Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

General naval discussions that don't fit within any specific time period or cover several issues.
Byron Angel
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

Hi wm
Re RoF, the number of steps involved is quite impressive. There is a great deal going on above and beyond opening the breech and slamming a new projectile in. Even after reading about the “official procedure”, I learned more from a friend who was a turret boss aboard one of the re-commissioned Iowas that were deployed to Lebanon in the 80s.

More later. Gotta get me wife.

B
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

wadinga wrote: Tue Jul 19, 2022 7:22 pm Hi Byron,

Firstly I want to second wmh829386's thanks for bringing excellent source material to the debate, the Naval Review article is clearly what Peter Padfield condensed in his comment about HMS New Zealand's Dogger Bank experience. As usual in the condensing loads of excellent, and often significant detail is lost.

It is fascinating to see the observation repeated
The BCF possessed the tactically preferred lee wind gauge
Admiral Beatty had so maneuvered us that we had the perfectly
ideal tactical position, i.e., the exact lee gauge
As a sometime catamaran sailor where the "apparent wind" effect is very significant, ie the vector resolution of ambient wind and forward motion wind allows the boat to point far higher into the ambient wind that should be possible, I am surprised by these observations.

If one were pootling along at 5-6 knots shooting at a battle practice target ambient wind direction could well be a problem, but if as at both Dogger Bank and Jutland winds are light breezes only, what is experienced on the vessel could be different. At the former the wind was coming from the East, and since the German Battlecruisers were intent on escaping to the ESE Beatty had little choice about the lee gage. As it was that meant his ships were "seeing" 25+ knots of wind from their forward motion plus 4-6 knots from slightly off their port bow, resulting in thirty knots plus. Filson Young describes a terrifying climb up to HMS Lion's forward control top in this icy blast expecting at any minute to fall to his death. The resulting vector resolution would mean Lion's funnel and cordite smoke would be rapidly left behind very slightly to starboard of her track. Beatty seems to have echeloned his ships out on his port quarter to keep them clear of the ship ahead's smoke.

For the German gunlayers looking downwind from their position the spray problems did not apply and their smoke was also being left behind as they retreated.
>>>>> When a professional serving naval officer records that the BCF occupied the "ideal tactical position", I find it difficult to dispute him. 1SG, fighting from the windward position, had plenty of problems with gun and funnel smoke interference, as was testified by a Blucher survivor and supported by the observation of the New Zealand officer present at the action. While the windward position certainly must have helped to moderate spray interference, a further great aid was the modest 23 knot average speed of Hipper's battle line. By comparison, Beatty's Lion and Tiger running at 28+ knots, while Princess Royal and New Zealand were making 26+ knots; all four ships complained of terrible spray problems. By comparison, Jellicoe's GF battle line at Jutland (TTBOMK) had no complaints at all of spray interference problems despite occupying the lee position; the difference was arguably that Jellicoe's battle line was making a moderate 19 knots. I also disagree with the argument that the German windward position was superior because the ship would leave their smoke behind as they sailed ahead. Such an argument might be valid for the first ship in the line, but it entirely inverts the widely accepted standard that the lee position was the most advantageous tactical position. See the complaints of Princess Royal at Jutland over interference from the drifting gun and funnel smoke of the next ahead Lion.

- - -
I have a copy of Brooks promised soon, (an anniversary present) so I will see his POV soon. Many other sources have suggested that whatever visibility obtained as Beatty turned south after sighting the enemy it was variable to his detriment long before he encountered the HSF.
>>>>> As far as sources go, I prefer those who were present at the scene -

