Operation Weserübung - why

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TTTT
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Operation Weserübung - why

Post by TTTT »

...use the short legged destroyers for Narvik? Why not switch and use the longer legged Blücher, Lützow and Emden and send the destroyers to Oslo? Both forces carried the same amount of troops (2,000). As it was, the short range basically doomed the destroyers.

Were the cruisers considered too vulnerable in the confined spaces of Ofotfjord (Narvik Fjord) - and the destroyers too vulnerable to the shore batteries in Oslofjord (Oscarsborg fortress)?
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by marcelo_malara »

I would say that heavier opposition was expected in Oslo, thus the cruisers there.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

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A force comprising a pocket battleship, heavy cruiser and light cruiser proceeding up the Norwegian coast is likely to be spotted by British air and sea reconnaissance let alone Norwegian observers, the British would sharply react for fear that this force would be intending to break out into the North Atlantic, the Norwegians would be alerted particulary if the troop carrying aspect of the operation was picked up. Don't forget the Norwegians and British would be on full alert after the Altmarck incident.....
It is far more likely that the Norwegians would be so alerted that the weaker destroyer force aiming up Oslo fjord could be destroyed by the coastal batteries now on full alert, so the attempt to take Oslo would fail and it would take days for the Germans to retrieve the situation.

With the British Home Fleet on full alert the Lutzow and Blucher might not get to Narvik, even if they did they could be bottled up at that port and later destroyed.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by RF »

marcelo_malara wrote: Thu Nov 24, 2022 4:44 pm I would say that heavier opposition was expected in Oslo, thus the cruisers there.
Moreover the most important targets - the Norwegian king and government were there and needed to be quickly seized. In the event the attempt still failed.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hello TTTT,

I am perplexed by
As it was, the short range basically doomed the destroyers.
The Germans had already got an oiler Jan Wellem, in position in Narvik Harbour, pretending to be an innocent merchant ship on passage from Murmansk to Germany, but actually with a stock of fuel for Bonte's ships. A second oiler, the Kattegat was supposed to have arrived as well, but worried about the British minefield, hung about offshore instead until, menaced by a Norwegian auxiliary warship wanting revenge for the assault on a neutral country, her captain decided to scuttle the ship.

Contradicting the suggestion, the Narvik invasion force was in fact IMHO the strongest group, because it had the two most powerful ships in the German navy Gneisenau and Scharnhorst offshore as a covering force. Unfortunately, Lutjens had been seen off by Renown and hightailed it "out of town" leaving Commodore Bonte trapped in a rathole to face the music. A charitable view might be that Lutjens might be coat-tailing to decoy the British away from Vestfjord, and possibly he might have made a few radio transmissions, to help put the hounds on his scent. But he didn't.

Some U-boats were detailed to act as substitute protection at the mouth of the fjord, but it was too little, too late. It had been hoped that there would be Norwegian shore batteries at the mouth which could be taken over without too much fuss, and used against the British, but they did not exist. Geirr Haar's excellent account suggests Bonte's seeming lack of preparation for a British assault was a reaction to his remorse for firing first and sinking Eidsvold and Norge. Perhaps he believed the lie that it was not actually an invasion but a mission to "protect" Norway and was surprised by the resistance.

With Lutjens heading for the Arctic Circle, and no Luftwaffe this far north, there would be no assistance for Bonte, but Warburton-Lee's initial attack was on the inaccurate premise that a single German ship was in Narvik, landing troops. After the first round, Warspite and her team moved in and slaughtered the remaining German ships.

The Norwegians were not really "on full alert" as they were desperately trying to maintain their neutral stance, and the Oscarborg's batteries had less than a third of their full complement of gunners. The Norwegians were so peaceable, "head in the sand/snow" and generally disorganized that German troops had reached some of the armouries for Norwegian soldiers before the latter even got their mobilization papers in the post.

