Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

[Byron Angel]

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/i ... ers#M.G._8
Looking at the fixed mounting available for the F.Q. 2 rangefinder. The one man unit of the M.N. 1 and M.N. 2 seems abhorrent. It requires the operator to man-handle the train and elevation while trying to make a cut. I cannot see how they can be remotely useful on a rolling, pitching deck, where it is not easy to stand straight, let alone doing three other jobs at the same time.

Although M.Q. 1 mountings with a trainer exist, it is not clear when they were introduced.

>>>>> After hunting through some of my books, I found the following information (Per "The Battleship Dreadnought" by John Roberts):
Dreadnought's main control positions (as completed) were the foretop and a platform on the roof of the signal tower. As completed, each control position featured a 9ft FQ2 Barr & Stroud rangefinder on a MN-1 (or MN-2) mounting. My interpretation of the text is that communication between the Transmitting Station (T.S.) and the two control positions was by "navyphone" and voice-pipe only; while communication between T.S. and the turrets was on a completely independent circuit which utilized Vickers fire control instruments for transmission of range and deflection orders.

Here quoting Roberts (pg.31) -
"During 1912-13, the turrets were equipped for local control, whereby the sight-setting receivers could be operated from the officer's position at the rear of the turret., and "A" and "Y" turrets were equipped to serve as secondary control positions for all or part of the main armament. The latter involved the provision of additional fire control instruments, navy phone and voice-pipes to communicate between the TSs and the controlling turrets. During the same period the ship was fitted with a Dreyer Fire Control table Mk1 in the main TS, a new fore top to carry a gyro-stabilized Argo rangefinder, and rangefinders were fitted in "A" turret and on the compass platform. She was also fitted with Evershed bearing indicators in the foretop during 1913-14.

Being the oldest dreadnought, she was one of the last to receive a director system although preparatory work for this began during her refit during May and June 1915. At this time, the foretop was rebuilt to take the director tower, rangefinders were fitted in "P", "Q", "X" and "Y" turrets and the after control position was removed. It is not known exactly when she received her director, particularly as it was not unusual for work to be carried out in ships while they were at Scapa Flow or Cromarty. However, whatever the preparatory work, it had not been completed by the end of 1915 and it seems likely that the system was finally fitted at Rosyth during April and May 1916."

Roberts provides a diagram indicating that 9ft FT8 rangefinders on MG3 mountings were fitted in the turrets.


R A Burt's book "British Battleships of World War One", although quite sparse in terms of rangefinder outfit details, does include some data on rangefinder outfits of various ships when they were completed with rangefinders aboard. For example, he indicates:
> Bellerophon Class - completed with "one in each 12in turret; one each side of after boat deck".
> St Vincent Class - completed with "one each spotting top, one each turret, one each side after boat deck".
> Neptune Class - completed with "one spotting top, one each turret".
> Colossus Class - completed with "one each spotting top, one each 12in turret, one after superstructure".
> Orion Class - completed with "one on spotting top, one each 13.5in turret, one over after shelter deck".
> "Lion" Class - completed with "one spotting top, one each 13.5in turret, one after superstructure".
I'm not altogether sure how trustworthy it all is, however - so "praemonitus, praemunitus".[/quote]

- - -

Edit: According to Brooks

By the end of 1909, improved mountings with separate training gear—the rangetaker remained responsible for elevation—were on order for the St. Vincent and later classes, together with conversion kits for existing ships. By early 1912, deliveries had begun of Argo’s gyro-stabilised rangefinder mounting.

>>>>> Agreed.

- - -

It is also not entirely clear whether F.Q. 2 were use in turrets as there seems to be no dedicated turret mounting for it. (Is there any information about the use of F.T. 8 9ft model?)

>>>>> See above details as to Dreadnought.

- - -

Regarding range data transmission, I think B&S did have range transmitter gear that allows range to be transmitted via ftp gear to TS.

>>>>> Barr & Stroud did indeed manufacture FC data transmission equipment, but TTBOMK not for transmission of data from rangefinder to TS. The RN started the war using the Pollen transmission system for transmission of data from the Argo master rangefinder to be automatically applied to the plot being generated by the FC table in TS. Data transmission from turret range-finders were AIUI verbally passed via navyphone or voice tube. There is commentary in the BCS Dogger Bank after-action report complaining about this verbally passed data failing to be applied upon the plot in a timely fashion (or at all) and asking what might be done to resolve the issue. FTP data transmission equipment sounds to me more like transmission of range and deflection data from TS to the turrets. FWIW.

In the period after Jutland, I am aware of electrical data transmission devices based upon typewriter technology being developed to connect the turret rangefinders to the FC plot; a rating in the turret would type in a range cut value which would be electrically relayed to a movable repeater typewriter so configured as to type an appropriate mark upon the plot roll - each turret having a unique code letter. IIRC, Brooks delved into this in his first book (or maybe it was his doctoral dissertation).

B

[wmh829386]

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/i ... ers#M.G._8
Looking at the fixed mounting available for the F.Q. 2 rangefinder. The one man unit of the M.N. 1 and M.N. 2 seems abhorrent. It requires the operator to man-handle the train and elevation while trying to make a cut. I cannot see how they can be remotely useful on a rolling, pitching deck, where it is not easy to stand straight, let alone doing three other jobs at the same time.

Although M.Q. 1 mountings with a trainer exist, it is not clear when they were introduced.

>>>>> After hunting through some of my books, I found the following information (Per "The Battleship Dreadnought" by John Roberts):
Dreadnought's main control positions (as completed) were the foretop and a platform on the roof of the signal tower. As completed, each control position featured a 9ft FQ2 Barr & Stroud rangefinder on a MN-1 (or MN-2) mounting. My interpretation of the text is that communication between the Transmitting Station (T.S.) and the two control positions was by "navyphone" and voice-pipe only; while communication between T.S. and the turrets was on a completely independent circuit which utilized Vickers fire control instruments for transmission of range and deflection orders.

Here quoting Roberts (pg.31) -
"During 1912-13, the turrets were equipped for local control, whereby the sight-setting receivers could be operated from the officer's position at the rear of the turret., and "A" and "Y" turrets were equipped to serve as secondary control positions for all or part of the main armament. The latter involved the provision of additional fire control instruments, navy phone and voice-pipes to communicate between the TSs and the controlling turrets. During the same period the ship was fitted with a Dreyer Fire Control table Mk1 in the main TS, a new fore top to carry a gyro-stabilized Argo rangefinder, and rangefinders were fitted in "A" turret and on the compass platform. She was also fitted with Evershed bearing indicators in the foretop during 1913-14.

Being the oldest dreadnought, she was one of the last to receive a director system although preparatory work for this began during her refit during May and June 1915. At this time, the foretop was rebuilt to take the director tower, rangefinders were fitted in "P", "Q", "X" and "Y" turrets and the after control position was removed. It is not known exactly when she received her director, particularly as it was not unusual for work to be carried out in ships while they were at Scapa Flow or Cromarty. However, whatever the preparatory work, it had not been completed by the end of 1915 and it seems likely that the system was finally fitted at Rosyth during April and May 1916."

Roberts provides a diagram indicating that 9ft FT8 rangefinders on MG3 mountings were fitted in the turrets.


R A Burt's book "British Battleships of World War One", although quite sparse in terms of rangefinder outfit details, does include some data on rangefinder outfits of various ships when they were completed with rangefinders aboard. For example, he indicates:
> Bellerophon Class - completed with "one in each 12in turret; one each side of after boat deck".
> St Vincent Class - completed with "one each spotting top, one each turret, one each side after boat deck".
> Neptune Class - completed with "one spotting top, one each turret".
> Colossus Class - completed with "one each spotting top, one each 12in turret, one after superstructure".
> Orion Class - completed with "one on spotting top, one each 13.5in turret, one over after shelter deck".
> "Lion" Class - completed with "one spotting top, one each 13.5in turret, one after superstructure".
I'm not altogether sure how trustworthy it all is, however - so "praemonitus, praemunitus".

- - -

Edit: According to Brooks

By the end of 1909, improved mountings with separate training gear—the rangetaker remained responsible for elevation—were on order for the St. Vincent and later classes, together with conversion kits for existing ships. By early 1912, deliveries had begun of Argo’s gyro-stabilised rangefinder mounting.

>>>>> Agreed.

- - -

It is also not entirely clear whether F.Q. 2 were use in turrets as there seems to be no dedicated turret mounting for it. (Is there any information about the use of F.T. 8 9ft model?)

>>>>> See above details as to Dreadnought.

- - -

Regarding range data transmission, I think B&S did have range transmitter gear that allows range to be transmitted via ftp gear to TS.

>>>>> Barr & Stroud did indeed manufacture FC data transmission equipment, but TTBOMK not for transmission of data from rangefinder to TS. The RN started the war using the Pollen transmission system for transmission of data from the Argo master rangefinder to be automatically applied to the plot being generated by the FC table in TS. Data transmission from turret range-finders were AIUI verbally passed via navyphone or voice tube. There is commentary in the BCS Dogger Bank after-action report complaining about this verbally passed data failing to be applied upon the plot in a timely fashion (or at all) and asking what might be done to resolve the issue. FTP data transmission equipment sounds to me more like transmission of range and deflection data from TS to the turrets. FWIW.

In the period after Jutland, I am aware of electrical data transmission devices based upon typewriter technology being developed to connect the turret rangefinders to the FC plot; a rating in the turret would type in a range cut value which would be electrically relayed to a movable repeater typewriter so configured as to type an appropriate mark upon the plot roll - each turret having a unique code letter. IIRC, Brooks delved into this in his first book (or maybe it was his doctoral dissertation).

B

Regarding the transmission device, i am certain that there are range and deflection transmitter installed for all possible control positions and I suspect the usage and arrangement various quite a lot from ship to ship. However, I agree that in principle RN was using manual plotting in which the range taker would call his range, then have a telephone number to inform TS/set the range transmitter, and finally have the range plotted manually.

Looking at the RF and mounting available to the 13.5" battlecruisers, it strikes me that the arrangement is very similar to the QEs and the only difference is the base length.

[wmh829386]

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/i ... ers#M.G._8
Looking at the fixed mounting available for the F.Q. 2 rangefinder. The one man unit of the M.N. 1 and M.N. 2 seems abhorrent. It requires the operator to man-handle the train and elevation while trying to make a cut. I cannot see how they can be remotely useful on a rolling, pitching deck, where it is not easy to stand straight, let alone doing three other jobs at the same time.