Excerpted from - THE FIGHTING AT JUTLAND

Narrative from Officers of HMS Princess Royal
….. at 3:32 we first sighted the enemy, 5 battle cruisers faintly distinguishable a very long distance away, accompanied by some torpedo craft. First of all their smoke, and later the outline of their masts, funnels, and the upper parts of their hulls became visible from the gun control position aloft, but from the turrets only smoke could be observed until some while later.
<snip>
Between 4 o’clock and 4.38 the Germans and ourselves ran on almost parallel courses, each endeavoring to the utmost of our ability to establish a mastery over the other.
<snip>
However, smoke and a decreasing visibility to the eastward now became two important difficulties. Our destroyers (at about 4:02) were between us and the enemy, and their smoke together with the smoke from Lion’s guns which was drifting across our range, was becoming a serious nuisance to our gun control.
(See photograph facing page 18, which shows column of DDs close by on the engaged side of 1st BCS)
<snip>
At 4:06 we altered a point to starboard, to South, to try and avoid the smoke, and for 10 minutes the range opened, until we were firing at ranges between 18,000 and 19,000 yards, or about 11 land miles. At 12 minutes past 4 we had to check fire for a while, and we turned back to South-South-East, 20 degrees more towards the enemy to close the range.
<snip>
When we had closed the enemy again slightly, to about 18,000 yards, it was pleasing to observe the 3rd ship of their line heavily on fire, but at 4:22 as a set-off to this advantage, we lost the Queen Mary and a few minutes later a salvo hit us abreast “Q” turret.
<snip>
At 4:24 we altered course more to port towards the enemy, on to a South-easterly course, and the range came down from 16,000 to 12,000 yards at about 4:26 (or 4:27). We were straddling the enemy and saw their leading ship hit; then our shots came short as the enemy were altering away from us, …
<snip>
At 4:36, after a turn of 20deg away from the enemy to S.S.E., we lost sight of them, at a range of perhaps 16,000 to 17,000 yards, …
<snip>
At 4:38 (or probably 4:46 according to book footnote) we turned 16 points to starboard, following round in the wake of Lion, and re-engaged the enemy to starboard at a range of 15,000 yards, but this range quickly increased, and though at 4:48 we altered course a point towards the enemy, at 4:52 the range had become as much as 18,000 yards. Two minutes before this the 5th Battle Squadron had passed on our port hand, still steering to the southward, and we also re-passed the wreck of the Queen Mary.
Our target was now the right hand, i.e., the rear battle cruiser, but we shifted on to the leading battle cruiser when she was visible (at 4:56), and fired 5 salvoes at her. The enemy line then altered away, and their range increased until it reached our maximum range, and we had to check fire. This was at 5:08, and we did not fire again until 5:50, when the leading battle ships of the Grand Fleet were sighted, and we had altered to starboard to close the enemy again.
<snip>
From a gunnery point of view the firing was becoming very difficult, the range at 5:00 p.m. being as much as 19,000 yards, and the enemy were difficult to see. We shifted target two or three times, as one or the other of the enemy could be observed, but at 5:08 we had to check fire, being unable to see a target any longer.

Narrative of the Gunnery Control Officer of HMS Lion
Having completed the 16-point turn at 4:45 p.m., a further turn of 4 points is made to starboard, for both battle cruiser lines have turned outwards, thereby considerable increasing the range. Three minutes later, by which time the German battle cruisers have completed their turn, the two lines have again converged to within gun range, and fire is opened on the enemy leading ship, which is noted as being the Von der Tann. The range is 20,000 yards but only eleven salvoes are fired before the bad light and mist make it possible for the enemy to pass out of sight at about 16,000 yards.
Note – 4:45 p.m. is the time referenced in the account of this officer when bad light and mist are mentioned as problems inhibiting gunnery. Bad light and mist, along with a generally smoky atmosphere, are thereafter constantly referred to throughout the remainder of the daylight action.

Narrative of the 5th B.S. (From a Turrte Officer of HMS Malaya)
About 4:10 p.m. – We turned to approx.. S.S.E., and I then sighted the German battle cruisers steaming on a parallel course to us. There were five of them, and I thought their order was as follows:- three Derfflinger Class leading the line, followed by the Moltke and then the Seydlitz. There were light cruisers and T.B.D.’s ahead and astern of them.
<snip>
4:15 p.m. We opened fire on the Seydlitz (actually Von der Tann), and were the last ship to commence, being the last in the line. The range was 19,000 yards, and the enemy bearing about 2 points before the beam. The visibility was then good for ranging, but I thought it bad for spotting, as the background was misty and of exactly the same shade as a splash, which made the latter difficult to distinguish.
<snip>
When the Von der Tann was hit, she at once turned away about 5 points (50 or 60 degrees), but shortly afterwards resumed her course. Very soon after this I remember thinking that the enemy must be zigzagging, as on several occasions we found our shot going wrong for deflection.
<snip>
We fired quickly for the first few salvoes, but as the light gradually became worse the range closed, and our firing became more deliberate
<snip>
The battle continued in this manner until 4:50 p.m. The visibility was rapidly becoming worse, and at times we could only see the flash of the enemy’s guns.
<snip>
Up to this time (4:50 p.m.) the shooting had for us been very like a “peace battle practice”.


- - -
The big turn to starboard made it very difficult to get the slower 2BCS out in a preferred port echelon from Lion's leading position. The ambient wind was from the west but as soon as he cranked the speed up his smoke should be mainly left astern.
>>>>> There was no big turn to starboard, if the suggestion is that it was one great arc. 2BCS, in its efforts to take up it ordered position astern of 1BCS, was actually obliged to execute two nearly 180deg turns in opposite directions.

- - -
The other problem was the 9th/10 flotilla which also needed to travel round the outside of a big turn and suffered a loss of station.
>>>>> According to the report and track charts of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla in the Jutland Despatches -
3:30pm - 2BCS took station astern of 1BCS with the six "L" class destroyers of 9th flotilla in line ahead abreast on the engaged side of 2BCS at 5 cables separation.
3:35pm - 9th Flotilla ordered to take station 5 miles ahead of the BCF; full speed (28 knots) put on the destroyer engine room telegraphs.
The 3 knot speed differential over the BCF meant that 9th ?Flotilla was only slowly crawling ahead of the 25 knot BCF.
4:11pm - order from SO/BCF flagship Lion to "Clear the Range" was received. (4:30pm according to Liberty and Lydiard)
Princess Royal complained of interference from destroyer smoke.
Tiger's gunnery notes remarked on interference from destroyer smoke between 3:52 and 3:58.


