Operation Weserübung - why

General naval discussions that don't fit within any specific time period or cover several issues.
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wadinga
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hello Hans and all,

Excellent input Hans. We must check timings to make sure everybody is on the same zone. So with some light available a bombing raid to disable Oskarborg's open air gun mounts was perfectly feasible, especially since aircraft were tasked with attacking Fornebu airfield prior to paratroop and Ju 52 landings. This gamble on "no reaction" was not necessary. Haarr says Norwegian Gladiators took off from Fornebu to investigate aerial intruders as early as 04:00.

The outer defences spotted and engaged German forces earlier than Blucher's detection therefore surprise was already lost, but as you say the safe career path for German commanders was to stick to plans already rendered outdated and irrelevant rather than to take any personal initiative. (Marschall and Hoffman both suffered criticism for using their heads in changed circumstances).

I'm confused:
Blame cannot come to Kummetz for the delay
Was he too early or too late? Oskarborg opened fire at 04:21. Arriving in total darkness would make passing Drobak Narrows very difficult and even if feasible Lutzow's thrumming diesels would alert the defences.

Back at Narvik, Haarr is very critical that Bey did not try to get some of his ships away before Warspite and co arrived and wiped them out.

All the best

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by hans zurbriggen »

Hello Mr. Wadinga,
according to (Lützow commander) Thiele criticism (also reported by Prager), Kummetz should have been better passing the narrow in full darkness, to have a better chance. I don't know whether he was right or not regarding difficulties and odds to get out without damages, however Kummetz could not disobey an order on his own.
The blame is with the OKM that should have changed plans (not an easy task anyway due to complexity of whole operation) since at least 23:25 the evening before, when Oslo transmitted via radio an order of the Norwegian Navy Command (decrypted by B-Dienst) to switch off all the beacons (as a clear defensive measure): that meant surprise was lost.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hi Hans,

The timing issues are that Norwegian time 04:00 is German time 05:00.

Koop and Schmolke Heavy Cruisers of the Hipper Class have an extensive quote of the combat report for Blucher created by her XO Erich Heymann. The preliminary highlights how little weapons training had been possible during the Baltic workup.

He notes the first act of war had been when Albatros reported at 03:00 German time having engaged, rammed and sunk a Norwegian patrol vessel.
As most coastal lights had been doused, Konteradmiral Kummetz announced his intention to pass through the Drobak Narrows at first light. The ships therefore reduced speed to 7 knots and increased to 12 knots shortly before Drobak.
After initially being illuminated by a patrol boat searchlight, Heymann describes the situation at Drobak:
The entrance to the Narrows was flooded with light from searchlights situated on either side of the fjord. It was about 05:18. A searchlight raked the ship from stem to stern and back. We were dazzled by it. Our orders were to respond to light with light; we were only to open fire if the Norwegians began to shoot in earnest.
He says mistiness meant the location of the shore batteries could not be identified, although he says the first hit from Oskarsborg was at 5-600m, knocking out the main Flak control centre.

To my mind, hopefully passing through the Narrows in pitch darkness (with some radar assistance?) with no navigational beacons is an irrelevant concept because of the searchlight barrage noted by Heymann. The decision to advance at first light makes sense, but having already started the war by sinking the patrol boat 2 hours earlier, and the action with the outer forts, the only logical approach was to engage with full force. Blucher's lighter armament found targets on both sides, but her main armament which had barely been test fired did not engage at all.
however Kummetz could not disobey an order on his own
I am always surprised by the lack of initiative by senior Kriegsmarine officers. There is no point in putting a Konteradmiral in charge of an operation if he cannot change his orders based on circumstances. One of the oft-quoted advantages of the WWII German Army over its opponents is that right down to NCO level individual initiative was encouraged to take charge and respond to and exploit tactical conditions, whereas their opponents sit on their haunches waiting for orders if their chain of command from the top was disrupted.

We can agree, I think, to blame primarily, inadequate planning which assumed the Norwegians were incompetent and would supinely allow invaders to breach their neutrality and sail into a Krigshavn past a bastion of defence at 400-500m without engaging. If for navigational safety reasons it was necessary to force the Narrows at first light, then Oskarsborg was a more fitting target for the Luftwaffe or a limited landing on its beach where German troops might have been able to subdue the surprised defenders. Elsewhere R-boat commanders took the initiative to land troops in locations where they could attack the outer fjord batteries from landward.

All the best

wadinga
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hans zurbriggen
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by hans zurbriggen »

Hello Mr. Wadinga,
I agree with all your points, however operation orders for Oslo approach obliged German ships to:
1) illuminate with searchlight only after having been illuminated by any opponent.
2) fire only after having been fired at (or after having been plainly 'attacked' as per Pol III patrol vessel that had rammed a German T-boat).
3) ignore warning shots from ashore and react only in case of direct shots from ashore to any German ship.