Although M.Q. 1 mountings with a trainer exist, it is not clear when they were introduced.

>>>>> After hunting through some of my books, I found the following information (Per "The Battleship Dreadnought" by John Roberts):
Dreadnought's main control positions (as completed) were the foretop and a platform on the roof of the signal tower. As completed, each control position featured a 9ft FQ2 Barr & Stroud rangefinder on a MN-1 (or MN-2) mounting. My interpretation of the text is that communication between the Transmitting Station (T.S.) and the two control positions was by "navyphone" and voice-pipe only; while communication between T.S. and the turrets was on a completely independent circuit which utilized Vickers fire control instruments for transmission of range and deflection orders.

Here quoting Roberts (pg.31) -
"During 1912-13, the turrets were equipped for local control, whereby the sight-setting receivers could be operated from the officer's position at the rear of the turret., and "A" and "Y" turrets were equipped to serve as secondary control positions for all or part of the main armament. The latter involved the provision of additional fire control instruments, navy phone and voice-pipes to communicate between the TSs and the controlling turrets. During the same period the ship was fitted with a Dreyer Fire Control table Mk1 in the main TS, a new fore top to carry a gyro-stabilized Argo rangefinder, and rangefinders were fitted in "A" turret and on the compass platform. She was also fitted with Evershed bearing indicators in the foretop during 1913-14.

Being the oldest dreadnought, she was one of the last to receive a director system although preparatory work for this began during her refit during May and June 1915. At this time, the foretop was rebuilt to take the director tower, rangefinders were fitted in "P", "Q", "X" and "Y" turrets and the after control position was removed. It is not known exactly when she received her director, particularly as it was not unusual for work to be carried out in ships while they were at Scapa Flow or Cromarty. However, whatever the preparatory work, it had not been completed by the end of 1915 and it seems likely that the system was finally fitted at Rosyth during April and May 1916."

Roberts provides a diagram indicating that 9ft FT8 rangefinders on MG3 mountings were fitted in the turrets.


R A Burt's book "British Battleships of World War One", although quite sparse in terms of rangefinder outfit details, does include some data on rangefinder outfits of various ships when they were completed with rangefinders aboard. For example, he indicates:
> Bellerophon Class - completed with "one in each 12in turret; one each side of after boat deck".
> St Vincent Class - completed with "one each spotting top, one each turret, one each side after boat deck".
> Neptune Class - completed with "one spotting top, one each turret".
> Colossus Class - completed with "one each spotting top, one each 12in turret, one after superstructure".
> Orion Class - completed with "one on spotting top, one each 13.5in turret, one over after shelter deck".
> "Lion" Class - completed with "one spotting top, one each 13.5in turret, one after superstructure".
I'm not altogether sure how trustworthy it all is, however - so "praemonitus, praemunitus".

- - -

Edit: According to Brooks

By the end of 1909, improved mountings with separate training gear—the rangetaker remained responsible for elevation—were on order for the St. Vincent and later classes, together with conversion kits for existing ships. By early 1912, deliveries had begun of Argo’s gyro-stabilised rangefinder mounting.

>>>>> Agreed.

- - -

It is also not entirely clear whether F.Q. 2 were use in turrets as there seems to be no dedicated turret mounting for it. (Is there any information about the use of F.T. 8 9ft model?)

>>>>> See above details as to Dreadnought.

- - -

Regarding range data transmission, I think B&S did have range transmitter gear that allows range to be transmitted via ftp gear to TS.

>>>>> Barr & Stroud did indeed manufacture FC data transmission equipment, but TTBOMK not for transmission of data from rangefinder to TS. The RN started the war using the Pollen transmission system for transmission of data from the Argo master rangefinder to be automatically applied to the plot being generated by the FC table in TS. Data transmission from turret range-finders were AIUI verbally passed via navyphone or voice tube. There is commentary in the BCS Dogger Bank after-action report complaining about this verbally passed data failing to be applied upon the plot in a timely fashion (or at all) and asking what might be done to resolve the issue. FTP data transmission equipment sounds to me more like transmission of range and deflection data from TS to the turrets. FWIW.

In the period after Jutland, I am aware of electrical data transmission devices based upon typewriter technology being developed to connect the turret rangefinders to the FC plot; a rating in the turret would type in a range cut value which would be electrically relayed to a movable repeater typewriter so configured as to type an appropriate mark upon the plot roll - each turret having a unique code letter. IIRC, Brooks delved into this in his first book (or maybe it was his doctoral dissertation).

B

Regarding the transmission device, i am certain that there are range and deflection transmitter installed for all possible control positions and I suspect the usage and arrangement various quite a lot from ship to ship. However, I agree that in principle RN was using manual plotting in which the range taker would call his range, then have a telephone number to inform TS/set the range transmitter, and finally have the range plotted manually.

Looking at the RF and mounting available to the 13.5" battlecruisers, it strikes me that the arrangement is very similar to the QEs and the only difference is the base length.

[Byron Angel]

The shooting of 5BS at Jutland impressed everyone (including 1SG). It is, IMO, no coincidence that the GFG&TO post-Jutland memorandum included a specific proposal to install one 15-ft RF aboard every Grand Fleet dreadnought and battle-cruiser.

B

[wadinga]

Hi All,

Delving into the acceptance or otherwise of elements of the Pollen Fire Control System into the RN, there is a nearly 15 year period of contentious dealings between Arthur Pollen, Linotype company owner, legally-trained entrepreneur, amateur naval gunnery enthusiast and patriot, and various RN gunnery experts to take into account. The "Pollen Papers" pub Navy Records Society is a mine of information.

Of the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder, Pollen writes to an unnamed RN supporter in 1916:

It is just the same with the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder. Rangefinders of the Zeiss and Barr and Stroud type can be made for a very reasonable price, because they have a design providing for an inferior illumination, inferior definition, and inferior resistance to temperature distortions. To obtain a higher standard of visibility, of instrument accuracy, of constancy, a fitness of design, more costly in itself, and a standard of workmanship and accuracy of a higher grade are necessary

Thomas Cooke and Sons were a highly regarded astronomical telescope and microscope manufacturer in which Pollen took a financial interest. Later in the war they built B&S units in their factory.

As a highly motivated outsider trying to get his complex ideas accepted by a technical bureaucracy which believed it already had all the answers, Pollen was what would be lauded today as a technological "disrupter". Some, including Jellicoe as Director of Ordnance, believed his ideas had merit and should be encouraged with development funds, other naval types were horrified when he demanded £100,000 up front to secure him from taking his ideas to overseas powers. Pollen's "salesman" type techniques of deluging RN officers with unsolicited monographs about his system or persistently going over the heads of naysayers, even up to the First Sea Lord, definitely turned some against him. But then it took Turbinia embarrassing the RN at a naval review to get turbine power properly evaluated.

Initially his concept of two separate azimuthal sighting stations forward and aft and using this lengthy baseline with simultaneous bearing readings transmitted automatically to a mechanical calculator and plotting system was a flawed concept. Most of the components had yet to be created. Even adding a precision gyroscope to account for vessel yaw helped only a little. There were enough problems in controlling movement and thermal distortion in a rangefinder tube let alone assuming a ship's hull was rigid and immutable. His and his engineer's lack of practical expertise at sea, acting against their excellent innovations, sometimes made the few trials in HMS Jupiter, HMS Natal and HMS Ariadne less than encouraging, yet visionaries within the RN like Captain Ogilvy (reporting to Jellicoe) could see that with development, much better results could be obtained.

Unfortunately when Jellicoe handed over the role to Reginald Bacon, a dyed in the wool sceptic with his acolyte Frederic Dreyer, there was little chance for Pollen and his Argo company's whole fire control system. His engineers were rudely put ashore from RN vessels during some trials and he was informed he could take his equipment away at his earliest convenience. However after the war, a legal judgement found that elements of Pollen's system had been misappropriated by Dreyer in the table adopted by the RN, and he received a financial award.

It is unclear when the two sighting station concept was replaced by superior performance conventional rangefinders, presumably the Cooke-Pollen.

Some Argo fire control clocks were delivered and used, but Winston Churchill (advised by service experts, guess who) as First Lord of the Admiralty, announced in 1913, that a monopoly of a whole Argo system would not be adopted in future, but that a "more satisfactory" one had been developed internally, by the Navy. This was undoubtedly a much cheaper option using 9ft B&S to supply a Dreyer and Dumaresq combination, but recent trials in HMS Orion had proved using the gyro-corrected Argo clock had allowed hits even whilst turning. Churchill announced on technical advice from those experts,

The good shooting was not attributable either to the Pollen apparatus or the Pollen system.

Even Jellicoe supervising the trials, decided that conditions of high or changing change of range conditions were unlikely to occur given current tactics and backed the simpler, cheaper Dreyer table.

Pollen had letters published in the Times newspaper protesting Churchill's decision, and there were letters supporting his case from naval personnel, albeit anonymously, due to concerns about the application of the Official Secrets Act. Disillusioned, he sold elements of his system to the Russians and the Austrians although the latter exports were delayed and stopped by the War.

If the Germans were impressed by 5BS (and GF shooting generally) by application of the Director system, might not a complementary fully-developed Pollen system have given even better results? Even inferior British projectiles caused several major propellant fires in Seylitz and Derfflinger at Jutland and Campbell's assertion that had these vessels used British propellants and cartridge design they would most likely have blown up as the British opponents did, is not often questioned. Peter Padfield in Aim Straight says in a footnote that results from the Dreyer table in Iron Duke at Jutland were not used at all, since the rangefinder input was too inaccurate in the short time the target was visible. Jellicoe at the Orion trials had not expected "high or changing change of range conditions" and yet here he was crossing the T with a battle line turning through nearly 90 degrees whilst firing. When Dreyer himself visited "a battlecruiser" he found his table stripped of various cogs and gears, which had been used for other purposes. There was still a strong reliance on using the gun as a rangefinder and relying totally on spotting and estimation.

Byron thanks for those excellent original source materials. Although parsimony was undoubtedly a feature, perhaps spoiling the ships for a ha'p'orth of tar, simmering resentment of a presumptuous outsider might have been a greater factor.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

Delving into the acceptance or otherwise of elements of the Pollen Fire Control System into the RN, there is a nearly 15 year period of contentious dealings between Arthur Pollen, Linotype company owner, legally-trained entrepreneur, amateur naval gunnery enthusiast and patriot, and various RN gunnery experts to take into account. The "Pollen Papers" pub Navy Records Society is a mine of information.