- - -
Contrary to the observation made by some is the eye witness account of Harry Oram who says only his ship HMS Obdurate and one other HMS Morris were on the engaged side, their flotilla mates being on the unengaged side trying to regain their assigned position near Lion's bow. Beatty should have ordered even these two out of the way.
>>>>> See above.

- - -
The Great Scuttle confirms your point about German fire-control equipment being removed and destroyed or hidden before the HSF went into internment despite the Armistice clause saying the ships should not be damaged in any way. Apparently even those AC stepper motors were removed to hide the secret although the French and US got their hands on them later (Friedman Naval Firepower) No argument from me on the excellence of Zeiss products, I was reading your 2011 debate with sundry others on stereoscopic versus coincidence rangefinders. Even the best optics can only do so much, identifying a tripod mast at 15 miles means the visibility was good in that direction.
>>>>> We have probably trampled the grass all around the range-finding issue, but the incorporation of the "Mittlungsapparat" real-time range-averaging system was a very important advantage.

Re visibility, it was IMO good in both directions at that time and not until 4:15-4:30pm did visibility to the E start to slowly deteriorate. Another factor which IMO is not given due consideration is that, after the BCF's course reversal in the face of the approaching HSF, everyone was steaming headlong into the atmospheric miasma of lingering gun and funnel smoke left from the initial "Run to the South". IIRC, both Tarrant and Groos indicate its presence on their respective battle charts.


- - -
You highlighted the lack of British imagination on how ranges would increase from pre-war estimates and if fiscal considerations stopped the re-equipping of vessels costing well over one million pounds each with longer baseline B&S products it was classic case of Pennywise/Pound foolish.
>>>>>Tricky question. Considering the steady range increases in annual pre-war Battle Practices and the adoption of the FQ2 9-ft range-finder in 1911 to outfit the fleet, a fighting range of at least 10,000 yards was arguably in the minds of the Admiralty. Callahan's Home Fleet GFBO's (prior to Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet) stipulated opening of deliberate fire at 15,000 yards, so there was that too. If I were going to level any criticism, it would be that the Admiralty was too reliant upon private industry and private parties to push the technological envelope. Optical sight = Scott; Director = Scott; Fire Control systems = Pollen and Dreyer; Range-finders = Barr & Stroud; Gyros = Anschutz & Sperry. What, if anything, did the Admiralty have at that time in the way of a scientific/technological development bureau?
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

Two other "private party" technological developments I omitted from my previous post -
Range clock = Dumaresq.
Data/Bearing transmitters = Evershed.

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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by wadinga »

HI Byron,

Can we just clarify something? I think I've just realised something (slow to catch on) Brooks (which I have yet to see) and you had already figured out.
There was no big turn to starboard, if the suggestion is that it was one great arc.
I'm looking at the series of turns to starboard made by Lion and the BCS from 15:45 onwards based on signals to alter course initially to 100T at that time. John Campbell says
Since opening fire [15:48} the Lion had been gradually turning to starboard, and by 15:54 when the range between the leading ships was about 14,000 yds she was on a divergent course of 156T, and 15:57 turned further away to about 164.T.


The flag signal at 15:45 (when the ships were sailing something like 080T) instructed his battlecruisers to take up line of bearing of 302T ie en echelon to port of Lion p 39 Campbell "to take up the most favourable disposition with regard to funnel and cordite smoke". That LOB was only the most favourable because of Lion's current heading.

This series of turns from c.77T to 164T is what I meant by big turn to starboard.

I find interesting Campbell's depiction p 44 of one of the turns where the echeloned BCS does what appears to be a "crossover turn" whereby the outer ship before the turn becomes the inner ship after the turn. It seems to me they have hung onto that ordered LOB of 302T when it is no longer valid. In order to minimise the smoke interference Lion needs her next astern to be closer to the enemy, ie on her port quarter, and so on down the line. Yes wind drift of 4-6 knots will blow the smoke eastwards, nothing to be done about it, Beatty is coming from the west, Hipper from the east.

From the diagrams I have seen when heading SE the BCF is echeloned the "wrong way" as you (and apparently Brooks) have identified, with each ship leaving its smoke in front (looking at the enemy) of the next behind. Somebody turned the need for the BCS to be echeloned to port ie a relative bearing to the flagship into an absolute bearing, and with no order to the contrary it looks like everybody maintained it during the arc to starboard which at least meant Indefatigable, as the slowest, and on the outside before the turn, did not have to make unachievable speed to maintain outer position as the "Marching band" turned to the right.
( 1 ) Beatty's miscarriage of his Line of Bearing order (see Brooks, p.187) just prior to the opening of fire (Brooks, p.187);
Now I understand........ Still lots to learn :D

Is this Beatty's mistake, or is this Seymour turning the Admiral's wishes into an inappropriate order?