The British Admiralty did not react as quickly as it might to reports of German forces at sea, but Renown and her destroyers were already in the Narvik area for the mining operation "Wilfred". This was intended to force German iron ore ships into international waters instead of exploiting Norwegian neutrality by using the "24 hours in port" rule to instead sail along the entire coastline as Altmark had tried to do, pretending to be a innocent merchant ship whilst holding 300 British prisoners below decks. The Norwegians had carried out a deliberately cursory search of Altmark as they wished to appease Germany and even provided a fairly ineffectual destroyer escort to take her south until she could dash across the Skagerrak to other neutral waters but Churchill and Vian acted to stop that.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by TTTT »

I would say that heavier opposition was expected in Oslo, thus the cruisers there.
That is of course a good enough argument as any. Maybe also because Blücher and its crew was brand new, not fully worked up and not ready for a prolonged jorney? Would the smaller destroyers had been able to advance faster past the Norwegian fortresses?
A force comprising a pocket battleship, heavy cruiser and light cruiser proceeding up the Norwegian coast is likely to be spotted by British air and sea reconnaissance let alone Norwegian observers,
Yes, could be. But then, the most powerful and most "visible" German warships, the Twins", were also moving along the coast all the way up to Narvik. Hipper and 4 destroyers also went to Trondheim, in the middle of Norway.
It is far more likely that the Norwegians would be so alerted that the weaker destroyer force aiming up Oslo fjord could be destroyed by the coastal batteries now on full alert,
Yes, the destroyers would have been very vulnerable even to the smallest guns of the Oscarsborg fortresses. OTH, they could possible have moved faster and be more difficult to hit with the heavy guns. The two 28 cm guns were only able to fire two rounds against Blücher, while the 15 cm guns on the other side of the fjord scored 6-7 hits, and the 57mm guns multiple hits.
With the British Home Fleet on full alert the Lutzow and Blucher might not get to Narvik, even if they did they could be bottled up at that port and later destroyed.
Maybe. But they could also be able to land the troops and just turn around without re-fueling, unlike the destroyers.
Moreover the most important targets - the Norwegian king and government were there and needed to be quickly seized. In the event the attempt still failed.
Wasn't Narvik equally important? Fail in one of these two targets, and the entire campaign is a failure. That said, failure in even one of the largest Norwegian cities would probably have been disastrous.
The Germans had already got an oiler Jan Wellem, in position in Narvik Harbour, pretending to be an innocent merchant ship on passage from Murmansk to Germany, but actually with a stock of fuel for Bonte's ships. A second oiler, the Kattegat
Yes, but still sound pretty risky to base the operation on two slow, vulnerable tankers - of which only one could be used anyway. Jan Wellem could only serve two destroyers at the same time, and this was the reasson for the fatal delay. And even the Twins were really not powerful not to guard the outer fjord, as the Kriegsmarine would not have risked its only two battleships against heavy RN units - which they of course did not in the end, anyway.
The Norwegians were not really "on full alert" as they were desperately trying to maintain their neutral stance, and the Oscarborg's batteries had less than a third of their full complement of gunners. The Norwegians were so peaceable, "head in the sand/snow" and generally disorganized that German troops had reached some of the armouries for Norwegian soldiers before the latter even got their mobilization papers in the post.
Very true. Norway paid dearly for its naivity. It wasn't just the politicians, but the mood in the Norwegian people was also very anti military. A strong Norwegian military would have made the invasion near impossible. In the first wave the Germans landed only some 9,000 soldiers, spread out on the largest cities and Narvik. They would have been no match for even a half strong and prepared Norwegian military. Norway had also recently bought P-36 fighters from USA, but these were not ready when the attack began. As the Bf 109 did not have the range to reach Norway, these fighters could have proved deadly to Luftwaffe bombers and transport planes.

Operation Weserübung was a hasty, improvised, perhaps poorly planned and extremely risky operation. It was a close call, and succeeded arguably only because Luftwaffe and the quality of the German infantry tipped the scales in favor of the Germans. Luckily for the Germans, Norway and its allies were even worse off.