>>>>> ”The Pollen Papers” is an excellent resource. Sumida made his academic name on it. Sumida’s follow-on book, “In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance , Technology and British Naval Policy 1889-1914”, is very good in terms of situating Pollen and his invention within the context of the times. Brooks’ book, “Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control” pleads the case for Dreyer and, as such, is itself a valuable reference work. In fact, the two authors tend to counter-balance one another (although I favour Brooks over Sumida on several grounds).

- - -

Of the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder, Pollen writes to an unnamed RN supporter in 1916:
It is just the same with the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder. Rangefinders of the Zeiss and Barr and Stroud type can be made for a very reasonable price, because they have a design providing for an inferior illumination, inferior definition, and inferior resistance to temperature distortions. To obtain a higher standard of visibility, of instrument accuracy, of constancy, a fitness of design, more costly in itself, and a standard of workmanship and accuracy of a higher grade are necessary
Thomas Cooke and Sons were a highly regarded astronomical telescope and microscope manufacturer in which Pollen took a financial interest. Later in the war they built B&S units in their factory.

>>>>> Based upon what I understand of Zeiss stereoscopic rangefinder design of the WW1 period, Pollen would have to support his allegations of inferior quality and performance with some considerable proof before I would entertain them.

- - -

As a highly motivated outsider trying to get his complex ideas accepted by a technical bureaucracy which believed it already had all the answers, Pollen was what would be lauded today as a technological "disrupter". Some, including Jellicoe as Director of Ordnance, believed his ideas had merit and should be encouraged with development funds, other naval types were horrified when he demanded £100,000 up front to secure him from taking his ideas to overseas powers. Pollen's "salesman" type techniques of deluging RN officers with unsolicited monographs about his system or persistently going over the heads of naysayers, even up to the First Sea Lord, definitely turned some against him. But then it took Turbinia embarrassing the RN at a naval review to get turbine power properly evaluated.

>>>>> Pollen, IMO, was in many respects his own worst enemy. However mathematically brilliant he was, his egotism and his failure to sense the gravity of his government’s anxieties over an inexorably growing naval budget went far to commercially doom Argo.

- - -

Initially his concept of two separate azimuthal sighting stations forward and aft and using this lengthy baseline with simultaneous bearing readings transmitted automatically to a mechanical calculator and plotting system was a flawed concept. Most of the components had yet to be created. Even adding a precision gyroscope to account for vessel yaw helped only a little. There were enough problems in controlling movement and thermal distortion in a rangefinder tube let alone assuming a ship's hull was rigid and immutable. His and his engineer's lack of practical expertise at sea, acting against their excellent innovations, sometimes made the few trials in HMS Jupiter, HMS Natal and HMS Ariadne less than encouraging, yet visionaries within the RN like Captain Ogilvy (reporting to Jellicoe) could see that with development, much better results could be obtained.

Unfortunately when Jellicoe handed over the role to Reginald Bacon, a dyed in the wool sceptic with his acolyte Frederic Dreyer, there was little chance for Pollen and his Argo company's whole fire control system. His engineers were rudely put ashore from RN vessels during some trials and he was informed he could take his equipment away at his earliest convenience. However after the war, a legal judgement found that elements of Pollen's system had been misappropriated by Dreyer in the table adopted by the RN, and he received a financial award.

>>>>> Pollen very much deserved the post-war settlement re received (if not more). There is an enticing story to the effect that the RN Ordnance officer (Admiral Moore) responsible for liaising with Argo was allowing Dreyer (a commissioned officer in the RN at that time) to examine Pollen’s Argo system design documents – (see Pollen Papers, page 84).

- - -

It is unclear when the two sighting station concept was replaced by superior performance conventional rangefinders, presumably the Cooke-Pollen.

>>>>> IIRC, the attempt to utilize the length of the entire ship as the base-length of a single great rangefinder was early in the process (HMS Ariadne?) and proved impractical. It is my belief that Pollen and Isherwood were committed to creation of a fully integrated seamless fire control system. The no-expense spared design of the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder, for example, points very strongly in that direction; TTBOMK, it was the only rangefinder of the period designed from the start to feature automatic electrical transmission of both range + target bearing data couplets (necessary to meet the logic requirements of the Argo system) directly into the FC table at the press of a button by the range taker

- - -

Some Argo fire control clocks were delivered and used,

>>>>> Six total –
Argo MkIV – Queen Mary
Argo MkV – Orion, King George V, Ajax, Centurion, Erin

but Winston Churchill (advised by service experts, guess who) as First Lord of the Admiralty, announced in 1913, that a monopoly of a whole Argo system would not be adopted in future, but that a "more satisfactory" one had been developed internally, by the Navy. This was undoubtedly a much cheaper option using 9ft B&S to supply a Dreyer and Dumaresq combination, but recent trials in HMS Orion had proved using the gyro-corrected Argo clock had allowed hits even whilst turning. Churchill announced on technical advice from those experts,
The good shooting was not attributable either to the Pollen apparatus or the Pollen system.

>>>>> Spoken like the true politician Churchill was.

- - -

Even Jellicoe supervising the trials, decided that conditions of high or changing change of range conditions were unlikely to occur given current tactics and backed the simpler, cheaper Dreyer table.

>>>>> Comment FWIW – Even disregarding evasive maneuvers, there are actually relatively very few cases in which range rate remains constant, even when both ships pursue straight courses; the change in rate may be modest, but it will steadily change.

- - -

Pollen had letters published in the Times newspaper protesting Churchill's decision, and there were letters supporting his case from naval personnel, albeit anonymously, due to concerns about the application of the Official Secrets Act. Disillusioned, he sold elements of his system to the Russians and the Austrians although the latter exports were delayed and stopped by the War.

>>>>> The Russians were reputed to have been quite pleased with their Argo systems.

- - -

If the Germans were impressed by 5BS (and GF shooting generally) by application of the Director system, might not a complementary fully-developed Pollen system have given even better results? Even inferior British projectiles caused several major propellant fires in Seydlitz and Derfflinger at Jutland and Campbell's assertion that had these vessels used British propellants and cartridge design they would most likely have blown up as the British opponents did, is not often questioned.

>>>>> DK Brown once commented in an email to me that, had Indefatigable, Invincible and Queen Mary been carrying German propellant in their magazines, they would in all likelihood have survived Jutland.

- - -

Peter Padfield in “Aim Straight” says in a footnote that results from the Dreyer table in Iron Duke at Jutland were not used at all, since the rangefinder input was too inaccurate in the short time the target was visible. Jellicoe at the Orion trials had not expected "high or changing change of range conditions" and yet here he was crossing the T with a battle line turning through nearly 90 degrees whilst firing. When Dreyer himself visited "a battlecruiser" he found his table stripped of various cogs and gears, which had been used for other purposes. There was still a strong reliance on using the gun as a rangefinder and relying totally on spotting and estimation.

>>>>> Complaints did arise in connection with the Dreyer FC tables, that, as various appendages were added over time, the table came to have trouble driving everything (certain aspects of the mechanical design relied upon friction between parts to perform necessary calculations (ball and disk, for example).

- - -

Byron thanks for those excellent original source materials. Although parsimony was undoubtedly a feature, perhaps spoiling the ships for a ha'p'orth of tar, simmering resentment of a presumptuous outsider might have been a greater factor.

>>>>> Like the devices themselves, the Argo/Dreyer competition/rivalry involved a number of moving parts.

[wmh829386]

Here is a partial reproduction of the text of the Grand Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo memorandum covering the Battle of Dogger Bank:

DOGGER BANK (24th January, 1915)
(G. F. G. and T.O. No. 12)

4. Gunlaying - The gunlaying conditions were difficult; in the forward turrets this was due largely to the spray thrown over the bows at the high speed at which ships were steaming, which inconvenience "A" turrets severely and "B" turrets slightly. The great volumes of black funnel smoke from the German ships increased the difficulty of the gunlayers in adhering to their point of aim; the tops of the funnels the masthead, and the flashes of his guns were occasionally order to be used.

The German gun smoke also appears to be denser than our cordite smoke, and this added to the invisibility of their ships, the wind tending to blow all smoke to their engaged quarter, in the direction of our ships.

On the other hand, the director layer aloft in Tiger found little difficult in laying, as he experienced no inconvenience from spray, was clear above the funnel smoke of our ships, and was much less incommoded by enemy shorts than men in the gun positions; he found no difficult in getting opportunities for firing and fired usually on the upward roll so as to cause the ship to increase her motion.

Taking everything into consideration, the director was probably at a considerable advantage, although the conditions were not sufficiently bad to prevent the gunlayers shooting well.

Evershed's bearing indicator gear was found to be invaluable

All ships experienced difficulty in keeping their periscopes and telescopes clear.

5. - Spray - Every precaution must be taken to keep gun-sights clear of spray. No hoses should be running where the water from them could possibly be blown over the sights by wind or gun blast.

The above applies also to the windows of rangefinders.

6. Point of Aim - The gunlayers and trainers must be prepared to aim at various alternative points, such as the top of a funnel, a control top, the flash of the enemy's guns. and even into the "brown" if ordered. There may be no alternatives to these, and the men must be prepared.

Few things to note.
1. Royal navy suffered from spray a lot thanks to it being the pursuer in many situations.

2. Points about director and evershed are perfect foreshadowing to what happened to HMS Tiger in Jutland.

7. Rapidity of Fire - It is strongly emphasized that rapidity of fire is essential both to disable the enemy quickly and to reduce the accuracy of his fire.

At extreme ranges, ships may have to open deliberate fire to test the range, but as soon as a straddle or a hit is obtained the rate of fire must be quickened.

The slower we fire, the easier it is for the enemy to develop a rapid fire, and, if he hits, the more difficult it will be for us to quicken again.

Fire can always be checked when need be, and burst of rapid fire, with checks to correct errors, are far preferable to adhering to a slow rate of fire.

There is nothing wrong in pursuing higher rate of fire. But at what cost though?
A further irony is that British heavy will always have a slower RoF due to the breech design (German brass casing allow the use of sliding breech block), which no amount of dangerous ammunition handling procedure can compensate.

