Hiroshima and Olimpic

[tnemelckram]

Hi Bgile and lwd!

1. Bgile

I like your informed and impartial account of employment of terror in WWII. The Germans also earned their place on the list. To keep this on topic, I put a brief digression about the Russians in a footnote.*

However, the kind of equivalence or natural progression you posit was not part of the moral calculus at the time. The bomb was regarded as different from and a quantum leap ahead of such tactics at the time. Truman used words to the effect that the bomb was new and terrible and perhaps a several hundredfold increase in destructive capacity. In fact the increase was greater when you consider that one plane could deliver what formerly required several hundred and the bomb was I think 15,000 tons of TNT vs. the former largest bomb which I think was 10,000 lbs.
The bomb was regarded as a completely different animal to such a degree that it gave rise to moral qualms about crossing the threshold. Here are three points or clarifications:

1. The whole point of using the bomb was the likelihood that the Japanese would recognize it as upping the ante several hundred times over the firebombings such as Tokyo (145,000 dead), not as the same or a normal progression. That should induce a surrender.

2. I'm not out to criticize Truman's morals. He had to make a tough decision of enormous consequence. He recognized that the decision had a moral aspect and weighed that in making his decision. That makes him a basically decent person whose decision was not the result of some flaw in character. The simple fact that he recognized a moral issue with enough weight to give him pause and balance in his decision shows that there was a known and significant moral issue.

3. I don't have a problem with the way the bomb was used if the demonstration bomb proved to be ineffective. I'm saying that the demonstration bomb was a known alternative that presented an opportunity to have our cake and eat it too. If it caused a surrender, then the world (Russians) would still know we had it while we enjoyed high moral standing instead of being the only nation to use it in anger. If they don't surrender, proceed with No. 2 on Hiroshima and No. 3 on Nagasaki, and say there's more where they came from (without adding "in December"). We would be where we ended up anyway with higher moral ground in addition - at least we tried.

4. Perhaps it comes down to the cost of the delay time while Japan mulls it over versus the long term political benefits of higher moral ground. I posited two weeks but one week would work instead. I can't recall any operations that required a substantial number of US or UK troops to be in active ground combat. The ground forces were preparing for the November invasion, the AAF and Navy were bombing strategic and tactical targets, and the Navy was bombarding the shore. In three months, the next operation will again put a significant number of lives at risk. So it seems the cost boils down to the weekly casualties from the AAF and Navy operations, or the lost weekly benefit if those operations are suspended to avoid the casualties.

2. lwd

1. My proposed demonstration will get full effect from a big audience without pre announcement. Drop it in Tokyo Bay 3-5 miles offshore of Tokyo and its ready audience of 10 million or the Inland Sea and the 5 million in Osaka and Kobe. Someone should notice. I've picked the largest population clusters for the biggest possible audience.
The common purpose of a demonstration bomb or a bomb dropped on a target is to cause the civil population to demand its government to surrender. Both cases call for the biggest possible audience and then that large crowd of newly convinced people has to be near the seat of government and still alive to have full desired effect. However, because Hiroshima and Nagasaki were small cities in isolated locations surrounded by mountains, together they could only offer an audience of about 800,000; after subtracting the dead relatively few witnesses remain in these cities far from the capital, which along with the fact that there was no pre announcement, limited the effect instead of having full effect. So:
(1) Both bombs have the same purpose and will meet it by having the same effect, but you impose different and greater effect requirements on a demonstration bomb.
(2) To achieve full effect, you further require a demonstration bomb to have the largest possible audience. However, when the same effect would serve the same purpose, the two actual bombs were not dropped where they would have the largest audience.
(3) You say that the largest possible audience requires a demonstration bomb to be announced ahead of time, which is an obviously impossible requirement. Again, the two actual bombs served the same purpose without preannouncement.

2. If the demo was misinterpreted as unwillingness to use, that would be corrected when the next one was actually used. And there was a third one available.

3. I didn't say it was fallacious to end the war. That would be a ridiculous thing for me to say. What I said was it was fallacious to attach great significance to one or two weeks under the circumstances. See 3 and 4 in my post to Bgile above for more.

4. As to the risk of casualties, see 3 and 4 to Bgile above.




_______________________________________
* Its hard to pinpoint a deliberate employment of these kind terror tactics as a matter of policy, but that's probably a result of circumstances rather than any aversion to it. The Russians fought most of the war on their territory an very little of it on German territory. They also did not focus on strategic bombing, probably as a matter of doctrine or allocation of resources. They did use terror to "encourage" their own population. There were atrocities when they entered Germany in 1945, but my impression is that these were driven from the bottom up instead of by some decree of policy from the top.

