British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

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Tank_Killer1
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British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Tank_Killer1 »

I've read that the 5" was an effective aa weapon especially with vt fuses and a large burster but what about the British 4.5"?
dunmunro
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by dunmunro »

Tank_Killer1 wrote: Thu Apr 29, 2021 3:48 pm I've read that the 5" was an effective aa weapon especially with vt fuses and a large burster but what about the British 4.5"?
Actually, the 5in/38 was quite ineffective as an AA weapon but it's performance was greatly overestimated by the USN. Certainly VT ammo helped but the rounds needed per AA kill was still too high for it to be considered effective. The RN 4.5in was probably pretty similar in performance.
Byron Angel
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Byron Angel »

The above representation of the 5in/38 DP is inaccurate (to coin a phrase) in several respects. A number of original USN analyses of AA weapon performance are available on the web which cover the PTO from Dec 1941 through the Kamikaze campaign of 1945. Worth reading, if there is any interest in gaining a proper grasp of things.

The most important aspect to keep in mind is the the gun itself was only one component of a very technologically complex anti-aircraft defense system that involved multiple weapon types, weapon arcs and elevation and RoF, target detection, accurate range/rate measurement and tracking in three dimensions, weapon and FC system stabilization, and projectile RoF and fuzing.

By 1943, the 5in/38 DP + Mk37 GFCS was the best Allied long range AA weapon system afloat.

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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Thu May 06, 2021 10:45 pm The above representation of the 5in/38 DP is inaccurate (to coin a phrase) in several respects. A number of original USN analyses of AA weapon performance are available on the web which cover the PTO from Dec 1941 through the Kamikaze campaign of 1945. Worth reading, if there is any interest in gaining a proper grasp of things.

The most important aspect to keep in mind is the the gun itself was only one component of a very technologically complex anti-aircraft defense system that involved multiple weapon types, weapon arcs and elevation and RoF, target detection, accurate range/rate measurement and tracking in three dimensions, weapon and FC system stabilization, and projectile RoF and fuzing.

By 1943, the 5in/38 DP + Mk37 GFCS was the best Allied long range AA weapon system afloat.

B
The USN based their AA studies on USN AA kill claims. These claims were inevitably inflated (probably by a factor of 2 to 3) due to multiple claims per aircraft shot down, as aircraft were almost invariably being engaged by multiple ships. The statement for the 5in/38 being effective as an AA weapon is based upon rather flawed data, that doesn't reference IJN records.
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Byron Angel »

dunmunro wrote: Sat May 08, 2021 4:27 pmThe USN based their AA studies on USN AA kill claims. These claims were inevitably inflated (probably by a factor of 2 to 3) due to multiple claims per aircraft shot down, as aircraft were almost invariably being engaged by multiple ships. The statement for the 5in/38 being effective as an AA weapon is based upon rather flawed data, that doesn't reference IJN records.

See:
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION SUMMARY covering Anti-Aircraft Actions
(Dec 1941 – Jul 1942) – Information Bulletin No. 20

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION SUMMARY covering Anti-Aircraft Actions
(Jul 1942 – Dec 1942) – Information Bulletin No. 22

Refer also to : USSBS Technical Mission to Japan, Volume 2 – Interrogation of Japanese Officials
(Page 204 and following ) Japanese Naval Aircraft Combat Losses: Dec 1941 through Dec 1942 –

822 - Fighters
631 - Torpedo and Dive Bombers
291 - Medium Bombers
295 – Float Planes and Flying Boats
----------------------------------------------
2,039 Total losses over the 13 month period

In the first eight months of the war (Dec 1942 through Jul 1942) 1,033 IJNAF aircraft were listed as combat losses, of which 128 (12.4 percent) were claimed by the USN as shot down by naval AA gunfire. In the following five months (Aug 1942 through Dec 1942) 1,006 IJNAF aircraft were listed as combat losses, of which 276 (27.4 percent) were claimed by the USN as shot down by naval AA gunfire. A total of 388 (19 percent) were claimed by USN naval AA gunfire of all calibers over the entire 13 month period. The other 1,651 IJNAF aircraft losses (81 percent) presumably fell to the fighter defense.