All the best

wadinga
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

wadinga wrote: Thu Jul 21, 2022 2:56 pm HI Byron,

Can we just clarify something? I think I've just realised something (slow to catch on) Brooks (which I have yet to see) and you had already figured out.
There was no big turn to starboard, if the suggestion is that it was one great arc.
I'm looking at the series of turns to starboard made by Lion and the BCS from 15:45 onwards based on signals to alter course initially to 100T at that time. John Campbell says
Since opening fire [15:48} the Lion had been gradually turning to starboard, and by 15:54 when the range between the leading ships was about 14,000 yds she was on a divergent course of 156T, and 15:57 turned further away to about 164.T.


The flag signal at 15:45 (when the ships were sailing something like 080T) instructed his battlecruisers to take up line of bearing of 302T ie en echelon to port of Lion p 39 Campbell "to take up the most favourable disposition with regard to funnel and cordite smoke". That LOB was only the most favourable because of Lion's current heading.

This series of turns from c.77T to 164T is what I meant by big turn to starboard.

I find interesting Campbell's depiction p 44 of one of the turns where the echeloned BCS does what appears to be a "crossover turn" whereby the outer ship before the turn becomes the inner ship after the turn. It seems to me they have hung onto that ordered LOB of 302T when it is no longer valid. In order to minimise the smoke interference Lion needs her next astern to be closer to the enemy, ie on her port quarter, and so on down the line. Yes wind drift of 4-6 knots will blow the smoke eastwards, nothing to be done about it, Beatty is coming from the west, Hipper from the east.

From the diagrams I have seen when heading SE the BCF is echeloned the "wrong way" as you (and apparently Brooks) have identified, with each ship leaving its smoke in front (looking at the enemy) of the next behind. Somebody turned the need for the BCS to be echeloned to port ie a relative bearing to the flagship into an absolute bearing, and with no order to the contrary it looks like everybody maintained it during the arc to starboard which at least meant Indefatigable, as the slowest, and on the outside before the turn, did not have to make unachievable speed to maintain outer position as the "Marching band" turned to the right.
( 1 ) Beatty's miscarriage of his Line of Bearing order (see Brooks, p.187) just prior to the opening of fire (Brooks, p.187);
Now I understand........ Still lots to learn :D

Is this Beatty's mistake, or is this Seymour turning the Admiral's wishes into an inappropriate order?

>>>>> My apologies. I had apprehended that you were referring to Beatty's order (prior to opening of fire) for 2BCS to take station astern of 1BCS, which required 2BCS to perform all sorts of gyrations to accomplish.

As regards Lion's turn away after suffering her early hits, I'm still trying to work out (f at all possible) the actual truth of the matter. I will need to pull out some other books on this and will shortly offer my "collected thoughts" in a follow-up post.
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by wadinga »

Hi Byron,
As regards Lion's turn away after suffering her early hits, I'm still trying to work out (f at all possible) the actual truth of the matter.
Is this what Campbell describes on p 42 where Chatfield says the quartermaster misheard a 5 degree starboard course change as a helm instruction and gave this amount of rudder at about 16:01/2? The gunnery records suggest she turned about 30 degrees in total and some of the following ships turned to conform.

They were still using the archaic form of helm instruction (like a boat tiller) ie "port helm" gives a starboard turn, so it is difficult to understand how a muddle occurred.

Apparently Beatty considered forming battleline with 2BCS ahead as they were already 2-3 miles ahead and to the east in cruising formation, but "leading from the front" required him to drop them behind him. Getting them to slow down to a crawl in a war zone was a bad idea so gyrations were in order.

Hi wmh829386

Interesting information about Iron Duke, I have read an account saying Konig was fortuitously illuminated by a shaft of sunlight at just the right time.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

Re the mystery of Lion’s Turn away -


Chatfield’s account from his memoir “Navy and Defence” (p.142)
It was not long after the disaster to the “Indefatigable”, that I heard a resounding clank behind me.” (referring to the hit on “Q” turret @ approximately 3:57?)
<snip>
“It was at this moment, seeing that the range was decreasing and not wishing to let it do so, I told Commander Strutt to steer 5 degrees to starboard. Strutt gave the order. The chief Quartermaster, however, misheard it as ordering him to give the ship 5 degree of port helm. I suddenly saw the ship swinging off to starboard rapidly and had to bring her back and increase speed to resume our station. The ships astern, having seen the large flame shoot up, thought we were sheering off because of the damage!”

Narrative of Gunnery Officer of HMS Lion (Longhurst?) – “The Fighting at Jutland” (p.107)
“At 3:57 one of the turrets is hit and put out of action, …
<snip>
The bearing of the enemy is now growing aft, and the range having been down to 14,500 yards at 3:54, has increased again to 16,750 at 4:01, indicating that the enemy has been altering course away slightly. The range still increases and the enemy does not fire for some ten minutes, a fact noted by the control top because there are no enemy gun flashes, and the line of view is not intermittently obstructed by columns of water thrown up by his salvoes.
<snip>
At 4:15 the enemy opens fire again, and so the running fight between the battle cruisers continues until 4:36, when the enemy, having altered course to port and being abaft the beam, has increased the range to the maximum possible for the guns, and fire is ceased.”