It would have been interesting to see the German reasonings for composition of the various battlegroups to the different cities, though.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hello TTTT,
But they could also be able to land the troops and just turn around without re-fueling
The nature of amphibious operations is that your forces will require continuous re-supply and that means retaining local maritime (and air) control to allow further ammunition and fuel to be delivered to your troops. Running back home as soon as you dump them ashore is not really viable. I believe there is a strong argument that the Germans should have concentrated on the capital and the south and accepted they would have a lengthy land campaign closely supported by deployed Luftwaffe to secure their iron ore route in the North. A coup de main air assault with paratroops and others landed on Oslo's airport might have decapitated the dilatory Norwegian government and Quisling's political coup would have been an instant success. As it was many Norwegian commanders hesitated to act to defend their country and even ordered their men to take no action.

This assault on a virtually-defenceless neutral country which was already supplying a vital war resource to Germany was indeed a risky and very lucky to succeed gamble. The simultaneous descent on several major cities, all of which were coastal, was based around the mistaken idea that Norwegians would welcome these "protectors". (A bit like an armoured column on an unsupported narrow-front thrust towards Kyiv expecting to have rose petals from a grateful populace strewn in their path. :lol: )
they could possible have moved faster and be more difficult to hit with the heavy guns.
There is a mystery why Kummertz did not charge through at full speed with Blucher, which was hardly significantly slower than any destroyer. A simultaneous air attack would have helped. With ranges at a few hundred metres the Oscarsborg guns couldn't miss, and a single hit would disable a destroyer.
Yes, but still sound pretty risky to base the operation on two slow, vulnerable tankers


Speed and vulnerability weren't factors as the idea was they would both be in Narvik, waiting. For the reasons stated above, if German forces were going to hang on to Narvik, the Kriegsmarine was going to have to defend against a British reaction at some stage. As it was when the Allies put troops ashore the Germans were forced back to invade Sweden. Only when the Luftwaffe made life impossible without allied air cover were the British, French and Polish troops evacuated.

There was not much German "reasoning" going on. Norway was a popular holiday cruising location for the Kaiser and the Fuhrer and the N*zi obsession with Norse mythology meant that many at the top believed that Norway and the rest of Scandinavia should be enthusiastic supporters of the Master Race. Like many countries (including Britain) there were fascist sympathizers in Norway who might gain power if Germany gave them enough support. Outrage that the measly prize of a few hundred British prisoners salvaged from the Graf Spee debacle was stolen away before they could be incarcerated in Germany, meant Norway should be punished for failing to provide safe passage, and a new ally might be created with regime change.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by Byron Angel »

I would imagine that that the cautious speed of Bluecher in passing the Oskarsborg Fortress battery was governed by the EXTREME narrowness of the channel at that point. My guess is that average channel width would not be likely to exceed 100m and 12 kts even nowadays is considered fast in such channels. Here is a map of the Oskarsborg narrows, barely 500m across shore-to-shore - https://mapcarta.com/18632180

The 28cm Krupp guns of the fortress were at least forty years old. There were only enough men to serve two of the three guns and the majority were cadets. Also, photos of the guns suggest that they were entirely manually operated (for example, no evidence of power loading in available modern imagery). The ingeniously constructed hidden torpedo battery also did well indeed, especially considering that the torpedoes were also genuine antiques.

Considering the tools at hand, I think the Norwegians did well. Strictly my opinion, of course.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hi Byron and TTTT,

I cannot locate any bathymetry for the Drobak Narrows but I suspect that since this is a drowned glacial fjord the deepwater extends to quite close to the shore, so the "channel" is quite wide. The wreck is in 90-65 m of water and photographs of her sinking show her close to the shore. Charging through the Narrows at high speed would indeed be risky, but German ships and Norwegian shore defences had engaged each other already that morning so Kummetz should have expected resistance. Oscarsborg was a tough proposition (on paper), and it was it was an enormous gamble to hope they would not fire.

Haar's account suggests that the Kapitan rang for full speed only when the engagement started but that Blucher did not have all boilers on line and did not speed up significantly. There was no use of smokescreens or similar measures by the R-boats or other small auxiliaries to shield the major vessels. The nearest comparable events in my mind are the blockship attempts on Zeebrugge and Ostend in WWI and the HMS Campbeltown attack on St Nazaire, all of which had carefully planned screening tactics (some of which worked) to shield the vulnerable assets approaching shore batteries at point blank range.