The upsurge in effectiveness of naval AA over the course of 1942 is explained by the following factors. As of Dec 1941, the standard USN AA weapon suite was represented by the .50HMG, the troublesome and still fairly rare 1.1-in/75 quad, the 5in/25 and the new 5in/38. The 20mm Oerlikon was only just reaching the fleet and supplanting the .50HMG in 1942; The 40mm Bofors arrived even later in 1942, steadily replacing the 1.1-in/75 quad over time; new ship construction meant that the mediocre 5in/25 DP of older existing warships steadily lost ground to increasing numbers of modern 5in/38s. The massive improvement of sighting and fire control technology over the course of 1942 was also a very important factor: the Mk14 lead computing gyro gunsight rapidly replaced “eye-shooting” with the 20mm; the Mk51 computing gunsight did likewise with the 40mm and later the 5in/38 for short range engagements.

An important and less well understood technical advance for the heavy AA in 1942 was introduction of the fully stabilized Mk37 + new Computer Mk 1 GFCS + auto-tracking radar + RPC for the 5in/38 mounts. The ground-breaking Mk37 GFCS (gunfire control system) was only just being introduced into the fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. AA FC was at that time still being handled by an array of old and technically obsolete fire control directors – Mk19, Mk28 and the Mk33 (which was about equivalent to the British HACS). In addition, both search and FC radar systems were also only just being fitted to ships in the PTO. Only 20 percent of ships were fitted with the Mk37 at the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942; 30 percent at Midway in June 1942; 40 percent at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942; 55 percent at the Battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942. While 1942 was a year of great and rapid technical advance, it also bears saying that the ships and crews so hastily sent to war after Pearl Harbor spent 1942 on an “On the Job” training course, learning and refining their AA skills.

I’d be interested to see a defense of the “USN AA over-claiming” argument. Perhaps inflated numbers may have been put about in the propagandist newspapers for “the benefit” of the civilians on the home front, but I do not see it in the internal wartime USN documentation that I have read.

B
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 3:49 am
dunmunro wrote: Sat May 08, 2021 4:27 pmThe USN based their AA studies on USN AA kill claims. These claims were inevitably inflated (probably by a factor of 2 to 3) due to multiple claims per aircraft shot down, as aircraft were almost invariably being engaged by multiple ships. The statement for the 5in/38 being effective as an AA weapon is based upon rather flawed data, that doesn't reference IJN records.

See:
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION SUMMARY covering Anti-Aircraft Actions
(Dec 1941 – Jul 1942) – Information Bulletin No. 20

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION SUMMARY covering Anti-Aircraft Actions
(Jul 1942 – Dec 1942) – Information Bulletin No. 22

Refer also to : USSBS Technical Mission to Japan, Volume 2 – Interrogation of Japanese Officials
(Page 204 and following ) Japanese Naval Aircraft Combat Losses: Dec 1941 through Dec 1942 –

822 - Fighters
631 - Torpedo and Dive Bombers
291 - Medium Bombers
295 – Float Planes and Flying Boats
----------------------------------------------
2,039 Total losses over the 13 month period

In the first eight months of the war (Dec 1942 through Jul 1942) 1,033 IJNAF aircraft were listed as combat losses, of which 128 (12.4 percent) were claimed by the USN as shot down by naval AA gunfire. In the following five months (Aug 1942 through Dec 1942) 1,006 IJNAF aircraft were listed as combat losses, of which 276 (27.4 percent) were claimed by the USN as shot down by naval AA gunfire. A total of 388 (19 percent) were claimed by USN naval AA gunfire of all calibers over the entire 13 month period. The other 1,651 IJNAF aircraft losses (81 percent) presumably fell to the fighter defense.

The upsurge in effectiveness of naval AA over the course of 1942 is explained by the following factors. As of Dec 1941, the standard USN AA weapon suite was represented by the .50HMG, the troublesome and still fairly rare 1.1-in/75 quad, the 5in/25 and the new 5in/38. The 20mm Oerlikon was only just reaching the fleet and supplanting the .50HMG in 1942; The 40mm Bofors arrived even later in 1942, steadily replacing the 1.1-in/75 quad over time; new ship construction meant that the mediocre 5in/25 DP of older existing warships steadily lost ground to increasing numbers of modern 5in/38s. The massive improvement of sighting and fire control technology over the course of 1942 was also a very important factor: the Mk14 lead computing gyro gunsight rapidly replaced “eye-shooting” with the 20mm; the Mk51 computing gunsight did likewise with the 40mm and later the 5in/38 for short range engagements.