S.M.S. “Lützow” at Jutland”; Her Gunnery Officer Commander Paschen, 1927, Royal United Services Institution Journal, 72:485, pp. 32-41
“Our fire is now very accurate; a sharp turn of 4 points by the enemy is noticed at once. At 4.52 we secure our third hit. Red flames shoot from the third turret and a great fragment, half the roof, goes up. Seventeen minutes after fire was opened, “ Lion” turned sharply away, until we could see her from aft and “Princess Royal” pushed in front.
<snip>
Although we clearly observed “Lion” leaving the line, the fact is not mentioned in our opponent’s accounts and is only alluded to inaccurately as a turning away of the whole line. This is contradicted by the fact, established by photos in “The Fighting at Jutland”, that ’‘Queen Mary” was second in the line when she blew up. It is certain that ‘’ Lion ” later resumed the lead, but I cannot state when this happened. At 5.8 we change target to “Princess Royal.”

Excerpted from Jutland Gunnery Log of “Lion”
3:47:30 -–--- 18500 –---- Open Fire ----- steering 93 degrees.
3:49:00 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:50:00 ------ 15500 ----- Suffered 1 hit from Lutzow.
3:50:30 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:51:00 ------ Suffered 1 hit from Lutzow.
3:52:30 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:53:00 ------ Straddled Lutzow; steering 156 degrees.
3:55:00 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:56:00 ------ 15000; steering 164 degrees.
3:59:00 ------ “Q” turret knocked out at 16500 yards.
4:00:00 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
4:01:00 ------ 16750
4:03:00 ------ A & B turrets not bearing.
4:08:00 ------ 21400
4:09:00 ------ Ship altered course to port.
4:10:00 ------ Steering 145 degrees.
4:12:00 ------ 23000
4:11:30 ------ Ship altered course to port.
4:13:00 ------ Steering 122 degrees.
4:15:00 ------ 21275

- - - - -

Comments welcome.

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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by wadinga »

Hi Byron,

Looking at the RN Manual of Seamanship 1937 the instruction should be "Alter course 5 degrees to starboard" for a course change whereas a direct rudder instruction should be in the format "Starboard 5 degrees". In both cases the helmsman repeats the order and when it has been achieved reports "Course XXX" when the new course has been steadied on, or "5 of starboard" when the rudder has been adjusted. These protocol should avoid confusion. The WWI instructions for direct rudder movement might well have been (tiller style) "Port 5 degrees" to turn the ship to starboard.

If Lion made an excessive turn to avoid being hit again, that is no big deal, provided the following ships realise it is a temporary move and squadron course remains as before. I believe Hipper turned away about the same time so the significance is even lower.

Triumphalist observations by German sources (sore losers) about Lion "leaving the line" are just irrelevant propagandist puff, since she was back and fighting on shortly afterwards, whereas Lutzow crawled away from the action and scuttled herself when the rest of the HSF left her behind to face the music. (Now who's being triumphalist!)

Do any of the photos in Fighting at Jutland suggest the BCF was echeloned to starboard during the run south? The photo of Indefatigable sinking looks like she was not dead astern of New Zealand's photographer, and implication is she was on starboard quarter of that ship.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by wmh829386 »

Byron Angel wrote: Fri Jul 22, 2022 5:14 pm Re the mystery of Lion’s Turn away -


Chatfield’s account from his memoir “Navy and Defence” (p.142)
It was not long after the disaster to the “Indefatigable”, that I heard a resounding clank behind me.” (referring to the hit on “Q” turret @ approximately 3:57?)
<snip>
“It was at this moment, seeing that the range was decreasing and not wishing to let it do so, I told Commander Strutt to steer 5 degrees to starboard. Strutt gave the order. The chief Quartermaster, however, misheard it as ordering him to give the ship 5 degree of port helm. I suddenly saw the ship swinging off to starboard rapidly and had to bring her back and increase speed to resume our station. The ships astern, having seen the large flame shoot up, thought we were sheering off because of the damage!”

Narrative of Gunnery Officer of HMS Lion (Longhurst?) – “The Fighting at Jutland” (p.107)
“At 3:57 one of the turrets is hit and put out of action, …
<snip>
The bearing of the enemy is now growing aft, and the range having been down to 14,500 yards at 3:54, has increased again to 16,750 at 4:01, indicating that the enemy has been altering course away slightly. The range still increases and the enemy does not fire for some ten minutes, a fact noted by the control top because there are no enemy gun flashes, and the line of view is not intermittently obstructed by columns of water thrown up by his salvoes.
<snip>
At 4:15 the enemy opens fire again, and so the running fight between the battle cruisers continues until 4:36, when the enemy, having altered course to port and being abaft the beam, has increased the range to the maximum possible for the guns, and fire is ceased.”