"Sneaking in", once the outer defences were alerted was surely not going to happen, and since there was no plan to strike first with bombardment or an air raid against Oskarsborg or the other batteries, a head-down charge and hope for the best seems to me to be the only possibility. As it was the big guns only had time for one shot each, although other weapons made more hits. This Norwegian resistance also knocked out Lutzow's forward turret and only when air raids on the fortress commenced at 07:45 was there much chance of successfully by passing it.

I must agree the Norwegians at Oskarsborg succeeded in playing a fine tune on a very old fiddle.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by TTTT »

The sinking of Blücher, a fantastic and very realistic scene from the Norwegian movie "The King's choice (2016).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZ79i11JSnU
There is a mystery why Kummertz did not charge through at full speed with Blucher, which was hardly significantly slower than any destroyer. A simultaneous air attack would have helped. With ranges at a few hundred metres the Oscarsborg guns couldn't miss, and a single hit would disable a destroyer.
High speed up the the narrow Drøbaksundet in complete darkness was not really an alternative, neither could Luftwaffe support the ships at night. Luftwaffe could offer support in daylight, but this was of course planned as a suprise attack, hopefully without any Norwegian intervention at all. I guess Blücher was used in Oslo because she was brand new and not really combat ready. This was also probably part of her untergang, as her damage control teams were poorly trained.

But why Lützow? After the twins, she was the most powerful units in the invasion fleet and had the best range of any German ship. Was she a bit too slow, and thus vulnerable to the British battlecruisers? While the twins could outrun Renown, Lützow probably could not.
The nature of amphibious operations is that your forces will require continuous re-supply and that means retaining local maritime (and air) control to allow further ammunition and fuel to be delivered to your troops. Running back home as soon as you dump them ashore is not really viable.
I doubt staying around in Ofotfjorden was an alernative for the German ships, that would basically be suicide, as the inlet to the fjord could easily be sealed off by powerful RN units. And Luftwaffe couldn't support Narvik until late April/early May - when a suitable airfield was built near Trondheim. Maybe that's the reason they sent in the destroyers; they could at least be seen as "somewhat" expendable - although they hardly expected to loose all 10. Or maybe not. Almost the entire Kriegsmarine was used in the invasion, so some of the targets just had to use less suitable ships for the mission, I guess.
The simultaneous descent on several major cities, all of which were coastal, was based around the mistaken idea that Norwegians would welcome these "protectors". (A bit like an armoured column on an unsupported narrow-front thrust towards Kyiv expecting to have rose petals from a grateful populace strewn in their path. :lol: )
Strangely enough, Hitler in 1940 without internet seems to have had a more realistic view on this than Putler with access internet. He certainly hoped the Norwegians would welcome the German troops, but he didn't really expect it - at least not to the same degree as Putin. But they gambled on a weak and unprepared Norwegian defence - and was for the most part right.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by RF »

Byron Angel wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 3:34 am
Considering the tools at hand, I think the Norwegians did well. Strictly my opinion, of course.

Byron
With a more modern torpedo battery with more torpedoes the whole operation up Oslo Fjord could have been scuppered - the big guns would not be needed, judicious firing from the torpedo battery could have bagged both Blucher and Lutzow and delay German occupation of Oslo for another two days.

But that is of course being prepared for war - and said with hindsight.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hi All,
that would basically be suicide, as the inlet to the fjord could easily be sealed off by powerful RN units. And Luftwaffe couldn't support Narvik until late April/early May - when a suitable airfield was built near Trondheim.
Well, it would be suicide for General Dietl and his 2000 mountain troops if Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and ten destroyers all disappeared off to safety, leaving him without hope of re-supply and at the mercy of the Allies and vengeful Norwegians. In this scenario the Germans only hope is that the overwhelmed Norwegian government orders its troops and civilians not to resist but welcome the invaders.

With ten refuelled destroyers and their torpedoes defending the narrow entrance, it would be a costly assault for the British and it would also be only a matter of time before Dietl got re-supply by land or air. Both oilers needed to be in Narvik, ready and waiting for Bonte. Of course, Lutjens' covering force was supposed to be providing additional protection offshore, not "legging it" for the North Pole.