An important and less well understood technical advance for the heavy AA in 1942 was introduction of the fully stabilized Mk37 + new Computer Mk 1 GFCS + auto-tracking radar + RPC for the 5in/38 mounts. The ground-breaking Mk37 GFCS (gunfire control system) was only just being introduced into the fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. AA FC was at that time still being handled by an array of old and technically obsolete fire control directors – Mk19, Mk28 and the Mk33 (which was about equivalent to the British HACS). In addition, both search and FC radar systems were also only just being fitted to ships in the PTO. Only 20 percent of ships were fitted with the Mk37 at the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942; 30 percent at Midway in June 1942; 40 percent at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942; 55 percent at the Battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942. While 1942 was a year of great and rapid technical advance, it also bears saying that the ships and crews so hastily sent to war after Pearl Harbor spent 1942 on an “On the Job” training course, learning and refining their AA skills.

I’d be interested to see a defense of the “USN AA over-claiming” argument. Perhaps inflated numbers may have been put about in the propagandist newspapers for “the benefit” of the civilians on the home front, but I do not see it in the internal wartime USN documentation that I have read.

B
The USN claimed 127 AA kills at Santa Cruz, this is in addition to USN CAP, Escort and strike aircraft claims, and the AA numbers. alone, are far in excess of the total number of IJN strike sorties at Santa Cruz, not all of which were shot down. Similar USN overclaims were made in almost all naval surface to air battles in 1942.

The USSBS numbers simply don't correlate to USN AA kill claims when the relevant IJNAF records are examined on an action by action basis.

The USN says that MK37 was effective as an AA weapon, but this is not borne out by IJNAF records.
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 3:49 am

An important and less well understood technical advance for the heavy AA in 1942 was introduction of the fully stabilized Mk37 + new Computer Mk 1 GFCS + auto-tracking radar + RPC for the 5in/38 mounts. The ground-breaking Mk37 GFCS (gunfire control system) was only just being introduced into the fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. AA FC was at that time still being handled by an array of old and technically obsolete fire control directors – Mk19, Mk28 and the Mk33 (which was about equivalent to the British HACS). In addition, both search and FC radar systems were also only just being fitted to ships in the PTO. Only 20 percent of ships were fitted with the Mk37 at the Battle of Coral Sea in May 1942; 30 percent at Midway in June 1942; 40 percent at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942; 55 percent at the Battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942. While 1942 was a year of great and rapid technical advance, it also bears saying that the ships and crews so hastily sent to war after Pearl Harbor spent 1942 on an “On the Job” training course, learning and refining their AA skills.

There was nothing ground breaking about Mk37, as the Mk33 had all the same features and Mk37 was not fitted with 'autotracking radar'. The MK4 FD radar was manually tracked.
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Steve Crandell »

So what perceived advantages does the 4.5" gun have over the 5"/38?

What is it about British AA kill claims that makes them more accurate? The British have better eyesight? It isn't likely genetic, since there is a common origin.

Didn't british cruisers with the 5"/38 and Mark 37 combo like it a lot? Did they get infected with US enthusiasm for the system?

One "disadvantage" of USN weapons in comparisons like this is the USN's problems and defects are easy to find out by reading easily accessed documents. Not so much with British weapons.
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by dunmunro »

Steve Crandell wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:07 pm So what perceived advantages does the 4.5" gun have over the 5"/38?

What is it about British AA kill claims that makes them more accurate? The British have better eyesight? It isn't likely genetic, since there is a common origin.

Didn't british cruisers with the 5"/38 and Mark 37 combo like it a lot? Did they get infected with US enthusiasm for the system?

One "disadvantage" of USN weapons in comparisons like this is the USN's problems and defects are easy to find out by reading easily accessed documents. Not so much with British weapons.
The problem here is that we don't have comparable info for the RN guns. What's happening is that people are making assumptions( The USN says something and then there's a search for confirmation) and then trying to prove it after the fact.

One RN AA cruiser had 5In/38 guns and Mk37 (with RN AA radar) but it simply doesn't standout as being more successful than other RN AA cruisers armed with 4in/4.5in/5.25in guns.
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Steve Crandell »

Right, so since we don't have comparable info for the RN guns, you assume they were superior.

A few of things are apparent to me:

If you have an aircraft approaching the TF and every gun in the force is encouraged to fire on it at maximum rate, you are going to expend a lot of ammo to kill one aircraft. That's how the USN operated. Naturally you will have a large expenditure of ammo per kill. That does not mean the weapons were ineffective. If your logistics capability provides you with ammo to do this, why not do it? If nothing else it would tend to increase the morale of the gunners because they are doing something, and increases their proficiency for the same reason. It tends to have a corresponding negative effect on the attackers.