S.M.S. “Lützow” at Jutland”; Her Gunnery Officer Commander Paschen, 1927, Royal United Services Institution Journal, 72:485, pp. 32-41
“Our fire is now very accurate; a sharp turn of 4 points by the enemy is noticed at once. At 4.52 we secure our third hit. Red flames shoot from the third turret and a great fragment, half the roof, goes up. Seventeen minutes after fire was opened, “ Lion” turned sharply away, until we could see her from aft and “Princess Royal” pushed in front.
<snip>
Although we clearly observed “Lion” leaving the line, the fact is not mentioned in our opponent’s accounts and is only alluded to inaccurately as a turning away of the whole line. This is contradicted by the fact, established by photos in “The Fighting at Jutland”, that ’‘Queen Mary” was second in the line when she blew up. It is certain that ‘’ Lion ” later resumed the lead, but I cannot state when this happened. At 5.8 we change target to “Princess Royal.”

Excerpted from Jutland Gunnery Log of “Lion”
3:47:30 -–--- 18500 –---- Open Fire ----- steering 93 degrees.
3:49:00 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:50:00 ------ 15500 ----- Suffered 1 hit from Lutzow.
3:50:30 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:51:00 ------ Suffered 1 hit from Lutzow.
3:52:30 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:53:00 ------ Straddled Lutzow; steering 156 degrees.
3:55:00 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
3:56:00 ------ 15000; steering 164 degrees.
3:59:00 ------ “Q” turret knocked out at 16500 yards.
4:00:00 ------ Ship altered course to starboard.
4:01:00 ------ 16750
4:03:00 ------ A & B turrets not bearing.
4:08:00 ------ 21400
4:09:00 ------ Ship altered course to port.
4:10:00 ------ Steering 145 degrees.
4:12:00 ------ 23000
4:11:30 ------ Ship altered course to port.
4:13:00 ------ Steering 122 degrees.
4:15:00 ------ 21275

- - - - -

Comments welcome.

Byron


The incident was shown pretty clearly from Lion's gunnery record
http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index ... of_Jutland

Time target bearing
4.00 114
4.01 129
4.02 144
4.03 136
4.04 125

Notes, Range and gunnery information are omitted.
Byron Angel
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

wadinga wrote: Sat Jul 23, 2022 12:23 am Looking at the RN Manual of Seamanship 1937 the instruction should be "Alter course 5 degrees to starboard" for a course change whereas a direct rudder instruction should be in the format "Starboard 5 degrees". In both cases the helmsman repeats the order and when it has been achieved reports "Course XXX" when the new course has been steadied on, or "5 of starboard" when the rudder has been adjusted. These protocol should avoid confusion. The WWI instructions for direct rudder movement might well have been (tiller style) "Port 5 degrees" to turn the ship to starboard.
>>>>> Not sure when the RN language protocol was altered, but the RN's use of "helm" must have gone back centuries, referring as it did to the the direction of the tiller rather than the intended direction of the ship's course alteration. IIRC, in WW2, the USN was using "Right" and "Left' to issue helm orders.
If Lion made an excessive turn to avoid being hit again, that is no big deal, provided the following ships realise it is a temporary move and squadron course remains as before. I believe Hipper turned away about the same time so the significance is even lower.
>>>>> It is unknown whether the other ships in the BCF line were aware; all we do know is that Lion's wireless was shot away shortly after commencing her turn-away. According to Groos's track chart (see web-link below) 1SG appears to have held a more or less steady course during the period of time in question; Gary Staff indicates that 1SG altered 1 point away at the time of Lion's turn-away. See web-link below for Groos's track chart. See Campbell's track chart - pp 44-45 for comparison).

- - -
Triumphalist observations by German sources (sore losers) about Lion "leaving the line" are just irrelevant propagandist puff, since she was back and fighting on shortly afterwards, whereas Lutzow crawled away from the action and scuttled herself when the rest of the HSF left her behind to face the music. (Now who's being triumphalist!).
>>>>> I would be extremely grateful if we can refrain from this sort of stuff. Campbell did not express any skepticism or criticism whatsoever in connection with Paschen's account (see p.42 in "Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting"). Whether unintentional or intentional, Lion steadily turned away to 165deg (approx. SSE) until only her "X" turret could bear upon the enemy. According to Campbell, it was about ten minutes before Lion resumed her station at the head of the line. In the meantime, Paschen had lost sight of Lion and temporarily switched fire to Princess Royal. If Paschen's word is good enough for Campbell, it's good enough for me.

- - -
Do any of the photos in Fighting at Jutland suggest the BCF was echeloned to starboard during the run south? The photo of Indefatigable sinking looks like she was not dead astern of New Zealand's photographer, and implication is she was on starboard quarter of that ship.
>>>>> Go here - https://www.jutland1916.com/wp-content/uploads/05.jpg
The action report of New Zealand and the account of Cdr Mahrholz (Gunnery Office of Von der Tann) both confirm that Indefatigable turned out of line to starboard upon being hit. I don't think it is possible to know whether this turn was intentional or a result of her heavy damage aft.
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by wadinga »

Hi Byron,
Whether unintentional or intentional, Lion steadily turned away to 165deg (approx. SSE) until only her "X" turret could bear upon the enemy.
Agreed, but what is the significance? Many ships altered course once they were hit, to avoid being hit again. Seems like a good idea to me. Does it even matter whether it was intentional or unintentional? There is no question of disbelieving Paschen, merely wondering whether a temporary course change is at all significant.