[José M. Rico]

Some people may take a different view on the Germans not using chemical weapons in WW2. The victims of the Auschwitz gas chambers for starters.

Oh, yes. I was thinking of the their use on the battlefield only.

[Bgile]

I'm not sure dropping the bomb in Tokyo Bay would cause less casualties than one dropped on a small city. Maybe it wasn't big enough to cause the kind of wave I'm thinking of.

[tnemelckram]

A tidal wave is a good thought. I don't know how it would complicate things but back then we might not know about that effect anyway. The wave would be impressive for demonstration purposes. I'm not averse to some casualties in a demonstration, just deliberately taking out a city without a demonstration first and the loss of moral authority and political benefits that come with it. Incidental or unexpected casualties resulting from a deliberate demonstration can hardly be viewed negatively.
I think no more than a few thousand would be acceptable.

I don't think an airburst would be good because people might not know what it was.

Maybe use a small sparsely populated or military island in the Inland Sea within sight of Osaka and Kobe.

[lwd]

Thinking things over a bit more. The object wasn't to convince the Japanese that they couldn't win they already knew that. The point was to convince their leadership that Japan would be destroyed with little they could do about it and failing that to do so. In that regards a demonstration bomb might be taken as indicating that the US was reluctant to do so. If the Japanese leadership was unconvinced it just meant that it would take longer to acomplish the task.

[tnemelckram]

Hi lwd!

The reason why I raised the demonstration v. actual use question was the hope of narrowing down the
relevant issues and considerations known at the time that affect the decision. As you have noted, I started by trying to preempt some of the shorthand reasons and peer behind them.

Thanks for your just above response because it helps frame an good issue. Do we want to impress the general population (as I say) or the leaders (as you have just said)?

This adds to what I think is another issue: what was the real effect of a 1-2 week delay for the demonstration in terms of lives endangered or adverse effect on operations? See items 3 and 4 of my further above response to Bgile.

Bgile brought out another one about the tidal wave. What problems will there by with demonstration side effects and how does that factor into making the demonstration convincing as well as have the audience know what was being demonstrated?

[tnemelckram]

A couple of "original Sources" indicating that the moral issues and their after effect were known and a factor in the decision.

Truman's Diaries: http://www.doug-long.com/hst.htm

Navy Undersecretary Bard's 6-27-45 Memorandum: http://www.doug-long.com/bard.htm

[RF]

A tidal wave is a good thought.

But you have no real control over, to describe it correctly, a seismic wave. Presumably an underwater explosion would be required - but to be sure of effect a big explosion is required, and at that time the full consequences would not be understood. Too risky I think.

[lwd]

...
This adds to what I think is another issue: what was the real effect of a 1-2 week delay for the demonstration in terms of lives endangered or adverse effect on operations? See items 3 and 4 of my further above response to Bgile.

I suspect even 2 weeks is a bit of an underestimate. If the dropping a demostration bomb give the leadership hope that a better deal might be obtained they may well try to hold out longer. In this case there is a real problem after the third bomb is dropped. Further more the cost is not just in casualties to allied troops. There is the financial cost of the war and their is the continued cost to Japan in particular to the civilians there. 2 or even 1 week might cause more additional casualties than dropping the bomb.

Bgile brought out another one about the tidal wave. What problems will there by with demonstration side effects and how does that factor into making the demonstration convincing as well as have the audience know what was being demonstrated?

I think a Tsunami is highy unlikely unless the bomb is detonated quite a distance under water. Certainly not enough was know at the time to intentionally cause one and I suspect there would have been considerable reluctance to do so as they might have consideralble negative effects on the allies as well.

[Bgile]

I don't think the explosion was anywhere near enough to cause a tsunami. I just meant it would cause a big wave which might cause as many deaths as the Hiroshima bomb if you set it off in Tokyo Bay.

[lwd]

... I just meant it would cause a big wave which might cause as many deaths as the Hiroshima bomb if you set it off in Tokyo Bay.