Not a great tactic, and too late for Blücher. I guess you are right when you say that Germans still thought they would have been welcomed by Norwegians and that Norwegians would have been reluctant to open fire first. This explains why Luftwaffe bombing or preventive gun action against Oscarsborg was not planned. Again blame goes to German high command more than to Kummetz.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hi Hans and all,

I must correct my earlier post. You are quite right. Pol III was not rammed, but the "rammer", creating a "grazing impact" which dented her bow a little. There is an excellent photo on the Wikipedia Action in the Oslofjord page showing very minor dent in the upper bulwark, which clearly shows she was not sunk by Albatros but shelled and machine-gunned, causing fires and wounding her captain fatally. The abandoned vessel drifted away, her fires went out subsequently and the wreck was towed into harbour and later refitted and passed into German service.

I think "plainly attacked" is a little over generous to the Germans. Haarr describes the action in detail. Pol III may have fired a warning shot. Her captain challenged Albatros over infringing Norwegian neutrality but the Germans ignored this and continued on into the forbidden Krigshavn, effectively a high-security area. Albatros ordered Pol III to stop and not to use her radio. The Pol III then barged into Albatros in a grazing impact similar to Icelandic gunboats acting against British frigates during the so called "Cod War" of the 1970s. As a way of demanding attention it was over successful. Two Norwegians were thrown onto Albatros by the impact and Pol III continued to transmit, fired warning flares and her captain actually demanded Albatros and the other ships leave Norwegian waters or surrender. :shock:

This robust approach caused Kapitanleutnant Siegfried Strelow to consider that this constituted an "attack" under Kummetz' guidelines for the operation and Albatros opened fire on the little auxiliary. Haarr concludes the description thus:
Norway was at war.
Siegfried Strelow became a very successful U-boat commander but was killed with his crew when U-435 was sunk by a RAF Wellington in 1943.

All the best

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by TTTT »

So, to conclude a bit about the reason for the composition of the Oslo force:

Blücher: Was used because she really wasn't fully operational yet.

Lützow: Was expected to quickly return for an Atlantic mission. I wasn't aware of this - good info.

Emden: The oldest (with exception of the pre-dreadnoughts), smallest and weakest of all the "heavy" German units, and probably not suitable for a prolonged campaign. She was also rather slow compared to other cruisers. After Norway she was used as a training ship.

As for the Narvik force: This was the only force that could not expect Luftwaffe support, and thus by far had the most dangerous - even possibly near suicidal mission. My guess is that they used the destroyers because they could go straight to the harbor and offload their troops, thus spending as little time as possible in the fjord. I don't think they were expected to stay in the fjord as support for the infantry - this support was possibly expected to come from south as the southern Norway became occupied.

The Norwegian campaign was basically Operation FUBAR for everybody involved - what saved the day for the Germans were Luftwaffe, the quality of the German infantry - and the invasion of France.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

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Hello TTTT, Hans and all,

This from Hans,
Also, Prager states that decision to employ Lützow in Oslo area (despite initial decision to send her to northern Norway) was taken following her Captain suggestions, because she was required back to Germany as soon as possible after the invasion, to replenish and to leave again to a second Atlantic cruise against British merchant traffic: Oslo attack was a shorter trip and it considered less dangerous than deep North Sea mission, left to stronger and faster twins.
Interestingly Haarr suggests there was much wrangling over Lutzow's mission . He says she was ready and stored for an Atlantic raiding mission when Hitler overrode Raeder and wanted her allocated to Weserubung. Initially she would be required to lead Group V to Oslo, but Raeder tried to forestall this by saying Blucher could be "ready enough" and substituted her. Whereupon the Fuhrer overrode him again, saying Lutzow should instead join Group II for Trondheim, and after landing troops could then proceed on her Atlantic mission taking advantage of any confusion created by the invasion.

However both supremos were frustrated because at 15:00 on the 6th only a few hours before departure, cracks were discovered in the engine mounts for auxilliary engine No 1, meaning despite a temporary repair an extended voyage was now out of the question. Thus Lutzow was re-designated at short notice for the shortest trip, bolstering Blucher at Oslo so she could return quickly for proper dockyard repairs. Koope and Schmolke confirm Lutzow's unreliable machinery as the reason she was attached to Group V, and that Kummetz had already hoisted his flag in the inadequately-worked-up Blucher.