8. Spotting was extremely difficult, chiefly owing to the great range and the amount of smoke made by the German ships; columns of water and spray from shorts were additional causes. In a number of cases large quantities of water from shorts came inboard.

Lion and Princess Royal spotted from the revolving Argo rangefinder hood; in other ships the primary control was worked from aloft. A bow observation position appears to be no use in a battle cruiser at high speeds as, even in fine weather, the view is too much interrupted by spray thrown over the forecastle. In fine weather, battleships should not suffer so much from this interference.

"Overs" were usually impossible to distinguish, while hits were very difficult, particularly when the German were firing quickly and the flash and smoke from their guns coincided with the time of arrival of our projectiles; our hell hits seldom make a distinctive flash.

Southampton, which was on the disengaged quarter of the enemy and approximately at right angles to the line of fire, was able to observe the fall of shot from our ships and report the result.

It was often difficult to judge whether shots were falling short of the further enemy ships or over the nearer, or from which ship they were fired, but occasionally there was no doubt on these points and valuable information could be gained.

In order that advantage may be taken of an observation ship on other occasions when a ship is available for such duty, the following signal has been inserted in the Signal Book :- "Take station as requisite to report fall of shot from our ships."

The exact station of the observing ship is purposely not definitely laid down; her object should be to take up quickly a good position for observing our fire.

If the 13.5" ships find spotting difficult, it will only be more so for 12" and 11" guns. It is not entirely clear to me how useful an observation ship would be. Considering that spotting relies on accurate fall of shot timer, which can be done more accurately on own ship.

Great care must be taken not to give inaccurate reports as these would be most misleading. A rake is not essential provided that a good report on the general result of a ship's fire can be made, but it should be used, if possible, when accurate results can be obtained.

Little use could be made of the rangefinders as few cuts could be obtained, whilst the range was too great for accurate readings to be take; time and range plotting was impracticable.

A guessed rate was used as far as practicable, but it was almost impossible to verify by observation of fire owing to the difficulty of spotting, and several ships used "no rate" and worked entirely by spotting corrections. The gun was, in fact, mainly used as its own rangefinder and rate-keeper.

It seems that there is no attempt to improve rangefinding by the BCF in anyway. Did Chatfield and Beatty have no knowledge of the improvements made by 15ft instruments or learnt anything from the war time gunnery practice in Scapa? Or is there any proposal to improve rangefinding from the BCF at all?

The conditions for spotting were extremely trying, and it appears to be essential that no ship should be dependent upon one spotter for too long a time. The majority of the ships were in action for over two hours, and during the whole of this period the spotters were required to keep their attention concentrated on fire control; this is almost bound to lead to waste of fire when the spotter becomes fatigued, and ship's organization should provide for a spotter in an alternative position taking over from time to time if necessary. This is more likely to be required at extreme ranges owing to long time of flight and the very close attention which must be given to recognize the fall of shot. Emphasis is laid on the great importance of this point, since it is n the efficiency of the spotters that that the result of action will mainly depend; there should be no chance of a ship's fire being wasted owing to undue strain being put upon personnel whose duty requires them to devote the whole of their energies, physical and mental, constantly to their work. A suitable organization should not be difficult to arrange for in the majority of ships, which have a spotter aloft, in the gun control tower and in "A" or "B" turrets.

Again more suggestions for spotting, but not on range finding

Large spotting corrections must be used at long ranges when observation of fire is difficult; small corrections have little effect and may be quite insufficient to counteract an error in rate.

This is simply not true. Large spotting correction cannot compensate for rate error because rapid salvos are not spotted. Rapid fire without a reasonably good rate is just a waste of ammunition. Even without range finding information, rate should be adjusted consecutive spotted salvos fell short/long.

The practice of using large spotting correction to compensate rate error means that the BCF could not land consecutive straddles under rapid like the 1SG or 5BS did.

"Overs" are wasted shots, since they can be seldom even spotted; "shorts", on the other hand, are not wasted.

If officer do not adjust the rate according the what was implied by spotting, much of the information is wasted regardless.

Spotters should provide themselves with a pair of service six-power binoculars as well as the Zeiss glasses; the latter are apt to become tiring to use after a time.

It is recommended that some practice runs on the spotting table should be made very difficult, to simulate, as far as possible, the conditions described.

Emphasis is laid on the fact that a spotter must give the whole of his attention to observation of shot, and that if this is not done false impressions are obtained; this is a common fault with inexperienced spotters.

The need for having spotters in alternative positions to refer to or take over as required has already been pointed out.

- - -

This Dogger Bank memorandum goes on for a further 40 sections, but the above 8 sections represent the important tactical and gunnery aspects of the action.

Byron

The surprising scant mention of rangefinding seems to suggest that the BCF have given up on it entirely. Or is there suggestions from the BCF the is not included here?

[wmh829386]

Hi All,

Delving into the acceptance or otherwise of elements of the Pollen Fire Control System into the RN, there is a nearly 15 year period of contentious dealings between Arthur Pollen, Linotype company owner, legally-trained entrepreneur, amateur naval gunnery enthusiast and patriot, and various RN gunnery experts to take into account. The "Pollen Papers" pub Navy Records Society is a mine of information.

Of the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder, Pollen writes to an unnamed RN supporter in 1916:

It is just the same with the Cooke-Pollen rangefinder. Rangefinders of the Zeiss and Barr and Stroud type can be made for a very reasonable price, because they have a design providing for an inferior illumination, inferior definition, and inferior resistance to temperature distortions. To obtain a higher standard of visibility, of instrument accuracy, of constancy, a fitness of design, more costly in itself, and a standard of workmanship and accuracy of a higher grade are necessary

<Snip>

I will just briefly respond to the whole debate around Dreyer vs Pollen.

1. Argro clock is undoubtedly a mechanically superior design, however it's closed architecture means additional features takes longer to integrate and the pre-war RN is too cost sensitive for it.

2. Regarding the change in range rates, the Mk lll and especially the Mk IV table can produce the resulting rates of straight line unequal course without issue. The rate on the plots is meant to allow the Dumerasq operator to suggest a new course and speed set up. There's no assumption of constant rate and largely helm free. (unlike the HACS with constant height assumption )
There are often too much handwaving when taking about "high" change in range rate. There are enough inter war firing trial with the Mk IV table to show that the mechanism is fit for purpose.

3. The good shooting of 5BS does have something to do with Dreyer table. At least Malaya can determine her target is zigzaging with a constant mean course. It's something that is far easier to detect on a plot. Certainly a more developed Argro clock (AFCT cough cough) will definitely be better, but I doubt anything dramatic.

4. Regarding Iron Dukes good shooting, the claim that "results of the Dreyer table is not used" probably means the rates are not derived from the plots because RF cuts were too few. And also because it's hard to imagine the string of hits made on Konig with both ships making course changes was done without range clock and Dumerasq, which are well integrated in the Mk IV table.

5. The best way for 5BS to improve its shooting is to not have them being shot at by the entire HSF.
The point is, Jutland would be very different if Evan-Thomas understand the significance of his squadron and take greater initiative. However, little can be done with the volatile nature of cordite.

Campbell is probably correct about his assessment on magazine detonation. Because Germans where also handling their charges dangerously, but none of their ship blew up even after huge turret fires. However, i do think proper ammunition handling could save some British ship by having less expose charges.

6. Getting back to B&S Range finder. I think RN was right in trying to pursue numbers of range-finders and a single range finder is simply too prone to damage. However, the choice of 9ft range finder is not ideal. And sadly compounded by poor mounting position of many 12" gun BB and BC. BCF's attitude towards rangefinding could not help either.

[Byron Angel]

Few things to note.
1. Royal navy suffered from spray a lot thanks to it being the pursuer in many situations.

>>>>> True re spray often being a price paid by the pursuer. Part of it might have been a factor of hull design (DK Brown wrote about lack of flare and sheer causing major spray problems in heavy weather for example. But it is also interesting to note that, while Beatty's battlecruisers complained bitterly about spray problem while making 26 to 28+ knots at Dogger Bank, Beatty's limiting the BCF to no more than 25 knots arguable resulted in no complaints from the BCF about spray problems at Jutland (TTBOMK). Interesting.

- - -

2. Points about director and evershed are perfect foreshadowing to what happened to HMS Tiger in Jutland.

>>>>> Indeed, DC "stepper" motors were known to be prone to getting "out of step" between transmitter and receiver and requiring a cessation of fire in order to re-align them. Use of AC current by the Germans avoided that problem altogether.

- - -

There is nothing wrong in pursuing higher rate of fire. But at what cost though?

>>>>> My interpretation of this argument is that Chatfield concluded that the conventional method of slow and deliberate bracketing fire was ineffectual at long ranges. The post-Dogger Bank alternative he proposed in correspondence with Beatty essentially tossed the whole bracketing scheme out the window and replaced it with the followed method (in brief) - start short and fire a rapid succession of "up" salvoes at 200 yd intervals until the target is bracketed or straddled; go to "rapid fire"; if/when target is lost, drop range 1,000 yards and re-start the process. When the battle-cruisers were outfitted with directors, the 200 yd "up-salvoes" was to be conducted by double-salvoes. In other words, I think Chatfield's argument was that better results could be obtained at the cost of increased ammunition expenditure. Strictly my opinion, of course.

- - -

A further irony is that British heavy will always have a slower RoF due to the breech design (German brass casing allow the use of sliding breech block), which no amount of dangerous ammunition handling procedure can compensate.

I don't think there was much difference between German versus British rates of fire under "service conditions". Although German heavy caliber guns were reputed to be capable of a maximum rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute, at Jutland Derfflinger's guns did not do better than 40 seconds between rounds under rapid fire orders. von Hase also noted that such a rate could not be maintained for more than a few minutes without exhausting the gun crews. FWIW.

- - -

If the 13.5" ships find spotting difficult, it will only be more so for 12" and 11" guns. It is not entirely clear to me how useful an observation ship would be. Considering that spotting relies on accurate fall of shot timer, which can be done more accurately on own ship.

>>>>> The key here is, I believe, the Southampton had taken a position "at a right angle to the line of fire". From that position, she would have been able to gain a good idea of how far long or short salvoes were falling relative to the target. A very similar procedure was often employed in gunnery practice shoots; the "rake" was a template employed to estimate distance of salvo CPI relative to the target sled.

- - -

It seems that there is no attempt to improve rangefinding by the BCF in any way. Did Chatfield and Beatty have no knowledge of the improvements made by 15ft instruments or learnt anything from the war time gunnery practice in Scapa? Or is there any proposal to improve rangefinding from the BCF at all?

