Re: Matapan
Posted: Thu Jun 20, 2019 11:06 am
Hello everybody,
I have to partially correct the timing of the "long" message (download/file.php?id=3532) and to add some info that I got from my friend F.Mattesini (who has written the most complete book on Matapan in Italy, edited by the USMM, Ufficio Storico Marina Militare).
The "long message" was the repetition (see words: "Ripeto teleavio 05521 del 25 marzo" where "ripeto" means "I repeat") of a written message sent by plane (the word "teleavio") to Rhodes on March 25 and never arrived due to an air accident to the plane.
The CinC Rhodes (Egeomil, Generale Bastico) was asked to acknowledge the arrival of the plane, Bastico however (at 20:00 on March 27) answered to Rome that he had never received the message. Thus, immediately, the message was encoded via Enigma and transmitted via radio to Rhodes (this is the origin of the "long message").
Thus I was in error saying that (due to an approximate classification of the messages from Supermarina in my hands) the "long" message was sent at around 18:00. It was sent just after 20:00, thus when Cunningham was surely at sea.
If, as I think, Ultra messages were never sent via radio to the ships, then, even if the message was decritted quite quickly, in no way it could help Cunningham in his decisions. If, instead it was decritted in a kind of record time and these info were distributed via radio, then it could came to him before the encounter with the Italian cruiser at Gaudo (8AM on March 28), but this is highly unprobable due to its lenght an complexity.
In any case, Mavis Batey is wrong in his interview when she says that Cunningham went to sea with the whole Mediterranean Fleet only after he had known that Vittorio Veneto was at sea: he had decided to sail with the whole battlefleet already based only on the short fatal message ("today is day X-3" download/file.php?id=3529).
In case anyone can confirm whether ULTRA messages were sent only via cable line or also via radio, and in case anyone has the decoded long message text and the time it was sent to Cunningham (I was unable to locate it as well as Mattesini was not aware of it), please let us know, as in any case the info was very important to better understand the tactical decisions of Cunningham on March 28 morning. Of course, after 11 AM on March 28, everything was clear to Cunningham (Vittorio Veneto had engaged the British cruisers) and whether the message was decoded or not makes no difference.
Bye, Alberto
I have to partially correct the timing of the "long" message (download/file.php?id=3532) and to add some info that I got from my friend F.Mattesini (who has written the most complete book on Matapan in Italy, edited by the USMM, Ufficio Storico Marina Militare).
The "long message" was the repetition (see words: "Ripeto teleavio 05521 del 25 marzo" where "ripeto" means "I repeat") of a written message sent by plane (the word "teleavio") to Rhodes on March 25 and never arrived due to an air accident to the plane.
The CinC Rhodes (Egeomil, Generale Bastico) was asked to acknowledge the arrival of the plane, Bastico however (at 20:00 on March 27) answered to Rome that he had never received the message. Thus, immediately, the message was encoded via Enigma and transmitted via radio to Rhodes (this is the origin of the "long message").
Thus I was in error saying that (due to an approximate classification of the messages from Supermarina in my hands) the "long" message was sent at around 18:00. It was sent just after 20:00, thus when Cunningham was surely at sea.
If, as I think, Ultra messages were never sent via radio to the ships, then, even if the message was decritted quite quickly, in no way it could help Cunningham in his decisions. If, instead it was decritted in a kind of record time and these info were distributed via radio, then it could came to him before the encounter with the Italian cruiser at Gaudo (8AM on March 28), but this is highly unprobable due to its lenght an complexity.
In any case, Mavis Batey is wrong in his interview when she says that Cunningham went to sea with the whole Mediterranean Fleet only after he had known that Vittorio Veneto was at sea: he had decided to sail with the whole battlefleet already based only on the short fatal message ("today is day X-3" download/file.php?id=3529).
In case anyone can confirm whether ULTRA messages were sent only via cable line or also via radio, and in case anyone has the decoded long message text and the time it was sent to Cunningham (I was unable to locate it as well as Mattesini was not aware of it), please let us know, as in any case the info was very important to better understand the tactical decisions of Cunningham on March 28 morning. Of course, after 11 AM on March 28, everything was clear to Cunningham (Vittorio Veneto had engaged the British cruisers) and whether the message was decoded or not makes no difference.
Bye, Alberto