Since the USN standardized on the 5"/38, logistics was less of a problem than for the British, who had to supply ammo for many different types of guns in the same general category. This is not something which shows up in "rounds per kill" figures, but is a real advantage in the conflict overall.

Finally, it should be noted that the Mark 37 was also an excellent surface gunnery system. One director located in an optimum position served both tasks. Was that true for the 4.5", or for the many other calibers the British used for the same purpose?
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by dunmunro »

Steve Crandell wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 7:20 pm 1) Right, so since we don't have comparable info for the RN guns, you assume they were superior.

A few of things are apparent to me:

If you have an aircraft approaching the TF and every gun in the force is encouraged to fire on it at maximum rate, you are going to expend a lot of ammo to kill one aircraft. That's how the USN operated. Naturally you will have a large expenditure of ammo per kill. That does not mean the weapons were ineffective. If your logistics capability provides you with ammo to do this, why not do it? If nothing else it would tend to increase the morale of the gunners because they are doing something, and increases their proficiency for the same reason. It tends to have a corresponding negative effect on the attackers.

Since the USN standardized on the 5"/38, logistics was less of a problem than for the British, who had to supply ammo for many different types of guns in the same general category. This is not something which shows up in "rounds per kill" figures, but is a real advantage in the conflict overall.

2) Finally, it should be noted that the Mark 37 was also an excellent surface gunnery system. One director located in an optimum position served both tasks. Was that true for the 4.5", or for the many other calibers the British used for the same purpose?
1) Where did I state that?

2) 4.5in On cruisers and battleships, yes.
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Byron Angel »

dunmunro wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:46 am There was nothing ground breaking about Mk37, as the Mk33 had all the same features and Mk37 was not fitted with 'autotracking radar'. The MK4 FD radar was manually tracked.
I'm sorry to say, dunmunro, that you have some things rather wrong here.

Design of the Mk37 was undertaken only two years after the introduction of the Mk33 in 1934, due to the Navy's dissatisfaction with the performance of the Mk33. The Mk37 was a completely new approach in configuration. Unlike the Mk33, the Mk37 featured a lightweight director aloft designed ab initio to accommodate a FC radar, while the plotting/FC system was situated in a protected position below decks. The Range Keeper Mk10 of the Mk33 Gun Director was discarded and an entirely new and more capable Computer Mk1 substituted. The technological difference was considered so considerable that the term "Gun Director" was replaced by "Gun Fire Control System" and the term "Range Keeper" replaced by "Computer". The Mk 37 GFCS (Gun Fire Control System) was the first such devices to employ servos in its data transmission system, which enabled computation time required to produce a targeting solution to be materially reduced. In addition, courtesy of the more sophisticated Computer Mk1, the Mk37 was the first such AA fire control system with the ability to compute target movement in all three-dimensions. Neither Mk33 (see Crenshaw and OD1347) nor the British HACS (see Pout, Pugh, Marland and Porteous) could compute/predict target movement in the vertical dimension; both systems employed after the fact "kludges" to account for vertical movement vectors.

The Mk37GFCS weighed 40,000 pounds in comparison to 14,000 lbs for the Mk33 and took up valuable below deck space which the Mk33 did not. Are you are prepared to argue that the USN consciously chose to spend precious time and funding to design and build a 40,000 lb fire control system which took up precious below deck space in order to replace a 14,000 lb gun director that "had all the same features"? I don't think so.

You are correct that the FD4 had no auto-tracking capability. It was the Mk22 late in the war. My apologies to the readership.


B
Byron Angel
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Byron Angel »

Steve Crandell wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:07 pm Didn't british cruisers with the 5"/38 and Mark 37 combo like it a lot? Did they get infected with US enthusiasm for the system?
Yes indeed, Iville Porteous (father of "Flyplane") and Hugh Clausen (then Chief Technical Advisor to DNO) went aboard HMS Delhi to inspect its 5in/38 Mk37GFCS in February 1942. Porteous later wrote - "I went aboard her and was most impressed. For the first time in my experience I was able to examine in detail a completely integrated gunnery system such as I had always hoped would be possible." .....and..... "I wrote a hurried and scrappy report which is of little significance except that it stung Clausen awake (so he says) and brought him back into the arena with a bang in fighting mood."

See also "Progress in Naval Gunnery - 1942" (page 40).

Note also, when the US finally did deliver a limited number of Mk37 GFCS late in the war, what new British ships received them.