It would probably depend on where it was initiated and how high. Here are two cases that might be used as analogies. In the Texas City case I suspect the explosive was ~1KT not quite sure how to translate amonium nitrate into TNT especially sense not all of it exploded but there was some decompositon and the hull was sealed which also allowed force to build up within.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halifax_Explosion
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_City_Disaster

The Halifax explosion was apparently around 3 KT. Based on these two examples and the that the bomb would probably have been an airburst at a significant altitude I suspect the direct fatalities would have been pretty low. Not sure what the subsequent fires would have done however especially as Tokyo had alread been bombed fairly heavily.

Here are maps to the same scale for Tokyo and Halifax. Tokyo Bay is considerably larger that combined with the burst at altitude vs surface makes me think that fatalities wouldn't be much higher if at all even with the more powereful exposion.
http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=w ... yo%20japan
http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl

[tnemelckram]

Hi Bgile, lwd and RF:

I'm going to try to respond to both of your above three posts that ably explore what I think are some of the real issues with demonstration bomb v. bomb used in earnest on a city.

1. lwd is concerned that dropping a demonstration bomb will give the leadership hope that a better deal might be obtained if they hold out longer so there will be a real problem after the third bomb is dropped. I'm not proposing three demonstration bombs. I''m proposing one demonstration bomb, followed by 1-2 weeks for the leadership to consider it, and if they opt to hold out as lwd suggests, then use the next two on city targets as was done historically. If you end up using all three in that manner and order, the last two examples would shatter any such hopes raised by the demonstration bomb. It's hard to argue that a plan based on the strength of the use of the second and third bombs on populated cities is inadequate to meet this contingency. Although it requires hindsight, we know that use of two in earnest was enough historically. However, it is easy to foresee that the latter two examples would replace the earlier example as reality.

2. lwd and RF are concerned, in turn, about continued cost to Japanese civilians of and the riskiness of a demonstration bomb. I don't think that the continued cost or risk to the enemy is a relevant concern. The only relevant concern is whether the long term U.S. political position would have been stronger by creating a factual record that precludes later questioning about morality. And if you flip it around, it's hard to say that the ongoing conventional operations would have inflicted more damage on Japan in 1-2 weeks than the atomic bombs did. Which leads to the next point.

3. The real issue is the cost to our side, which seems to come down to the cost of the 1-2 week delay time while Japan mulls it over. I'm interested in your comments about:
(a) Whether there were any ongoing operations requiring a substantial number of Allied troops
to be in active ground combat over the next 1-2 weeks. I can't think of any.
(b) Whether an accurate summary of operations over the next 1-2 weeks would have ground
forces preparing for the November invasion, the AAF and Navy bombing strategic and
tactical targets, and the Navy bombarding the shore.
(c) Whether the invasion would be the next time a significant number of lives were risked.
(d) What military benefit would be obtained, and how many casualties were likely, from those
AAF and Navy operations over the next 1-2 weeks.
Since the invasion preparations could continue without risking lives or losing time, it seems the ultimate cost of a 1-2 week delay boils down to the weekly casualties from the AAF and Navy operations, or the lost weekly benefit if those operations are suspended to avoid the casualties.

4.lwd provides some good insight on the probability of a tidal wave and extent of other destruction from a demonstration bomb over Tokyo Bay, based on some examples. Basically he seems to say that an air burst would not produce such a wave, a ground burst probably would not, and only an underwater detonation would make this likely. This rings true to me. A few thousand incidental casualties would be acceptable if everything else shows demonstrative intent; on the other hand you want millions of witnesses to see and understand what they saw. What does everybody think about the following:
(a) Even though these witnesses had never seen such a thing before, would they know that
an airburst over water 3-5 miles was a bomb exploding? They might confuse it with
natural or supernatural phenomena.
(b) Assuming they knew it was a bomb, would it be clear that the explosion was a thousand
times more destructive and terrible than the bombs they were used to?
(c) There would be a large number of ships and boats under the airburst. Would their
destruction be visible and adequate proof of the power of the bomb?
(d) Would positioning the airburst to include a small area of waterfront land with industrial
or military use be a better way to address this problem?
(e) How would the effects of a ground burst on the water surface differ from an air burst
and would ground burst effects make a better demonstration?
Some death and destruction may be an unavoidable part of an effective demonstration bomb.

[RF]

Really the only practical demonstration of the atomic bomb to the Japanese is to drop it on one of their cities, which was what was done. That is presumably why Hiroshima was targetted, and not Tokyo itself.

The above post is basically concerned with political correctness aspects to dropping the bomb, in conjunction with not predjucing American interests. I think Truman made the right decision and history has borne this out.