>>>>> A plethora of questions, indeed! I'm no fan of Beatty, to be sure, but I have seen a copy of explicit orders issued by Beatty stipulating that special attention be paid to training in rangefinding, but this would have predominately been static exercises carried out in the anchorage. I do think that the basing of the BCF in the Firth of Forth greatly constrained training opportunities in many respects; there was simply no safe nearby area of water to conduct realistic gunnery or rangefinding practices. Moray Firth was the closest sheltered water to Rosyth and, although used for gunnery practice in 1915 (IIRC), was not made properly secure until after Jutland (1917?) when it was finally secured from submarine threat by nets and mines. The BCF was also arguably one of the busier commands of the GF over the first year or so of the war and lack of time for training due to the demands of detached service may have played a role.

That having been said, I'm not sure how much difference more rigorous rangefinder training would have made at Jutland. The effective ranging limit of the Barr & Stroud 9-ft FQ2 rangefinder was (IMO) not much more than 13,000 yards. Much is made of the good shooting of 3BCS at Jutland and people point to 3BCS having undertaken recent gunnery practice at Scapa as the explanation. What is always left out of the story is that Hood's squadron was engaging 1AG at ranges well under 10,000 yds while initially being invisible to and therefore unfired upon by the Germans. By comparison, 1BCS and 2BCS rarely engaged at less than about 14,000 yds during their Run to the South. It is also possible that poor rangefinding performance was not the only problem affecting the gunnery of Beatty's battlecruisers that day.

News of the FT24 15-ft rangefinder must without question have been known within the fleet; The problem was almost certainly production and availability.

- - -

"Large spotting corrections must be used at long ranges when observation of fire is difficult; small corrections have little effect and may be quite insufficient to counteract an error in rate."

This is simply not true. Large spotting correction cannot compensate for rate error because rapid salvos are not spotted. Rapid fire without a reasonably good rate is just a waste of ammunition. Even without range finding information, rate should be adjusted consecutive spotted salvos fell short/long. The practice of using large spotting correction to compensate rate error means that the BCF could not land consecutive straddles under rapid like the 1SG or 5BS did.

The post-action Dogger Bank commentary states pretty categorically that:
> Beatty's ships rarely, if ever, had a valid range rate in hand.
> If they were using a range rate, it was almost certainly a guessed rate value.
> It was by no means uncommon for "no rate" to be used and control to be based strictly upon spotting.

Engaging at such lengthy ranges (without effective rangefinder help) neither target range, nor target inclination, nor the distance any short salvo may fall from the target ship can be known ("Overs" cannot be seen; "Shorts" can be seen but distance from target cannot be judged). It is almost impossible to establish a predictive plot with any confidence and the firing ship (AIUI) is reduced to educated guesswork. Lion fired about 55 salvoes at Dogger Bank and scored four hits, which suggests four straddles in 55 salvoes. Rapid fire would not have been resorted to under such conditions; a review of von Hase's gunnery log excerpt (as reproduced in "Kiel and Jutland") shows that Rapid Fire was only ordered after two successive salvoes had been seen to straddle ..... which, taken together, had validated the FC solution.

- - -

-"Overs" are wasted shots, since they can be seldom even spotted; "shorts", on the other hand, are not wasted -
If officer do not adjust the rate according the what was implied by spotting, much of the information is wasted regardless.

{b}>>>>> In such cases, precious little can be discerned by the spotting officer: if the salvo is short, either his range rate or his range estimate or perhaps both may be wrong; if the salvo lands long and falls unseen, he knows his range and range rate must be wrong and deflection is an unknown. There is no way he can know more than that.[/u]

- - -

The surprising scant mention of rangefinding seems to suggest that the BCF have given up on it entirely. Or are there suggestions from the BCF that are not included here?

>>>>> I transcribed everything from the Dogger Bank GFG&TO that was gunnery related. I have a copy of the original Battle Cruiser Force Dogger Bank report that discusses some gunnery related issues in greater detail.


B

[wmh829386]

>>>>> True re spray often being a price paid by the pursuer. Part of it might have been a factor of hull design (DK Brown wrote about lack of flare and sheer causing major spray problems in heavy weather for example. But it is also interesting to note that, while Beatty's battlecruisers complained bitterly about spray problem while making 26 to 28+ knots at Dogger Bank, Beatty's limiting the BCF to no more than 25 knots arguable resulted in no complaints from the BCF about spray problems at Jutland (TTBOMK). Interesting.

The weather conditions also play a large part, in run to the south, the wind is blowing towards the Germans, hence spray, if there's any was not thrown onboard. I also wonder weather 5BS can keep up with 1SG when they are not damaged.

>>>>> Indeed, DC "stepper" motors were known to be prone to getting "out of step" between transmitter and receiver and requiring a cessation of fire in order to re-align them. Use of AC current by the Germans avoided that problem altogether.

Definitely true, not sure how much of the use of DC was down to RN being a forerunner in introducing electricity onboard.

>>>>> My interpretation of this argument is that Chatfield concluded that the conventional method of slow and deliberate bracketing fire was ineffectual at long ranges. The post-Dogger Bank alternative he proposed in correspondence with Beatty essentially tossed the whole bracketing scheme out the window and replaced it with the followed method (in brief) - start short and fire a rapid succession of "up" salvoes at 200 yd intervals until the target is bracketed or straddled; go to "rapid fire"; if/when target is lost, drop range 1,000 yards and re-start the process. When the battle-cruisers were outfitted with directors, the 200 yd "up-salvoes" was to be conducted by double-salvoes. In other words, I think Chatfield's argument was that better results could be obtained at the cost of increased ammunition expenditure. Strictly my opinion, of course.

This scheme is terrible when control officer underestimate the closing rate Either Chatfield didn't think it through or he had something more sophisticated in mind.

Let's say there's a target closing 300 yard/min more than rate in use. Assuming the 200 yard up salvos are fired at 30s intervals. The salvos would be creeping towards the target by 350 yards. Worse still, once the target is cross/straddled, breaking into rapid fire just garuntees two wasted over salvos.

The problem is not so much about the firing scheme itself, but the lack of recognition that the rate have to be corrected as well. The longer shell travel time means that having the correct rate is essential to maintaining straddles.

I don't think there was much difference between German versus British rates of fire under "service conditions". Although German heavy caliber guns were reputed to be capable of a maximum rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute, at Jutland Derfflinger's guns did not do better than 40 seconds between rounds under rapid fire orders. von Hase also noted that such a rate could not be maintained for more than a few minutes without exhausting the gun crews. FWIW.

Although slow deliberate fire is limited by shell travel time, the maximum RoF is a definite advantage when straddles are established and fire broke into rapid. The burst of maximum rate of fire makes the best use of the limited time a firing solution is correct.

>>>>> The key here is, I believe, the Southampton had taken a position "at a right angle to the line of fire". From that position, she would have been able to gain a good idea of how far long or short salvoes were falling relative to the target. A very similar procedure was often employed in gunnery practice shoots; the "rake" was a template employed to estimate distance of salvo CPI relative to the target sled.

Interesting, never knew that before!
- - -

>>>>> A plethora of questions, indeed! I'm no fan of Beatty, to be sure, but I have seen a copy of explicit orders issued by Beatty stipulating that special attention be paid to training in rangefinding, but this would have predominately been static exercises carried out in the anchorage. I do think that the basing of the BCF in the Firth of Forth greatly constrained training opportunities in many respects; there was simply no safe nearby area of water to conduct realistic gunnery or rangefinding practices. Moray Firth was the closest sheltered water to Rosyth and, although used for gunnery practice in 1915 (IIRC), was not made properly secure until after Jutland (1917?) when it was finally secured from submarine threat by nets and mines. The BCF was also arguably one of the busier commands of the GF over the first year or so of the war and lack of time for training due to the demands of detached service may have played a role.

That having been said, I'm not sure how much difference more rigorous rangefinder training would have made at Jutland. The effective ranging limit of the Barr & Stroud 9-ft FQ2 rangefinder was (IMO) not much more than 13,000 yards. Much is made of the good shooting of 3BCS at Jutland and people point to 3BCS having undertaken recent gunnery practice at Scapa as the explanation. What is always left out of the story is that Hood's squadron was engaging 1AG at ranges well under 10,000 yds while initially being invisible to and therefore unfired upon by the Germans. By comparison, 1BCS and 2BCS rarely engaged at less than about 14,000 yds during their Run to the South. It is also possible that poor rangefinding performance was not the only problem affecting the gunnery of Beatty's battlecruisers that day.

Looking at the B&S mounting information, the range-takers have to work the elevation and working head together. Essentially, the range-takers have a more challenging job than director layer yet were taken less seriously. The difficulty of holding target on sight is proportional to the range and change in roll rate. I think static practice without sufficiently long range target is not that useful.
I do not think the F.Q.2 instrument is predominantly to blame because from BCF's report, none of the complaints were directed to the quality of the optics. Furthermore, I do not think the problem of the 9ft instrument will cause a sharp drop of both accuracy and number of cuts. As the latter should drop off more slowly in reasonably good visibility such as in Dogger Bank

I am quite sure that the gunnery officer on Lion and Tiger are not that good judging from their gunnery record and comments on them on previous practice.

News of the FT24 15-ft rangefinder must without question have been known within the fleet; The problem was almost certainly production and availability.

I am just curious that they never mentioned it as a potential solution to the range finding problem.

The post-action Dogger Bank commentary states pretty categorically that:
> Beatty's ships rarely, if ever, had a valid range rate in hand.
> If they were using a range rate, it was almost certainly a guessed rate value.
> It was by no means uncommon for "no rate" to be used and control to be based strictly upon spotting.

Engaging at such lengthy ranges (without effective rangefinder help) neither target range, nor target inclination, nor the distance any short salvo may fall from the target ship can be known ("Overs" cannot be seen; "Shorts" can be seen but distance from target cannot be judged). It is almost impossible to establish a predictive plot with any confidence and the firing ship (AIUI) is reduced to educated guesswork. Lion fired about 55 salvoes at Dogger Bank and scored four hits, which suggests four straddles in 55 salvoes. Rapid fire would not have been resorted to under such conditions; a review of von Hase's gunnery log excerpt (as reproduced in "Kiel and Jutland") shows that Rapid Fire was only ordered after two successive salvoes had been seen to straddle ..... which, taken together, had validated the FC solution.