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Byron Angel
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by Byron Angel »

dunmunro wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:40 am The USN claimed 127 AA kills at Santa Cruz, this is in addition to USN CAP, Escort and strike aircraft claims, and the AA numbers. alone, are far in excess of the total number of IJN strike sorties at Santa Cruz, not all of which were shot down. Similar USN overclaims were made in almost all naval surface to air battles in 1942.
Please advise where this figure of 127 AA kills has come from in connection with the Battle of Santa Cruz. Admiral Nimitz's official report for The BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ ISLANDs, October 26, 1942 states - "In addition, Commander Task Force reports that air and antiaircraft together destroyed 123 enemy carrier planes."

Further along in the note, the following interesting comment is added - "Antiaircraft fire continues to grow in effectiveness. In this action for the first time AA. fire from carrier forces shot down more planes than did our fighters, This gratifyin advances results from increased experience and training, from improved guns (40-mm and 20-mm) and fire control equipment., and from the greater number of automatic weapons installed."

In closing, I will also offer this thought - In such confused and chaotic actions, EVERYONE over-claims to one degree or another.

- - -

quote=dunmunro post_id=87346 time=1620538821 user_id=276]
The USSBS numbers simply don't correlate to USN AA kill claims when the relevant IJNAF records are examined on an action by action basis.[/quote]

The IJNAF combat loss figures cited in "USSBS Interrogation of Japanese Officials" were supplied by a Commander Fukamizu, IJN - in charge of the First Section of the First Department of the Koku Hombu; it was he who compiled the loss data, not the USSBS.
His accounting shows combat losses of 248 a/c for the month of October 1942 (Battle of Santa Cruz). This was the second highest monthly loss for the entire year of 1942, exceeded only by June 1942 (Battle of Midway).

- - -

quote=dunmunro post_id=87346 time=1620538821 user_id=276]
The USN says that MK37 was effective as an AA weapon, but this is not borne out by IJNAF records.
[/quote]

For the sake of good order, the Mk37 was not an AA weapon; it was a Gun Fire Control System. Be that as it may, it is worthy of note that the 5in/38, despite the fact that a respectable fraction of them were still under the control of the Mk33 even as late as 1945, was considered to have been responsible for approximately 40 percent of all AA kills in the latter part of 1944 leading up to the advent of the Kamikaze campaign. It is also worthy of note that the same US operational analysis that credited the 5in/38 with only ~20 percent of overall AA kills in the Okinawa campaign, also stated that it had in fact been responsible for (IIRC) 39 percent of kamikaze kills (Note: only about one in four Japanese a/c participating in the Kamikaze campaign actually attempted suicide attacks. There is a vast amount of research available on the web on the topic of the Kamikaze campaign and USN defense efforts against it. A good start is the DTIC website; just do a search for "kamikaze".
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Re: British 4.5"/45 (11.4 cm) vs American 5"/38 (12.7 cm) Mark 12

Post by dunmunro »

Byron Angel wrote: Mon May 10, 2021 1:46 am
dunmunro wrote: Sun May 09, 2021 6:40 am The USN claimed 127 AA kills at Santa Cruz, this is in addition to USN CAP, Escort and strike aircraft claims, and the AA numbers. alone, are far in excess of the total number of IJN strike sorties at Santa Cruz, not all of which were shot down. Similar USN overclaims were made in almost all naval surface to air battles in 1942.
Please advise where this figure of 127 AA kills has come from in connection with the Battle of Santa Cruz.
I am at a bit of a loss to understand why you made this statement:
In the first eight months of the war (Dec 1942 through Jul 1942) 1,033 IJNAF aircraft were listed as combat losses, of which 128 (12.4 percent) were claimed by the USN as shot down by naval AA gunfire. In the following five months (Aug 1942 through Dec 1942) 1,006 IJNAF aircraft were listed as combat losses, of which 276 (27.4 percent) were claimed by the USN as shot down by naval AA gunfire. A total of 388 (19 percent) were claimed by USN naval AA gunfire of all calibers over the entire 13 month period. The other 1,651 IJNAF aircraft losses (81 percent) presumably fell to the fighter defense.
when the figure of 127 AA kill claims comes from BuOrd's Bulletin 22 (which covers July-Dec 1942) which you also referenced earlier. Have you actually read it? It seems to me that you are trying to obfuscate rather than clarify things here.
Last edited by dunmunro on Mon May 10, 2021 2:44 am, edited 1 time in total.
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