Hello TTTT, Hans and all,
This from Hans,
Also, Prager states that decision to employ Lützow in Oslo area (despite initial decision to send her to northern Norway) was taken following her Captain suggestions, because she was required back to Germany as soon as possible after the invasion, to replenish and to leave again to a second Atlantic cruise against British merchant traffic: Oslo attack was a shorter trip and it considered less dangerous than deep North Sea mission, left to stronger and faster twins.
Interestingly Haarr suggests there was much wrangling over
Lutzow's mission . He says she was ready and stored for an Atlantic raiding mission when Hitler overrode Raeder and wanted her allocated to Weserubung. Initially she would be required to lead Group V to Oslo, but Raeder tried to forestall this by saying
Blucher could be "ready enough" and substituted her. Whereupon the Fuhrer overrode him again, saying
Lutzow should instead join Group II for Trondheim, and after landing troops could then proceed on her Atlantic mission taking advantage of any confusion created by the invasion.
However both supremos were frustrated because at 15:00 on the 6th only a few hours before departure, cracks were discovered in the engine mounts for auxilliary engine No 1, meaning despite a temporary repair an extended voyage was now out of the question. Thus
Lutzow was re-designated at short notice for the shortest trip, bolstering
Blucher at Oslo so she could return quickly for proper dockyard repairs. Koope and Schmolke confirm
Lutzow's unreliable machinery as the reason she was attached to Group V, and that Kummetz had already hoisted his flag in the inadequately-worked-up
Blucher.
Regarding Narvik, Haarr says that there were two logistics cock-ups which stopped Bonte from withdrawing directly the troops were off-loaded. Not only did
Kattegat's skipper dither offshore until he was forced to scuttle on the the morning of the 10th, but
Jan Wellum was carrying more diesel for U-boats than bunker fuel for the destroyers. So the German force spent most of the 9th sitting in harbour. It was also the case that the three unprotected transports carrying heavy weapons, ammunition etc for Dietl's troops failed to show up on time, or indeed at all, with
Rauenfels being sunk by Warburton-Lee's withdrawing ships.
Alster was captured by
Icarus on the 11th, and
Barenfels was sunk off Bergen by FAA Skuas on the 14th. FUBAR indeed.
Group West 10th April 15:00 ordered
all available cruisers, destroyers and torpedo boats are to proceed to sea tonight. Narvik destroyers are to concentrate with the C-in-C.
That meant the survivors of Warburton-Lee's attack.
This would be tricky since no-one knew where Lutjens was. He was maintaining radio silence after being seen off by
Renown, but sent an Arado (10th at12:00) with his position on a long flight to Trondheim to report. He appears to me to have taken no responsibility for protecting or even diverting attention away from the Narvik destroyers, leaving them to fend entirely for themselves. Bey reported only two ships would be ready to sail, and did so from Narvik with
Zenker and
Giese at 19:40 on the 10th, but returned after encountering
Penelope and destroyers. During the 11th,
Koeller,
Kunne and
Ludemann reported they too were ready for breakout, but Bey considered conditions were not favourable, despite the urgency of his situation. An air attack by Swordfish from
Furious on the 12th through strong winds and snow showers still did not not persuade him a desperate attempt at escape was his only hope.
Annoying the British off the mouth of Vestfjord was entirely left to the U-Boats, but they had no success, due in part to torpedo failures. By the 13th Bey had more ships operational, but his options had run out. Doom was approaching him, in Narvik, whereas Lutjens and his battleships were approaching....... Wilhelmshaven.
Kriegsmarine losses in the Norwegian campaign meant that See Lowe would be impossible in 1940. The Luftwaffe could establish air superiority in Norway and negate British naval strength and therefore dictate the land campaign because there was no serious aerial opposition. That would not be true in the English Channel. If Hitler had not attacked and occupied a peace-loving, determinedly neutral and thoroughly unprepared Norway (and Denmark) would the resources not deployed there have enabled him to prevent the escape of the BEF at Dunkirk? Another time another thread methinks.
All the best
wadinga