Byron Angel wrote: ↑Fri Apr 07, 2023 4:02 pm
Hi Marcelo,
Apologies if my previous post sounded a bit pedantic. I went through all the nuts and bolts on repeating ships for the benefit of others who might not have been completely familiar.
Re Nelson’s column approach at Trafalgar, some observations I’ve made from studying the battle -
AIUI -
Wind on the day of battle was very light. Even carrying all possible sails (including studding sails) HMS Victory, sailing directly before the wind, is recorded as having made only about 1.75 knots in her approach.
Although the wind was very light, there was a heavy sea swell moving with the wind - an early indicator of the heavy gale that would strike that night after the battle. This swell was striking Villeneuve’s line broadside and causing his ships to roll considerably, which is said to have caused much of their fire to go high.
A somewhat murky issue relates to use of gunlocks versus old-fashioned burning linstock fuzes to fire the guns. By 1805, we know the mechanical gunlock was in widespread use in the RN. We know the gunlock was known to the French Navy as early as 1780 (per Boudriot), but I do not know how widely issued it was within the fleet. Use of the gunlock by the Spanish Navy is a complete mystery to me. Any data on gunlock usage by the French and Spanish would me most appreciated.
Byron
No need to apologize my friend! There is no offense in your words.
Back to Trafalgar, may be that Nelson took in account the rolling of the enemy ships, for sure that would be a sign of ability. Anyway his was a hazardous approach, and I am pretty sure he would not have done so if the abilities of his enemies were not suspect. The very low speed you mentioned would make it more dangerous, his fleet would need 20 minutes to sail the last 1000 m (my estimate of effective gunnery range) before veering parallel to the enemy.
About Spanish artillery, the Spanish literature is not quiet as abundant as the British about the age of sail. For sure I don´t know an equivalent to Lavery´s Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War. May be Jose Rico can answer that.
marcelo_malara wrote: ↑Fri Apr 07, 2023 5:50 pm
Back to Trafalgar, may be that Nelson took in account the rolling of the enemy ships, for sure that would be a sign of ability. Anyway his was a hazardous approach, and I am pretty sure he would not have done so if the abilities of his enemies were not suspect. The very low speed you mentioned would make it more dangerous, his fleet would need 20 minutes to sail the last 1000 m (my estimate of effective gunnery range) before veering parallel to the enemy.
About Spanish artillery, the Spanish literature is not quiet as abundant as the British about the age of sail. For sure I don´t know an equivalent to Lavery´s Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War. May be Jose Rico can answer that.
Regards
Hi Marcelo,
I agree with all your comments re Nelson's tactical acumen. If the opponent had been an equally competent force, I doubt that Nelson would ever have risked such a rash maneuver.
Re Spanish artillery, there is a book 'en espanol' that I acquired a few years ago - "Navios de la Real Armada 1700 - 1860" by Enrique Garcia-Torralba Perez.
My Spanish language skills are sadly < zero, but what little I have been able to decipher suggests that it must contain some good information on Spanish ordnance. Does it make sense for me to send you photos of a couple of page images for you to review?
Meanwhile, Sr Perez has apparently been working together with authors Rif Winfield and John Tredrea to produce a book in English entitled "Spanish Warships in the Age of Sail 1700 - 1860"; this book is due for release on 15 June 2023. I have it on order from Amazon.
marcelo_malara wrote: ↑Fri Apr 07, 2023 5:50 pm
Back to Trafalgar, may be that Nelson took in account the rolling of the enemy ships, for sure that would be a sign of ability. Anyway his was a hazardous approach, and I am pretty sure he would not have done so if the abilities of his enemies were not suspect. The very low speed you mentioned would make it more dangerous, his fleet would need 20 minutes to sail the last 1000 m (my estimate of effective gunnery range) before veering parallel to the enemy.
About Spanish artillery, the Spanish literature is not quiet as abundant as the British about the age of sail. For sure I don´t know an equivalent to Lavery´s Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War. May be Jose Rico can answer that.
Regards
Hi Marcelo,
I agree with all your comments re Nelson's tactical acumen. If the opponent had been an equally competent force, I doubt that Nelson would ever have risked such a rash maneuver.