{b}>>>>> In such cases, precious little can be discerned by the spotting officer: if the salvo is short, either his range rate or his range estimate or perhaps both may be wrong; if the salvo lands long and falls unseen, he knows his range and range rate must be wrong and deflection is an unknown. There is no way he can know more than that.[/u]

I think the issue is that no suggestion or instructions were made to use spotting results for adjusting range rate. There is a fairly simple example: getting an over after a straddle. That is almost definitely require both spotting down in range and (more closing) rate together. This, IIRC, was stipulated in the spotting rule according to Brooks.

The reason why I seems to be speaking about BCF ignoring rate ab nausea is that their underestimation of the closing rate is the main reason why they keep shooting overs. Yet in the lesson learned from Dogger Bank they suggested to use large spotting corrections to overcome rate errors. That does not charge the fact that even when straddle is achieved through spotting correction, the next salvo will lose the target due to incorrect rate.

>>>>> I transcribed everything from the Dogger Bank GFG&TO that was gunnery related. I have a copy of the original Battle Cruiser Force Dogger Bank report that discusses some gunnery related issues in greater detail.

I am really grateful for what you have done. I have learnt a lot from the sources and the discussion!

[wadinga]

Hi All,

The BCF's difficulties with rangefinding at both Dogger Bank and Jutland have a lot to do with visibility, differential visibility. If combat experience suggests rangefinders will prove to be relatively useless unlike artificial conditions of gunnery practice, another pragmatic solution will be sought.

The weather conditions also play a large part, in run to the south, the wind is blowing towards the Germans, hence spray,

One should remember when one is travelling at c. 25 kts the artificial wind forward to aft over your deck is often far more a factor than ambient strength and direction. At Dogger Bank British ships' funnel and cordite smoke were being left astern, leaving them relatively exposed. Both fleets sailed in en echelon formation to keep their smoke off the next astern.

Although I find his rabid anti-British bias risible, Gary Staff's books do have some value in quoting original material:

Now finally I can see with my glasses through a gap in the smoke veil [his own] two points to starboard aft. Unclear and indistinctively on the horizon the silhouettes of five enemy ships.

Kurt Gebeschus (Blucher)

Although he complains about swirling smoke, obviously his own, making spotting fall of shot difficult, there are at least "gaps" at the emitting end. With cordite smoke and funnel smoke covering the German ships from the British POV they are going to be tough targets.

Aim Straight quotes conditions described by a British gunnery officer in HMS New Zealandat Dogger Bank:

Gunlayers were trying to lay on the left hand cloud of smoke of several smoke streams on the horizon- they never saw the ships themselves the whole time- their sighting lenses were dulled by spray and cordite smoke after each round, the spray was driving in through the observation slits, green water pouring through the sighting hoods and washing down into the working chamber through the ladderway trunk- they were soaked through and cold.

He remarks that if pre-war gunnery practices had been carried out at realistic speeds, director control would have been adopted much earlier. However you need a stabilised, long baseline rangefinder up there as well. Calibrating rangefinders for range and bearing requires a static fixed location for the test, plus surveyed in targets onshore. Of course they can go out of calibration subsequently.

Staff quotes the Krieg zur See on Jutland:

At 16.20 hrs the German battlecruisers sighted , in the WSW, the two columns of quickly approaching Dreadnoughts, and at about 16.22 at a range of 15nm two battlecruisers with tripod masts, the 2nd BCF were clearly sighted from Seydlitz At 16.25 hrs HMS Princess Royal made out five smoke clouds in the east by north. Whether the British ships were easier to make out against the clearer western horizon, or if the German measuring and observation gear was better, or the light grey colour of the German ships was more favourable, as reason for the earlier observation of the English ships remains unknown.

Despite the enthusiasm for German optics, being able to pick out tripods at 30,000 yds suggests the British ships were silhouetted against the western sky for the run to the south.

As for rapid fire rates, interestingly the Wiki page on Baden after her capture and examination suggests her 15" brass cased main shots were indeed quicker to reload than the British equivalent, unfortunately it does not say anything about her Zeiss rangefinder performance. However this whole "maximum rate of fire" thing is IMHO a bit of a red herring. The object is not to get rid of ammunition as quickly as possible but to hit the enemy. Unfortunately synchronising the stop/go need for reloads depending on varying visual conditions, solutions from any fire control etc causing temporary witholding of fire contrasts with the magazine crews' activities whose drill, efficiency and sense of a good job done is to get those shells and charges "upstairs"as quickly as possible. The creation of backlog in the trunk and handling chamber may result in disaster.

Flank marking as HMS Southampton attempted to do depended on excellent rehearsed procedure and radio communications between the firer and "spotter" which didn't really exist then. You need to know precisely who is firing at who and estimated time of flight. It's even possible their helpful contributions actually made things worse, ascribing shell impacts to the wrong vessel. Even in WWII it didn't work well against Graf Spee or Bismarck.

Hi Byron, I know you are no great fan of Churchill, but unless there is evidence he bullied his technical advisors into recommending the cheaper system and canning Pollen's, he had surely just stood up and recounted what the current Director of Naval Ordnance, Reginald Bacon and the previous, John Jellicoe were telling him. The Great Monster has enough sins he was responsible for, without adding anybody else's. There is a new book out apparently blaming him for the Aboukir/Hogue/Cressy disaster when years ago Marder quoted an "interfering" memo he had sent Battenberg and Sturdee (who actually made the dispositions) telling them they should move the vulnerable old ships to the Western Approaches.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

I will just briefly respond to the whole debate around Dreyer vs Pollen.

1. Argo clock is undoubtedly a mechanically superior design, however it's closed architecture means additional features takes longer to integrate and the pre-war RN is too cost sensitive for it.

>>>>> Hi wm. I'm not in a position to judge which (if either) FC system was easier to modify. I will say that IMO cost was most definitely one of the principal determinants in the selection decision.

- - -

2. Regarding the change in range rates, the Mk lll and especially the Mk IV table can produce the resulting rates of straight line unequal course without issue. The rate on the plots is meant to allow the Dumerasq operator to suggest a new course and speed set up. There's no assumption of constant rate and largely helm free. (unlike the HACS with constant height assumption )
There are often too much handwaving when taking about "high" change in range rate. There are enough inter war firing trial with the Mk IV table to show that the mechanism is fit for purpose.

>>>>> Completely agree re the ability of both systems to trigonometrically process own and target straight line courses and deliver firing data. This has never really been an major issue in my view. The problem was always the accuracy of the data inputs required to produce accurate gunnery data: target bearing, target speed, target inclination and target range. The first two were manageable, but target inclination and range proved to be and remained serious problems. "GI/GO" is a modern aphorism, but IMO it well describes the difficulties facing WW1 naval gunners. My reading of various RN gunnery reports have led me to the opinion that operation of the Dreyer table was basically a matter of making successive adjustments to the Dumaresq/range clock until the results predicted by the Dreyer table matched the observed fall of shot results.

- - -

3. The good shooting of 5BS does have something to do with Dreyer table. At least Malaya can determine her target is zigzaging with a constant mean course. It's something that is far easier to detect on a plot. Certainly a more developed Argo clock (AFCT cough cough) will definitely be better, but I doubt anything dramatic.

>>>>> From my perspective, the success of 5BS's shooting most likely derived from their good rangefinders and/or good spotting of fall of shot. That would IMO have been the only way target weaving or zigzagging could have appeared on the Dreyer plot.

- - -

4. Regarding Iron Duke's good shooting, the claim that "results of the Dreyer table is not used" probably means the rates are not derived from the plots because RF cuts were too few. And also because it's hard to imagine the string of hits made on Konig with both ships making course changes was done without range clock and Dumaresq, which are well integrated in the Mk IV table.

>>>>> Just got some new bookcases to handle accumulated overflow and my library is in a state of semi-chaos . Anyways ..... I checked Campbell, Dreyer ("The Sea Heritage") and the "Jutland Despatches", but could find no mention of whether or not any ranges were obtained by Iron Duke before opening fire upon Konig. In as much as fire opened at about 12,000 yds upon an allegedly clearly seen sunlit target lasted only 4m 50s, my guess is that fire must have been opened immediately upon sighting Konig without awaiting generation of a plot and FC solution. When reading the reports of the ships in the GF battle line in the Official Despatches, many report state no useful range-finding results having been obtained - curious.

- - -

5. The best way for 5BS to improve its shooting is to not have them being shot at by the entire HSF.
The point is, Jutland would be very different if Evan-Thomas understand the significance of his squadron and take greater initiative. However, little can be done with the volatile nature of cordite.

>>>>> Evan-Thomas was either (intentionally or unintentionally) hung out to dry by Beatty, or was the victim of yet another signals foul-up aboard Lion. I doubt that the truth of this particular mystery can ever be unraveled at this late date.

- - -

Campbell is probably correct about his assessment on magazine detonation. Because Germans were also handling their charges dangerously, but none of their ship blew up even after huge turret fires. However, I do think proper ammunition handling could save some British ship by having less exposed charges.

>>>>> Five (nearly six) British ships blew up that day; I would not dismiss the possibility that more careful ammunition handling might have saved at least one of them.



6. Getting back to B&S Range finder. I think RN was right in trying to pursue numbers of range-finders and a single range finder is simply too prone to damage. However, the choice of 9ft range finder is not ideal. And sadly compounded by poor mounting position of many 12" gun BB and BC. BCF's attitude towards rangefinding could not help either.

>>>>> The Battle of Santiago was fought at 2,000 yds range in 1898. RNBattle Practice in the years leading up to the war had still not surpassed 10,000 yds; Beatty had to obtain special Admiralty permission for his BCF to conduct an experimental gunnery practice at 14,000 yds, and that took place (IIRC) only a few months before the outbreak of the war. By 1915, fire was opened at Dogger Bank at 20,000 yds. By mid-1915, GF gunnery practices were being routinely conducted at ranges up to 20,000 yds. On the one hand, the technology was clearly moving VERY fast; on the other hand the navy's budget loomed as a major political and fiscal concern. Once again ..... IMO ..... a complicated issue to cast judgment upon.

B

[Byron Angel]

The BCF's difficulties with rangefinding at both Dogger Bank and Jutland have a lot to do with visibility, differential visibility. If combat experience suggests rangefinders will prove to be relatively useless unlike artificial conditions of gunnery practice, another pragmatic solution will be sought.