There is no doubt the Germans were expecting to have more time to prepare for a British counter-attack, not realising powerful forces were already in the area.

With regard to the Oskarsborg debacle, it interesting to compare it with the highly sophisticated glider assault on Belgian fortress Eben-Emael conducted only a month later. The Norwegian fort was an ancient relic built to resist ironclads with its guns in open mountings installed before there was any threat from the air. The Belgian fortress had its guns buried in casemates or turrets requiring hollow charge weapons to disable them.

Flares and searchlights could have been used to illuminate the Drombak Narrows, whilst an amphibious assault from small craft with mortars lobbing bombs into the gunpits would have knocked out the defenders. The torpedo installation would have been harder work. Alternatively, timing an aerial bombing attack for first light and running the ships through at speed during the ensuing confusion.

The Germans obviously expected to suffer as little resistance as they did in Denmark, or to be able to crush it ruthlessly as they did to HNoMS Norge and Eidsvold. Haarr details the anger of the German Army generals over the way Kummetz and the Kriegsmarine bungled the Oslo operation and their insistence future amphibious operations would be under Army control with the Navy acting as mere bus drivers. That would have made See Lowe interesting. Germany had evaluated Norway's run-down defence forces:
With a more modern torpedo battery with more torpedoes
with no money spent on it for many years, and with many of its ships being obsolete before WWI, as being insignificant. Oberst Birger Eriksen
Either I will be decorated, or I will be court-martialed. Fire!
gave them an unwelcome surprise.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by RF »

wadinga wrote: Tue Dec 13, 2022 3:00 pm
Flares and searchlights could have been used to illuminate the Drombak Narrows
A searchlight illuminated Blucher so Eriksen could fire on it.
Either I will be decorated, or I will be court-martialed. Fire!
I believe he got both, albeit not at the same time....
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hi RF
A searchlight illuminated Blucher so Eriksen could fire on it.
And searchlights make excellent targets - see Battle of Jutland. The Germans unaccountably thought they could sneak through without opening fire first, even though shots had been exchanged earlier. With Blucher and Lutzow they had overwhelming firepower but Kummetz' dithering meant this advantage was thrown away, Blucher and top echelon troops were lost, the Oslo assault was delayed, and the King and government escaped.

Apparently, a subsequent investigation (not a Court Martial) suggested Eriksen should have had higher authority approval before opening fire. Many Norwegian officers waited for the same, too long and lost their opportunity and in some cases their lives. Obsession with bureaucratic procedure over practicality was apparently a common problem in socialistic, peaceable Norway in those times. Haarr has many examples.

If anybody should have been court martialled it would be Kummertz or maybe the planners who failed to come up with a better (any) idea for neutralising Oscarsborg and the other shore batteries. Instead, the N*zi state gave Kummetz the Knight's Cross :shock:

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by hans zurbriggen »

Hello all,
Kummetz had mission orders that explicitly requested to wait until 05:15 (when darkness is already not complete) before getting close to Dröbak/Oscarborg (source H.G.Prager in "Panzerschiff Deutschland / Schwerer Kreuzer Lützow", surely not a Kummetz fan). He passed Oscarborg just when first daylight was coming up: it is well possible that in total darkness (and without the previous detection of invasion forces by Norwegians) his force could have been able to escape any punishment, acting by surprise. Blame cannot come to Kummetz for the delay, but to usual KM chain of command that left too limited margin of decision to the commander at sea and reacted too slowly to loss of surprise. Norwegians reacted quickly and effectively.

Also, Prager states that decision to employ Lützow in Oslo area (despite initial decision to send her to northern Norway) was taken following her Captain suggestions, because she was required back to Germany as soon as possible after the invasion, to replenish and to leave again to a second Atlantic cruise against British merchant traffic: Oslo attack was a shorter trip and it considered less dangerous than deep North Sea mission, left to stronger and faster twins.
Things went differently, with HMS Spearfish torpedo disabling Lützow for long time and finally preventing her cruise.

hans
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