Re Spanish artillery, there is a book 'en espanol' that I acquired a few years ago - "Navios de la Real Armada 1700 - 1860" by Enrique Garcia-Torralba Perez.
My Spanish language skills are sadly < zero, but what little I have been able to decipher suggests that it must contain some good information on Spanish ordnance. Does it make sense for me to send you photos of a couple of page images for you to review?
Meanwhile, Sr Perez has apparently been working together with authors Rif Winfield and John Tredrea to produce a book in English entitled "Spanish Warships in the Age of Sail 1700 - 1860"; this book is due for release on 15 June 2023. I have it on order from Amazon.
Gentlemen,
Going back to the original question about putting PoW in front of Hood, it would have been interesting to see if history would have been changed!
paul.mercer wrote: ↑Wed Apr 12, 2023 8:56 am
Gentlemen,
Going back to the original question about putting PoW in front of Hood, it would have been interesting to see if history would have been changed!
If one leaves aside the customs, conventions and traditions of the service, all sorts of strange tactics suggest themselves.
What if PoW takes the lead and engages Bismarck with her forward turrets while making smoke to cover Hood's advance on PoW's port quarter? When range is reduced to a satisfactory distance, PoW ceases making smoke and allows Hood to forge ahead.
Admittedly, this sort of outlandish scheme is concocted on the basis of historical hindsight, but it might be interesting as a tabletop wargame exercise.
Hi Byron.
I think that manoeuvre would have been highly dangerous for both ships, particularly when Hood overtakes PoW as Bismarck's gunners will have (for a short time) two ships fairly close together to shoot at with any 'Overs' on the first ship possibly hitting the other one, also would PoW making smoke interfere with Hoods gunnery?
However, if they did pull it off, things would not look too good for PE and Bismarck, especially as PE was the leading ship and would have been fired on first, (as she was in the actual battle). If that had happened, I've often wondered how many 14" &15" shell it would have taken to either sink or put even a large Cruiser like PE out of action?
paul.mercer wrote: ↑Fri Apr 14, 2023 8:40 am
Hi Byron.
I think that manoeuvre would have been highly dangerous for both ships, particularly when Hood overtakes PoW as Bismarck's gunners will have (for a short time) two ships fairly close together to shoot at with any 'Overs' on the first ship possibly hitting the other one, also would PoW making smoke interfere with Hoods gunnery?
However, if they did pull it off, things would not look too good for PE and Bismarck, especially as PE was the leading ship and would have been fired on first, (as she was in the actual battle). If that had happened, I've often wondered how many 14" &15" shell it would have taken to either sink or put even a large Cruiser like PE out of action?
Hi Paul,
Good point re a period of target overlap as HOOD overtook PoW. I had not considered that.
Re PoW's smokescreen - given that the intention was to hide HOOD from BISMARCK until she got into her plunging fire immune zone, yes it would almost certainly have prevented HOOD from shooting.
hans zurbriggen wrote: ↑Fri Mar 31, 2023 3:23 pm
Hello Mr. Mostlyharmless, hello Mr.Mercer,
I remember I have read here that German 'fighting instructions', in case of confrontation against multiple units, foresaw to open fire on vessel carrying the largest guns, therefore Hood would have been targeted anyway.
...
The problem here is when did the Germans actually identify the two British ships? Initially they were reported to be cruisers not battleships.
Hello Mr. lwd,
Germans were uncertain for a while: on Prinz Eugen, according to Jasper, he never understood he was fighting battleships, but apparently Brinkmann did; according to Baron also aboard Bismarck it took a while, at least until British open fire, but not later.
Anyway, at least Lütjens understood he was under fire of 2 heavy units at 05:52 (see his message to Group West) and he re-assigned first ship as target to Prinz Eugen already at 05:55 (see PG battlemap), thus identifying Hood, at same time, as priority target vs King George V battleship.
That's why I don't believe Prince of Wales in front of Hood would have changed much in terms of probabilities, at least with British ships sailing close together as they were.
