indoctrinated in his basic principles of tactics and command;
( b ) his plan at Trafalgar was so simple in conception;
( c ) his opponents were so inferior in general quality;
that few if any signals were found necessary after the action was under way.

A great and unquestionably brave commander, Nelson.


Byron

[marcelo_malara]

I agree, Marcelo.
I'm sure you are quite familiar with the cumbersome nature of trying to command a fleet of 30 or 40 warships formed in a battle line that might be up to 8 or 9 miles long. Even with the admiral's flagship positioned in the center squadron, the best means of distributing signals through a deployed fleet required use of a parallel line of "repeating ships" (typically frigates) to copy the signals made by the admiral's flagship and pass them to one another up and down the line so that all the line-of-battleships could clearly see them. This could indeed be a time-consuming process with a large fleet. If the admiral was leading the line, the repeating process could only go in one direction and would consequently take much longer to accomplish.

Nelson's success at Trafalgar (IMO) derived from the following -
( a ) the captains under his command had (generally speaking) been so well indoctrinated in his basic principles of tactics and command;
( b ) his plan at Trafalgar was so simple in conception;
( c ) his opponents were so inferior in general quality;
that few if any signals were found necessary after the action was under way.

A great and unquestionably brave commander, Nelson.


Byron

Hi Byron. Yes, I am aware of the first. For the second, yes, I agree too. Nelson´s approach head on to a line of battleships presenting its full battery for fire would be suicidal, except of course if it was a far inferior enemy.

[Byron Angel]

Hi Marcelo,
Apologies if my previous post sounded a bit pedantic. I went through all the nuts and bolts on repeating ships for the benefit of others who might not have been completely familiar.

Re Nelson’s column approach at Trafalgar, some observations I’ve made from studying the battle -

AIUI -

Wind on the day of battle was very light. Even carrying all possible sails (including studding sails) HMS Victory, sailing directly before the wind, is recorded as having made only about 1.75 knots in her approach.

Although the wind was very light, there was a heavy sea swell moving with the wind. This swell was an early indicator of the heavy gale that would strike that night after the battle. This swell was striking Villeneuve’s line broadside and causing his ships to roll considerably. This roll is said to have caused much of their fire to go high.

A somewhat murky issue relate to use of gunlocks versus old-fashioned burning linstock fuzes to fire the guns. By 1805, we know the mechanical gunlock was in widespread use in the RN. We know the gunlock was known to the French Navy as early as 1780 (per Boudriot), but I do not know how widely issued it was within the fleet. Usage of the gunlock by the Spanish Navy is a mystery to me. Any data on this gunlock usage by the French and Spanish would me most appreciated.

Byron

[Byron Angel]

Hi Marcelo,
Apologies if my previous post sounded a bit pedantic. I went through all the nuts and bolts on repeating ships for the benefit of others who might not have been completely familiar.

Re Nelson’s column approach at Trafalgar, some observations I’ve made from studying the battle -

AIUI -

Wind on the day of battle was very light. Even carrying all possible sails (including studding sails) HMS Victory, sailing directly before the wind, is recorded as having made only about 1.75 knots in her approach.

Although the wind was very light, there was a heavy sea swell moving with the wind - an early indicator of the heavy gale that would strike that night after the battle. This swell was striking Villeneuve’s line broadside and causing his ships to roll considerably, which is said to have caused much of their fire to go high.

A somewhat murky issue relates to use of gunlocks versus old-fashioned burning linstock fuzes to fire the guns. By 1805, we know the mechanical gunlock was in widespread use in the RN. We know the gunlock was known to the French Navy as early as 1780 (per Boudriot), but I do not know how widely issued it was within the fleet. Use of the gunlock by the Spanish Navy is a complete mystery to me. Any data on gunlock usage by the French and Spanish would me most appreciated.

Byron