Perhaps Lion should have hoisted "not under control" whilst she had her detour, to indicate to the others to maintain course and not follow her.

All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by HMSVF »

Gentleman,

In regards to HMS Indefatigable you may find this of interest...


http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/29391/ ... ig.%203%29.


Of interest is that she was was found 5 miles away from where Harper recorded her as being sunk, which is surprising as he pretty much got all the others right. Also the paper revaluates her loss - her stern was found some 500 metres away from the rest of her hull. It reports that she suffered a deflagration of "X" magazine which lead to the loss of the stern and control - she was seen to haul out of line. She was all ready finished when VdT effectively "kicked a corpse" when she landed shells on "A" turret leading to a further explosion.

BW


HMSVF
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

wmh829386 wrote: Sat Jul 23, 2022 12:44 am The incident was shown pretty clearly from Lion's gunnery record
http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index ... of_Jutland

Time target bearing
4.00 114
4.01 129
4.02 144
4.03 136
4.04 125

Notes, Range and gunnery information are omitted.

Hi wm,
Thank you very much (yet again) for your reference to "Lion's gunnery log document posted on Tone Lovell's website. It appears to be the original and complete document - and far more detailed than the clearly abbreviated version provided in the Jutland Despatches. I have known Tone for more than twenty years (he's also from Massachusetts) and it's embarrassing to me that I have failed so miserably to keep up to date on his Dreadnought Project website.

What this version of the gunnery report indicates can IMO be summed up as follows -

3.49.0 / 3.50.5 / 3.52.5 / 3.55.0 -
Four minor course alterations to starboard were ordered over this span of about six minutes. My guess that these were executed under small helm to limit speed loss and, based upon net change in target bearing from R53 to R114, averaged about one or two points each. The end result brought target bearing from Red 53 and more or less steadied it at Red 114/115.

3.58.5 -
It appears that Lion may have recorded a straddle - "2 short L 5".

3.59.0 / 3.59.5 -
Data entry for 3.59.0 still indicates target bearing at R114; data entry for 3.59.5 shows only that s salvo (3 shots?) was fired. No other spotting observation data or aim correction orders were entered in that time span. The obvious impression is that this was the moment when "Q" turret was struck.

4.00.0
Within 30 seconds after firing the 3.59.5 salvo" three splashes are spotted short. A correction of "up 200 R 3, Rapid" is sent to the guns and a course alteration to starboard is immediately ordered.

Here is where the course alteration issue gets interesting -
3.49.0 course alteration: change in target bearing in the first minute of the turn was about 4-5 degrees (a 1/2 point course change?).
3.50.5 course alteration: change in target bearing in the first minute of the turn was about 10-11 degrees (a 1 point course change?).
3.52.5 course alteration: change in target bearing in the first minute of the turn was about 9-10 degrees (a 1 point course change?).
3.55.0 course alteration: change in target bearing in the first minute of the turn was about 10 degrees (a 1 point course change?).
4.00.0 course alteration: change in target bearing in the first minute of the turn was about 15 degrees (a 1.5 point course change???).

5 degrees = approximately 1/2 point turn; OK, I can buy that; 10 degrees = approximately a 1 point turn; OK, I can buy that; But 15 degrees = approximately a 1.5 point turn .... and, if you take into consideration that the 4.00.0 turn had altered target bearing by a full 30 degrees after two minutes before being coaxed back to 136 degrees in the 3rd minute; now I am starting to wonder about Chatfield's description of a mere helm order misunderstanding.

Another point of interest:
At 4.01.00, a range cut from Lion to Lutzow gave a range reading of 16750 yds. At 4.12.00, when Lion had once again brought Lutzow back on a R91 target bearing, Lion recorded a range cut of 23,000 yds, which was about a mile beyond the reach of Lutzow's guns. Altogether, Lion had opened the range by three miles. I suggest that this was manifestly different from evasively zig-zagging to throw off enemy fire.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

If anyone reading this has practical experience at the wheel of a large warship, I'd be pleased to hear from you - no matter whether you support or dispute my thinking.

Byron
Last edited by Byron Angel on Sun Jul 24, 2022 10:23 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by Byron Angel »

HMSVF wrote: Sun Jul 24, 2022 7:35 pm Gentleman,

In regards to HMS Indefatigable you may find this of interest...


http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/29391/ ... ig.%203%29.


Of interest is that she was was found 5 miles away from where Harper recorded her as being sunk, which is surprising as he pretty much got all the others right. Also the paper revaluates her loss - her stern was found some 500 metres away from the rest of her hull. It reports that she suffered a deflagration of "X" magazine which lead to the loss of the stern and control - she was seen to haul out of line. She was all ready finished when VdT effectively "kicked a corpse" when she landed shells on "A" turret leading to a further explosion.