The weather conditions also play a large part, in run to the south, the wind is blowing towards the Germans, hence spray,

One should remember when one is travelling at c. 25 kts the artificial wind forward to aft over your deck is often far more a factor than ambient strength and direction. At Dogger Bank British ships' funnel and cordite smoke were being left astern, leaving them relatively exposed. Both fleets sailed in en echelon formation to keep their smoke off the next astern.

>>>>> Several factors militated against British range-finding and gunnery at Dogger Bank:
> The BCF possessed the tactically preferred lee wind gauge; any resulting interference from German funnel smoke was considered far less incommoding than suffering from own smoke when fighting from windward.
> It was freely acknowledged that the 9-ft base-length FQ2 range-finder was inadequate for such ranges.
> Perhaps the most prominent complaint was related to the effects of spray, which played havoc with (non-director) turret sighting hoods, gun-sights and range-finders and consistently washed out "A" turret on several of the ships. Some of the spray was the result of enemy "shorts"; most was attributed to the high speeds maintained by the ships (26+ to 28+ kts).
> German funnel smoke was mentioned as a factor, but not deemed a dominating factor.

FWIW, the above is taken from a copy of the original BCF post Dogger Bank action report.

- - -

Gary Staff's books do have some value in quoting original material:

Now finally I can see with my glasses through a gap in the smoke veil [his own] two points to starboard aft. Unclear and indistinctively on the horizon the silhouettes of five enemy ships.

Kurt Gebeschus (Blucher)

Although he complains about swirling smoke, obviously his own, making spotting fall of shot difficult, there are at least "gaps" at the emitting end. With cordite smoke and funnel smoke covering the German ships from the British POV they are going to be tough targets.

Aim Straight quotes conditions described by a British gunnery officer in HMS New Zealandat Dogger Bank:

Gunlayers were trying to lay on the left hand cloud of smoke of several smoke streams on the horizon- they never saw the ships themselves the whole time- their sighting lenses were dulled by spray and cordite smoke after each round, the spray was driving in through the observation slits, green water pouring through the sighting hoods and washing down into the working chamber through the ladderway trunk- they were soaked through and cold.

>>>>> Following comments are excerpted from an essay written for Naval Review by an officer of New Zealand at Dogger Bank -

All this time we had been increasing speed, and more and more
spray was coming over the f'csle and "A" turret. I kept the turret
on the smoke for a while, and then trained away to prevent the spray
getting in the sights.

None of us could make out anything but the smoke, and I couldn't use
my glasses on account of the spray. However, we remained trained
on the rear cloud of smoke.

By this time my range-finder was useless; I was soaked through
to the skin by the spray coming in through the slit in my hood, hitting
me in the face and then trickling down outside and inside my clothes,
and I was frozen by the wind which came in with the spray. My eyes
were extremely sore, and I was blinking all the time.

Admiral Beatty had so maneuvered us that we had the perfectly
ideal tactical position, i.e., the exact lee gauge. Ranges were being
passed down of about 20,000 yards, our guns and sights were on the
stops at maximum elevation, and the cross wires were still well below
the horizon. There was very little roll on the ship at the time-it
being a perfectly clear and calm day-and what little roll there was
was rarely and at long intervals, sufficiently large to bring the sights on.

At about 9 a.m.- the Lion opened fire, and continued very slowly
and deliberately. I could only see the fall of shot very indistinctly
with the naked eye at that range. The Tiger opened about ten minutes
later, followed shortly by the Princess Royal. Their rate of fire gradually
increased, and in about a quarter of an hour they were firing at
a good speed.

We fired our first round at 9.33 a.m. at the Blucher, our opposite
number in their line. For about an hour and a-half we kept up a
very slow and intermittent fire, the range remaining about 18,000 yards.
'The blast from that first round of ours drove all the salt into my
eyes and half blinded me for some minutes. It was extremely painful,
and after that I found myself ducking my head to get below the slit
every time the fire gongs were rung.

During the chase I never really got a good detailed view of the
enemy's line, and couldn't observe the effect of our fire, but at one
time I noticed a fire in the third ship. It looked like the flash from
a big gun, but it went on for some considerable time instead of going
out. I maintain that I could tell when guns were being fired at us
from the flash.

The German gunlayers throughout the action must have found it
very difficult to lay their guns on account of the smoke and spray of
short shots as well as their own funnel smoke. They were in the very
worst possible position for both.

For approximately the first two hours after the chase had commenced,
the spray from the forecastle caused the greatest possible
inconvenience to the gunlayers, trainer, rangefinder operators, and
myself. It was found to be almost useless to wipe over any of the
glasses, as the spray came over practically continuously. For a few
seconds after the glasses had been wetted a fairly good view was
obtained (i.e., when there was a complete film of water over the glass),
but as soon as the water started to run off and dry up the glasses became
blurred.
The spray being driven in through my observation slit made my
eyes extremely sore, and the blast from my own guns firing made this
soreness worse. In a very short time I was wet through to the skin
and very cold. I propose to try and fit a talc shield which I can place
in the slit at will.
My rangefinder operator did not obtain one good reading the whole
time.

I was unable to use my glasses (except at the very end), and my
field of view was interrupted by the muzzles of both guns. Consequently
I never obtained a detailed view of the enemy; in fact, during the
chase, I never saw the ships, but only the clouds of smoke.

The gunlayers reported that they could have fired more often if
the order " Independent " had been given.

Spray from the water on the midship deck kept wetting the sights,
and made it necessary to send a hand out of the turret to dry them.
Owing to this, the wipers soon became sodden and useless.

The rangefinder operator reported early in the action that he could
not take ranges owing to the vibration at the high speed.

Water coming through the sighting hoods is bad, as it soaks the
gunlayers, trainer and sightsetters, and the whole of the sight mechanism
and electrical gear; but the water entering through the gun ports is
far worse. The volume of water is very great, and comes in with suficient
force to carry it all over the gun-house, soaking everyone and
everything there and in the working chamber, into which it pours like
a cascade. It overflows from the working chamber into the central
trunk, secondary shell trunk and ladder-way trunk. One man who was
entering the ladder-way trunk was washed off the ladder and fell down
the trunk to the handing room, severely damaging his ankle.
No drill could be carried out in the turret under these conditions
for some time. The electric lighting in the gun-house and working
chamber failed immediately, through short-circuiting, and the guns
themselves were filled with water. If the cages had happened to have
been loaded all the charges would have been rendered useless, and the
guns could have only have been fired by percussion tubes

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE SURVIVORS OF THE BLUCHER.
One of the Turret Masters stated:
(6) That his layer could not make out the ship he was laying on once
she opened fire, and that throughout the action she was a very bad
target. The great difficulty he experienced was their own gun and funnel
smoke, which hung round and would not clear. He laid on the flashes.

It is pretty clear that the British ships were far from uniquely disadvantaged by the tactical position at Dogger Bank.

- - -

He remarks that if pre-war gunnery practices had been carried out at realistic speeds, director control would have been adopted much earlier. However you need a stabilised, long baseline rangefinder up there as well. Calibrating rangefinders for range and bearing requires a static fixed location for the test, plus surveyed in targets onshore. Of course they can go out of calibration subsequently.

>>>>> I would not disagree.

- - -

Staff quotes the Krieg zur See on Jutland:

At 16.20 hrs the German battlecruisers sighted , in the WSW, the two columns of quickly approaching Dreadnoughts, and at about 16.22 at a range of 15nm two battlecruisers with tripod masts, the 2nd BCF were clearly sighted from Seydlitz At 16.25 hrs HMS Princess Royal made out five smoke clouds in the east by north. Whether the British ships were easier to make out against the clearer western horizon, or if the German measuring and observation gear was better, or the light grey colour of the German ships was more favourable, as reason for the earlier observation of the English ships remains unknown.

Despite the enthusiasm for German optics, being able to pick out tripods at 30,000 yds suggests the British ships were silhouetted against the western sky for the run to the south.

>>>>> There is no dispute that the German optical industry was FAR superior to its British counterpart at that time. One of the biggest early supply crises in Great Britain was that British optical firms, who had been obtaining their optical glass from German sources, were cut off from supply by the outbreak of the war. No British optical glass makers produced product close to Germany in quality. Germany was considered the world's leader in optical glass and lens products. In fact, there are accounts of the Entente and Germany conducting quiet "off the books" transactions trading rubber for optical glass via neutral Switzerland.

As far as E/W versus W/E visibility is concerned, note that the time differential between Lutzow's sighting of New Zealand and New Zealand's sighting of Lutzow was a matter of perhaps five minutes. Harper and the Naval Staff Appreciation estimated New Zealand's spotting distance to have been about 29,000 yds (14-15 miles). Compare the masts of the two ships: New Zealand had a very large and prominent spotting top situated atop a very heavily built lower tripod mast; Lutzow (at the time of Jutland) carried only slender pole mast and no such large spotting top structure as was fitted to New Zealand.

See Brooks' ("Battle of Jutland") for his assessment of visibility leading up[ to the 3:47pm opening of fire -

p.185 - "Lion's officers recalled that, as the flagship turned E while recording an enemy range of 23,000 yards, the day had been 'glorious', 'perfect'
, with just the masts, funnels and part of the hull of their target being visible above the horizon from aloft. Lion's director layer confirmed: 'When action was sounded, the light was good.', though he and others remarked that it deteriorated as the first phase of the action was ending. This leads to the following question - What was "the first phase of the action"? The logical answer, barring valid testimony to the contrary, is probably "The Run to the South".

Any unusual visibility difficulties faced by the BCF during said "Run to the South" can be explained by
( 1 ) Beatty's miscarriage of his Line of Bearing order (see Brooks, p.187) just prior to the opening of fire (Brooks, p.187);
( 2 ) The inexplicable passage of 9th/10th DD Flotilla at full speed close down the engaged side of the BCF battle line (Frost, p.202).

- - -

As for rapid fire rates, interestingly the Wiki page on Baden after her capture and examination suggests her 15" brass cased main shots were indeed quicker to reload than the British equivalent, unfortunately it does not say anything about her Zeiss rangefinder performance. However this whole "maximum rate of fire" thing is IMHO a bit of a red herring. The object is not to get rid of ammunition as quickly as possible but to hit the enemy. Unfortunately synchronising the stop/go need for reloads depending on varying visual conditions, solutions from any fire control etc causing temporary witholding of fire contrasts with the magazine crews' activities whose drill, efficiency and sense of a good job done is to get those shells and charges "upstairs"as quickly as possible. The creation of backlog in the trunk and handling chamber may result in disaster.