[lwd]

...
1. lwd is concerned that dropping a demonstration bomb will give the leadership hope that a better deal might be obtained if they hold out longer so there will be a real problem after the third bomb is dropped. I'm not proposing three demonstration bombs.

I never thought you were..

I''m proposing one demonstration bomb, followed by 1-2 weeks for the leadership to consider it, and if they opt to hold out as lwd suggests,

Not just as I suggest as history shows. If they didn't surrender after the first bomb dropped on a city why would they surrender after one was dropped as a demo?

If you end up using all three in that manner and order, the last two examples would shatter any such hopes raised by the demonstration bomb. It's hard to argue that a plan based on the strength of the use of the second and third bombs on populated cities is inadequate to meet this contingency.

Is it. Dropping the first bomb as a demo sends the following message:
"We can destroy you but we don't really want to, So you should surrender"
Dropping one on a real target says:
"We can and will destroy you if you don't surrender"
Even after two cities are destroyed this difference will still exist. Consider that there was a revolt to try and prevent the surrender even after Nagasaki. Also consider that the sort of nuance above is one that the Japanese culture would have predisposed them to consider.

Although it requires hindsight, we know that use of two in earnest was enough historically. However, it is easy to foresee that the latter two examples would replace the earlier example as reality.

No it's clear that the use of the first two in earnest was enough but not by a huge margin. It's not at all clear even now and less so back then that demo, real, real, would have been as effective as real, real. And the latter leaves the option of taking out another target with the third bomb.

2. lwd and RF are concerned, in turn, about continued cost to Japanese civilians of and the riskiness of a demonstration bomb. I don't think that the continued cost or risk to the enemy is a relevant concern.

I'm not really concerned with the risks to civilians of a demo drop. It's lower than any other option. However concern as to the cost to Japanese civilians was a legitimate concern under the rules of war and the referances you posted show that it was a concern both to Truman and at least in his opinion the people of the united states.

The only relevant concern is whether the long term U.S. political position would have been stronger by creating a factual record that precludes later questioning about morality.

No. There are many other relevant concerns. Leaving aside the ongoing costs to all concerned it was an important message to send that if we say we will do something we will do it and not necessarily give multiple and escalating warnings. It prevents people from missunderstanding and/or trying to game your reluctance to do something. IE Never pay Dane Geld.

And if you flip it around, it's hard to say that the ongoing conventional operations would have inflicted more damage on Japan in 1-2 weeks than the atomic bombs did.

No it's not. If you look at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of ... rld_War_II
and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bom ... d_Nagasaki
You will see that one raid vs Tokyo resulted in 88,000-97,000 dead and 120,000 + to over 200,000 casualties where the initial fatalities for the atomic bombs were 70,000 and 40,000-70,000. According to that site by the way the third bomb wouldn't be available until the third week in August so over a week from the historical 2nd city being hit and perhaps over two weeks as there was still some debate as to how to use them.

(b) Whether an accurate summary of operations over the next 1-2 weeks would have ground
forces preparing for the November invasion, the AAF and Navy bombing strategic and
tactical targets, and the Navy bombarding the shore.

Sounds about right.

(c) Whether the invasion would be the next time a significant number of lives were risked.

What is a significant number?

Since the invasion preparations could continue without risking lives or losing time,

No, invasion preparations are not risk free. The risk may be lower but military ops even during peace time are dangerous.

or the lost weekly benefit if those operations are suspended to avoid the casualties.

[/quote][/quote]
Suspend those ops and you are not only loosing the military advantages you are sending a message to Japan and not the one we want to send at that time.

[tnemelckram]

Hi RF!

The above post is basically concerned with political correctness aspects to dropping the bomb, in conjunction with not prejudicing American interests.

Your right, I'm trying to strike a balancing act but it's not driven by PC. I'm not critical of Truman as I explain in one of my above posts. He was troubled by his decision and that's about all you can ask of him from a PC point of view. I'm also willing to use them in earnest. But I do think that this was the best option at the time, and that you can reach that conclusion without using hindsight. As follows:

I think Truman made the right decision and history has borne this out.

I don't think it's that clear cut. History also shows that Proliferating nations have and still do claim that they need nuclear arms for protection and cite, among other excuses, the fact that they have already actually been used. This is the biggest long term security risk to the US that I have in mind. Since it was known at the time that several nations had programs, this long term consequence was foreseeable. The Soviets used hook and crook to get a bomb and their desire for one was evident in the way they pressed their claims to German knowledge before and during the Potsdam Conference..