Regarding Narvik, Haarr says that there were two logistics cock-ups which stopped Bonte from withdrawing directly the troops were off-loaded. Not only did Kattegat's skipper dither offshore until he was forced to scuttle on the the morning of the 10th, but Jan Wellum was carrying more diesel for U-boats than bunker fuel for the destroyers. So the German force spent most of the 9th sitting in harbour. It was also the case that the three unprotected transports carrying heavy weapons, ammunition etc for Dietl's troops failed to show up on time, or indeed at all, with Rauenfels being sunk by Warburton-Lee's withdrawing ships. Alster was captured by Icarus on the 11th, and Barenfels was sunk off Bergen by FAA Skuas on the 14th. FUBAR indeed.

Group West 10th April 15:00 ordered
all available cruisers, destroyers and torpedo boats are to proceed to sea tonight. Narvik destroyers are to concentrate with the C-in-C.
That meant the survivors of Warburton-Lee's attack.

This would be tricky since no-one knew where Lutjens was. He was maintaining radio silence after being seen off by Renown, but sent an Arado (10th at12:00) with his position on a long flight to Trondheim to report. He appears to me to have taken no responsibility for protecting or even diverting attention away from the Narvik destroyers, leaving them to fend entirely for themselves. Bey reported only two ships would be ready to sail, and did so from Narvik with Zenker and Giese at 19:40 on the 10th, but returned after encountering Penelope and destroyers. During the 11th, Koeller, Kunne and Ludemann reported they too were ready for breakout, but Bey considered conditions were not favourable, despite the urgency of his situation. An air attack by Swordfish from Furious on the 12th through strong winds and snow showers still did not not persuade him a desperate attempt at escape was his only hope.

Annoying the British off the mouth of Vestfjord was entirely left to the U-Boats, but they had no success, due in part to torpedo failures. By the 13th Bey had more ships operational, but his options had run out. Doom was approaching him, in Narvik, whereas Lutjens and his battleships were approaching....... Wilhelmshaven.

Kriegsmarine losses in the Norwegian campaign meant that See Lowe would be impossible in 1940. The Luftwaffe could establish air superiority in Norway and negate British naval strength and therefore dictate the land campaign because there was no serious aerial opposition. That would not be true in the English Channel. If Hitler had not attacked and occupied a peace-loving, determinedly neutral and thoroughly unprepared Norway (and Denmark) would the resources not deployed there have enabled him to prevent the escape of the BEF at Dunkirk? Another time another thread methinks. :cool:

All the best

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by TTTT »

Very interesting! All those "small" logistic details that we don't think too much about when we read about various campaigns.

One thing I learnt when I was in the army: It is not so much about being brilliant, the most important thing is to screw up fewer times than your enemy. The Norwegian campaign in a nutshell...
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by RF »

wadinga wrote: Fri Dec 16, 2022 2:25 pm
Back at Narvik, Haarr is very critical that Bey did not try to get some of his ships away before Warspite and co arrived and wiped them out.
There is another aspect to this - a couple of torpedo hits on Warspite and that battle is transformed - though this is with hindsight with ten destroyers available and anticipating battleship assault I would be looking to take out the battleship, especially as a U-boat was also present at the time. Bey's mistake was to be taken by surprise and not being prepared for such an attack.

The RN by tradition grew up on being aggressive and taking risks, which is why it was such a dominant force. The KM was much more passive and avoided risks, a strange paradox to the attitude of the Heer - using the destroyer force was the correct strategy my criticism of the KM was that it wasn't aggressive enough and should have been prepared for RN attack, especially after the initial destroyer only attack.

If you are an aggressive power with capacity only for a short war then to be successful it must be aggressive to the final conclusion. The invasion of Norway could have been used to weaken the RN so that Sea Lion then has a greater chance of success - a more aggressive and strategic approach could have changed the whole history of 1940, but then you have a fuhrer who is entirely land focused and not only ignorant of seapower but too cowardly to use what seapower he has.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

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Double posting removed.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by Byron Angel »

Hi RF,
Interesting question - What exactly were the strategic motivations behind the expansion of the Kriegsmarine surface navy, yeyond securing the German position in the Baltic Sea?

I have difficulty seeing Germany as able to afford a really competitive oceanic force.

B
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by RF »

For a''liberal democracy'' where defence is aimed at deterring attack, securing the Baltic would be a reasonable objective for a Weimar Germany.

However we are not dealing with the reasonable, here we have an aggressive expansionist military power consumed with an ideology bent on racial supremacy and world domination. Nazi Germany had the second highest levels of personal taxation in the world (Japan having the highest) largely paying for the military so questions of affordability are not matters for the Fuhrer but the Finance Minister, who is a minor functionary.
Strategically the motivation is to have a force complementing the land and air forces that can overcome countries whose strength is based on seapower. As Britain had agreed to the KM having 35% the strength of the RN the logical thing to do would be to build to that strength, with the rationale being offence not defence.