I personally think it would have as Hoods destruction was the result of a very low probability hit. Given the changing configuration and timing that particular hit is not likely to reoccur. Given how close Hoods first salvo was to Eugen and the odds on her fighting top not being taken out early (in a sense all hits are low probability events) Eugen taking severe damage seems likely and Bismarck taking more damage does as well. If the Germans do concentrate on Hood she's like to take significant damage as well but the odds on a catastrophic loss are pretty low IMO. That said I'm not an expert and saying someone should or could have done x to avoid an event that's highly unlikely is less than satisfying.
Hello Mr. lwd,
I was speaking in pure statistical terms: inverting position between Hood and PoW would not have changed probabilities of Hood being destroyed in 5 minutes, because Bismarck, based on German practice, would probably have open fire against Hood anyway.
Of course, you are right, any change in actual development of battle would give a different outcome, even repeating same battle with Hood ahead of PoW several times.
Repetition may get to Hood exploding after just 1 minutes (extremely "lucky" hit) or after 1 hours fire (extremely "unlucky" fall of shots for Bismarck), but fact that Hood was not totally immune to Bismarck fire at any distance would not have changed much in terms of statistically expected theoretical outcome.
However, British ships might have hit Bismarck in meantime, impairing her gunnery, therefore you are right that actual outcome may have changed.
While Hood wasn't immune the probability of catastrophic destruction was quite low. Look at all the work that went into trying to figure out exactly what happened and the fact that there was no definitive answer. Bismarck and Eugen were lucky to survive much less win the Battle of Denmark Straits. Also note that if Bismarck takes any serious damage the RN has a couple of cruisers that can join the fight.
Hello Mr. lwd,
Probability of catastrophic hit for Hood was low, but not negligible.
I think best work on such matter is from M. Santarini, an admiral, gunnery and weapons performances specialist, working at NATO, in his book 'Bismarck and Hood', where he statistically calculated number of salvoes needed to 'ensure' Hood destruction, based on vulnerable area in Hood hull.
He concluded that Bismarck hit was actually 'lucky' (5th full salvo) but not so much, because at 40th full salvo (around 30 minutes battle, 320 shells expended), under same geometric and kinematic conditions as per 5th salvo, probability of catastrophic magazine explosion was 0,95 (almost certain).
Even without catastrophic hit, Hood machinery (very wide area) was vulnerable to Bismarck fire and Hood could have been put out of action or left behind, while, once on a parallel course, the whole Hood vertical protection was not immune to 15" @ 15 km distance.
Of course this is just hypothetical, because, as you correctly say, actual outcome of such battle may have been different.
hans zurbriggen wrote: ↑Wed Sep 13, 2023 8:10 am
Hello Mr. lwd,
Probability of catastrophic hit for Hood was low, but not negligible.
I think best work on such matter is from M. Santarini, an admiral, gunnery and weapons performances specialist, working at NATO, in his book 'Bismarck and Hood', where he statistically calculated number of salvoes needed to 'ensure' Hood destruction, based on vulnerable area in Hood hull.
He concluded that Bismarck hit was actually 'lucky' (5th full salvo) but not so much, because at 40th full salvo (around 30 minutes battle, 320 shells expended), under same geometric and kinematic conditions as per 5th salvo, probability of catastrophic magazine explosion was 0,95 (almost certain).
Even without catastrophic hit, Hood machinery (very wide area) was vulnerable to Bismarck fire and Hood could have been put out of action or left behind, while, once on a parallel course, the whole Hood vertical protection was not immune to 15" @ 15 km distance.
Of course this is just hypothetical, because, as you correctly say, actual outcome of such battle may have been different.
hans
Thanks for the reference. I'll have to look up that.
My guess as to what would have happened with PoW leading would be that both Hood and PoW take considerable damage but Bismarck and possibly Eugen do as well before the German ships disengage. Bismarck can't afford to take too much damage even to sink to RN battleships and if Hood is left behind and PoW has the issues she did with her main guns I suspect she'd disengage as well. But as history has proven lucky can have a huge impact on engagements like this. For instance I seem to recall a shell from Bismarck ending up in a rather critical location of PoW but not exploding. So PoW wasn't immune to critical hits either. Bismarck's fate after the battle shows she was also susceptible to them.