BW

HMSVF

Hi HMSVF,
Agree. This all pretty much concurs with McCartney's wreck analysis and Mahrholz's account (gunnery officer of Von der Tann) re the sequence of events.

B
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Re: Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

Post by wmh829386 »

Byron Angel wrote: Sat Jul 23, 2022 6:19 pm
wadinga wrote: Sat Jul 23, 2022 12:23 am Looking at the RN Manual of Seamanship 1937 the instruction should be "Alter course 5 degrees to starboard" for a course change whereas a direct rudder instruction should be in the format "Starboard 5 degrees". In both cases the helmsman repeats the order and when it has been achieved reports "Course XXX" when the new course has been steadied on, or "5 of starboard" when the rudder has been adjusted. These protocol should avoid confusion. The WWI instructions for direct rudder movement might well have been (tiller style) "Port 5 degrees" to turn the ship to starboard.
>>>>> Not sure when the RN language protocol was altered, but the RN's use of "helm" must have gone back centuries, referring as it did to the the direction of the tiller rather than the intended direction of the ship's course alteration. IIRC, in WW2, the USN was using "Right" and "Left' to issue helm orders.
If Lion made an excessive turn to avoid being hit again, that is no big deal, provided the following ships realise it is a temporary move and squadron course remains as before. I believe Hipper turned away about the same time so the significance is even lower.
>>>>> It is unknown whether the other ships in the BCF line were aware; all we do know is that Lion's wireless was shot away shortly after commencing her turn-away. According to Groos's track chart (see web-link below) 1SG appears to have held a more or less steady course during the period of time in question; Gary Staff indicates that 1SG altered 1 point away at the time of Lion's turn-away. See web-link below for Groos's track chart. See Campbell's track chart - pp 44-45 for comparison).

- - -
Triumphalist observations by German sources (sore losers) about Lion "leaving the line" are just irrelevant propagandist puff, since she was back and fighting on shortly afterwards, whereas Lutzow crawled away from the action and scuttled herself when the rest of the HSF left her behind to face the music. (Now who's being triumphalist!).
>>>>> I would be extremely grateful if we can refrain from this sort of stuff. Campbell did not express any skepticism or criticism whatsoever in connection with Paschen's account (see p.42 in "Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting"). Whether unintentional or intentional, Lion steadily turned away to 165deg (approx. SSE) until only her "X" turret could bear upon the enemy. According to Campbell, it was about ten minutes before Lion resumed her station at the head of the line. In the meantime, Paschen had lost sight of Lion and temporarily switched fire to Princess Royal. If Paschen's word is good enough for Campbell, it's good enough for me.

- - -
Do any of the photos in Fighting at Jutland suggest the BCF was echeloned to starboard during the run south? The photo of Indefatigable sinking looks like she was not dead astern of New Zealand's photographer, and implication is she was on starboard quarter of that ship.
>>>>> Go here - https://www.jutland1916.com/wp-content/uploads/05.jpg
The action report of New Zealand and the account of Cdr Mahrholz (Gunnery Office of Von der Tann) both confirm that Indefatigable turned out of line to starboard upon being hit. I don't think it is possible to know whether this turn was intentional or a result of her heavy damage aft.
My impression is that Beatty's line were far more ragged than most plot would suggest. (It will be difficult for the Germans to plot the British accurately while the BCF (Beatty) have plenty of reasons to not show the true states of his line.

Comments of individual ships

Lion almost certainly swing to starboard at 4:00, which were clearly shown on her gunnery records. The resulting lost of speed and position certainly took some time to recover.

Princess Royal almost certainly did not form the line of bearing that could completely clear the smoke from Lion, furthermore, the smoke interference got worse after Lion's swing to starboard, which means that she was sailing behind Lion's smoke until that time.

From her gunnery records she must have partly followed Lion's turn, as her gunnery record from the official despatch reads "Red 130" at 4:01:20 compared to "Red 115" at 3:55:5.

I have not much information about Queen Marry, but she was certainly closer to the 1SG and seems to have less smoke interference.

Tiger's record show a gun range of 10,500 yards at 4.00.1/2
I can only interpret that as a combination of poor gunnery AND the line of bearing putting the rear of Beatty's line close to 1SG.
I do not understand how could she shoot that badly at such ranges. (Or how massively inaccurate her ranges are)

New Zealand seems to be on the Starboard quarter (wrong side for the line of bearing) from Tiger. Her range at 4:00 is 12,500 yds. It decrease to 10,800 yds at 4.02. Perhaps she is trying get to the correct line of bearing by taking advantage of the starboard turn triggered by Lion. Again much of the thing said about Tiger's gunner can apply on her, however she is an older ship without director and poor RF and control positions.

Little can be know about indefatigable, but according to Brooks, Von der Tann recorded a minimum range of 13,450 yds around 4.02 which mean she is either agin on the wrong side for the line of bearing too, or that New Zealand is shooting massively short.

The "line" Beatty is anything but straight at that point.
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