A fuhrer with an understanding of seapower would appreciate that, especially as the Baltic is not the key battleground - control of the North Sea and being able to operate in the North Atlantic are the relevant theatres if you want to conquer the world.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by wadinga »

Hello All,

There is a danger of this thread diverting off into a discussion of Plan Z and its purpose. There are other threads devoted to this.

Raeder was required to carry out the transport and support of an army invasion of Norway using what would be a barely adequate naval force force, and would become completely inadequate should the Royal and French navies became involved early enough. The success of the plan depended on having a clear "head start" before allied reaction came, and as TTTT has identified, withdrawing those naval forces before they could become trapped. The apparent assumption was that the Norwegian government and people would acquiesce to becoming a German protectorate much as Czechoslovakia had done under threat of bombing of Prague. Fait accompli.

The force devoted to the subduing and occupation of Narvik, two battleships and ten destroyers was certainly enough for the task, although the logistical support was inadequate. This latter may be a consequence of the bad weather encountered during the sail north. The naval force rigidly maintained its timetable despite weather damage to the ships and the loss of some deck cargo, and maybe because the merchant vessels, not operating under military discipline, allowed themselves to be unduly delayed.

There was no need for the battleships to enter Vestfjord since there were no shore defences to be subdued. Their only function would be to ensure rapid surrender of Narvik town under threat of civilian loss of life by bombardment and the destroyers could do that. The two ancient Panserships were easily overcome due to Norwegian reluctance to defend their waters by firing the first shot and allowing the Germans to approach to point blank range under a flag of truce.

Lutjens should have acted aggressively once it was clear that there were already significant RN forces in the vicinity and there would be no "breathing space" to get Bonte's ships out and Dietl's support in. It would be interesting to know if his instructions from Raeder were as they were for a later operation, ie avoid any contact with enemy forces even if somewhat inferior. If they were, there was no point in these ships being there, they should have stayed safe in Wilhelmshaven. In Operation Berlin, Lutjens had the whole Atlantic to find other easy targets in, and plenty of freedom of action, but here he was somewhat tied to the vicinity to support Bonte, even it was just to decoy the British away to allow a break-out. As noted above, he was so determined to keep his location and operations secret he used an aircraft to report his location. The speed advantage of his ships over most RN opposition should have allowed him to carry out probing attacks and disengagement at his discretion. However, in reality, after one bruising encounter he took no further part in the operation, leaving the Narvik force to their fate.

Although Lutjens' ships had taken some damage, they were hardly disabled and it is interesting to speculate what Wilhelm Marschall would have achieved in similar circumstances.

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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by RF »

Yes, there is a danger of going off thread, however the issues in my previous post do directly relate to the Norwegian campaign.

With respect to Marschall, yes again it is easy to speculate. However Renown quickly degraded Gneisenau's gunnery and with Admiral Whitworth having some 12 destroyers in company the threat of torpedo attack in poor visibility I think would force Marschall to withdraw as Lutjens did.

On paper the twins should have been able to overcome Renown, but that would have to be a battled dictated by the Germans: use the twins to attack Renown on opposite flanks to split the British ships fire, the same tactics Harwood used against AGS. Also Renown would have to be alone, with no destroyer escorts, in reality an unlikely scenario.
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Re: Operation Weserübung - why

Post by TTTT »

If you are an aggressive power with capacity only for a short war then to be successful it must be aggressive to the final conclusion. The invasion of Norway could have been used to weaken the RN so that Sea Lion then has a greater chance of success
True, but Weserübung was an extremely aggressive, even reckless, operation by an inferior force. And I can't really see this small force having much of a chance inflicting severe, let alone crippling, damage to RN. Maybe if they had more U-boats with working torpedoes. As it was, both Warspite and Rodney were lucky to escape undamaged. And Allied naval losses were about the same as KM - even losing an aircraft carrier.
The two ancient Panserships were easily overcome due to Norwegian reluctance to defend their waters by firing the first shot and allowing the Germans to approach to point blank range under a flag of truce.
It had been so long since Norway had been at war that they simply weren't mentally prepared. The commander of one of the panserships described the situation as "strange" and "surrealistic", and that it almost felt wrong to open fire! At the short range, they really should have been able to hit the destroyers, it was almost as if they missed on purpose.
On paper the twins should have been able to overcome Renown, but that would have to be a battled dictated by the Germans: use the twins to attack Renown on opposite flanks to split the British ships fire, the same tactics Harwood used against AGS. Also Renown would have to be alone, with no destroyer escorts, in reality an unlikely scenario.
One thing: Why couldn't Renown keep up with the twins when they retreated? Was it because Renown, after her armor upgrades, no longer was a 31 knot ship?
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