>>>>> AIUI, there were only so many positions for propellant charges to occupy at any one time in the hoists. My guess therefore is that the danger spot for unwarranted accumulations of charges would be in the working chamber and/or the handing room. As regards the post-war ins0pection of the Baden at Scapa Flow, it is my understanding that the Germans had comprehensively stripped out all sensitive fire control and range-finding equipment from all their ships prior to internment. I imagine that is one of the reasons why the post-war Cumberland Trials featured no German capital ship range-finders at all.


Flank marking as HMS Southampton attempted to do depended on excellent rehearsed procedure and radio communications between the firer and "spotter" which didn't really exist then. You need to know precisely who is firing at who and estimated time of flight. It's even possible their helpful contributions actually made things worse, ascribing shell impacts to the wrong vessel. Even in WWII it didn't work well against Graf Spee or Bismarck.

>>>>> I would not dispute your logic. Perhaps Southampton was favorably "mentioned in despatches" as a means of encouraging such behavior in future

- - -

Hi Byron, I know you are no great fan of Churchill, but unless there is evidence he bullied his technical advisors into recommending the cheaper system and canning Pollen's, he had surely just stood up and recounted what the current Director of Naval Ordnance, Reginald Bacon and the previous, John Jellicoe were telling him. The Great Monster has enough sins he was responsible for, without adding anybody else's. There is a new book out apparently blaming him for the Aboukir/Hogue/Cressy disaster when years ago Marder quoted an "interfering" memo he had sent Battenberg and Sturdee (who actually made the dispositions) telling them they should move the vulnerable old ships to the Western Approaches.

{b}>>>>> My criticism and dislike of Churchill derives solely from his egotistical inability to leave war fighting to the professionals. As regards procurement policy, Churchill was appointed to the post of First Lord at the Admiralty in late 1911. The navy budget AIUI had been marked out as a matter of serious governmental concern as early as 1905. Being ignorant of the personalities and politics surrounding the decision-making process within the Admiralty bureaucracy after Fisher's 1910 departure, I hesitate to lay that at Churchill's door.

Re Jellicoe - IIRC he had left his post as Director of Naval Ordnance in 1907, serving as Controller from 1908-1910. But he is reputed to have pushed hard for funds to modernize the navy during that time[/b]

B

[wadinga]

Hi Byron,

Firstly I want to second wmh829386's thanks for bringing excellent source material to the debate, the Naval Review article is clearly what Peter Padfield condensed in his comment about HMS New Zealand's Dogger Bank experience. As usual in the condensing loads of excellent, and often significant detail is lost.

It is fascinating to see the observation repeated

The BCF possessed the tactically preferred lee wind gauge

Admiral Beatty had so maneuvered us that we had the perfectly
ideal tactical position, i.e., the exact lee gauge

As a sometime catamaran sailor where the "apparent wind" effect is very significant, ie the vector resolution of ambient wind and forward motion wind allows the boat to point far higher into the ambient wind that should be possible, I am surprised by these observations.

If one were pootling along at 5-6 knots shooting at a battle practice target ambient wind direction could well be a problem, but if as at both Dogger Bank and Jutland winds are light breezes only, what is experienced on the vessel could be different. At the former the wind was coming from the East, and since the German Battlecruisers were intent on escaping to the ESE Beatty had little choice about the lee gage. As it was that meant his ships were "seeing" 25+ knots of wind from their forward motion plus 4-6 knots from slightly off their port bow, resulting in thirty knots plus. Filson Young describes a terrifying climb up to HMS Lion's forward control top in this icy blast expecting at any minute to fall to his death. The resulting vector resolution would mean Lion's funnel and cordite smoke would be rapidly left behind very slightly to starboard of her track. Beatty seems to have echeloned his ships out on his port quarter to keep them clear of the ship ahead's smoke.

For the German gunlayers looking downwind from their position the spray problems did not apply and their smoke was also being left behind as they retreated.

I have a copy of Brooks promised soon, (an anniversary present) so I will see his POV soon. Many other sources have suggested that whatever visibility obtained as Beatty turned south after sighting the enemy it was variable to his detriment long before he encountered the HSF. The big turn to starboard made it very difficult to get the slower 2BCS out in a preferred port echelon from Lion's leading position. The ambient wind was from the west but as soon as he cranked the speed up his smoke should be mainly left astern. The other problem was the 9th/10 flotilla which also needed to travel round the outside of a big turn and suffered a loss of station. Contrary to the observation made by some is the eye witness account of Harry Oram who says only his ship HMS Obdurate and one other HMS Morris were on the engaged side, their flotilla mates being on the unengaged side trying to regain their assigned position near Lion's bow. Beatty should have ordered even these two out of the way.

The Great Scuttle confirms your point about German fire-control equipment being removed and destroyed or hidden before the HSF went into internment despite the Armistice clause saying the ships should not be damaged in any way. Apparently even those AC stepper motors were removed to hide the secret although the French and US got their hands on them later (Friedman Naval Firepower) No argument from me on the excellence of Zeiss products, I was reading your 2011 debate with sundry others on stereoscopic versus coincidence rangefinders. Even the best optics can only do so much, identifying a tripod mast at 15 miles means the visibility was good= in that direction.

You highlighted the lack of British imagination on how ranges would increase from pre-war estimates and if fiscal considerations stopped the re-equipping of vessels costing well over one million pounds each with longer baseline B&S products it was classic case of Pennywise/Pound foolish.

All the best

wadinga

[wmh829386]

AIUI, there were only so many positions for propellant charges to occupy at any one time in the hoists. My guess therefore is that the danger spot for unwarranted accumulations of charges would be in the working chamber and/or the handing room.

The tragedy about this practice is that, despite the danger, the increase to the rate of fire is barely noticeable.

The Rof, more often than not is limited by
1. Gunnery consideration (shell travel time for spotting)
2. Gun cycle (depress, opening breech, ramming, close breech, elevate)
3. Upper hoist cycle speed

The only reason why ammunition stacking at handling room improve RoF is that the cramp, overloaded magazines are difficult to pull charges out and feed them to lower hoist in time, hence the practice of stacking bare charges in the handling room.

In many ways, the pre-war standard practice of having 4 full charges per gun out of the magazine (one each in gun loading cage, working chamber, lower hoist, handling room) already provided some buffer for snags in ammunition handling. As the post Jutland practice of 2 full charges per gun (one each in gun loading cage OR working chamber, and lower hoist OR handling room) is the minimum number of changes without theoretically slowing RoF.

(Basically once gun is loaded, working chamber crew is allowed to take the charge out from the lower hoist at up position while the empty loading cage is lowering, and the magazine crew is allow to move one charge to the handling room while the empty lower hoist is lowering. Rof will reduce if crew cannot finish moving the charge in the time taken for hoist to lower.)

>>>>> Following comments are excerpted from an essay written for Naval Review by an officer of New Zealand at Dogger Bank -

One should also remember that due to the lower position of the turret, much of the hull of the enemy at long range will be under the horizon anyway. The condition is difficult enough without sea water pouring through sighting hood.

The rangefinder operator reported early in the action that he could
not take ranges owing to the vibration at the high speed.

Seems like vibration is particularly bad of 12" BC. Given that the mounting wasn't dramatically different, seems like the direct result of overloading those ships for 26 kt.

What was "the first phase of the action"? The logical answer, barring valid testimony to the contrary, is probably "The Run to the South".

Agree. The 5BS by burning oil, having less destroyer escort, better RF and practice, is probably the more reliable source of ambient visibility from the British side.

>>>>> From my perspective, the success of 5BS's shooting most likely derived from their good rangefinders and/or good spotting of fall of shot. That would IMO have been the only way target weaving or zigzagging could have appeared on the Dreyer plot.

Of course having data in the first place is essential. However, plotting is probably a better way to show zigzaging compare to range averaging instrument, which produce averages periodically and produce various kind of patterns depending on the period of zigzags vs period of calculating rate.

I think attributing all of 5BS shooting to the range-finders omitted their performance during run to the North. During which none of the ship in 5BS thought they have shot effectively yet hits were still made.

>>>>> Just got some new bookcases to handle accumulated overflow and my library is in a state of semi-chaos . Anyways ..... I checked Campbell, Dreyer ("The Sea Heritage") and the "Jutland Despatches", but could find no mention of whether or not any ranges were obtained by Iron Duke before opening fire upon Konig. In as much as fire opened at about 12,000 yds upon an allegedly clearly seen sunlit target lasted only 4m 50s, my guess is that fire must have been opened immediately upon sighting Konig without awaiting generation of a plot and FC solution. When reading the reports of the ships in the GF battle line in the Official Despatches, many report state no useful range-finding results having been obtained - curious.

http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index ... of_Jutland

Notes Made by Lieutenant Richard Shelley, R.N., on Iron Duke's 13.5-in. Transmitting Station

...
6.29½. 70 Green Inclination 100 to the left.
6.30½. Open fire. Spotting corrections, detailed record not kept, No correction; Straddle no correction; Enemy on fire; record not kept.
6.37.10. No spotting correction.
6.37.40. Check fire. 90 Green.
For information Enemy was straddled and badly hit twice, a fire broke out under "A" and "B" Turrets. Enemy a/c/ 14 points and disappeared in the mist.
Passed sunken ship on starboard side.
Train 60 green follow the Director.
...

In the one minute interval, probably the Agro tower is the only RF that could reliably be train in time to get a range cut. Which is probably all that is necessary to open fire with a guess speed and inclination.

>>>>> The Battle of Santiago was fought at 2,000 yds range in 1898. RNBattle Practice in the years leading up to the war had still not surpassed 10,000 yds; Beatty had to obtain special Admiralty permission for his BCF to conduct an experimental gunnery practice at 14,000 yds, and that took place (IIRC) only a few months before the outbreak of the war. By 1915, fire was opened at Dogger Bank at 20,000 yds. By mid-1915, GF gunnery practices were being routinely conducted at ranges up to 20,000 yds. On the one hand, the technology was clearly moving VERY fast; on the other hand the navy's budget loomed as a major political and fiscal concern. Once again ..... IMO ..... a complicated issue to cast judgment upon.

Definitely agree